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mABSTRACT
The aim of this study Is to trace the development o* nonallgnment as a 
contemporary approach to forel n policy. I define nonalignment as a 
logical policy development among weak non-Western nations and may form 
the basis for a Third World perception of international relations.
For analytical purposes, this study Is divided Into three parts:
(a) Part One, Chapter One Is a discussion of the theories on nonalign­
ment, an explanation of the different forms of nonalignment and a com­
parative study of neutrality.
(b) Part Two Is an historical overview of the development of nonallgn- 
aant In the Afro-Aslan Movement. The further development of nonallgn- 
aent as a policy of consensus Is then examined. An exposition of se­
lected economic issues of the nonaligned nations Is also emphasized.
(e) Part Three consists of an analysis of the p itfa lls  or success of 
nonallgnment as an approach to foreign policy.
Research findings Indicate that the strategy of nonallgnment was 
f irs t expressed by Jawaharl*! Nehru In pre-Independence India. When 
India gained Independence, nonallgnment as an approach to foreign policy 
was re-affirmed and elaborated by Nehru at various Aslan conferences.
In April 1955, at Bandung, the African and Asian states re-affirmed 
their support for peaceful co-exlstance, pledged their support for anti- 
colonial movements and dedicated themselves to promote world peace and 
International cooperation. Bandung led to further consultations among 
African and Aslan leaders and to an awareness that they had common 
problems.
Leaders like l^nru, Nasser, Tito and Nkrumah view the Ideological 
conflict of the East and the West from a different perspective. Their 
attitudes art influenced by their nation's historical experiences.
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They put their nation's Independence, modernization and development, 
their quest for national Identity and cohesion and their search for 
peace above a ll other priorities. Since the West reminds them of 
their past colonial domination, they feel they must not join the West 
against the East.
Nonalignment Is a recent phenomenon distinct from isolationism, 
neutrality and neutralization. Nonallgnmont Is a global phenomenon 
with adherents In Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. The nonalign­
ed nations comprise a majority of states in the United Nations and other 
International organizations. Since each state has one vote In the 
United Nations General Assembly, the nonaligned nations tend to dominate 
I t  by their majority votes. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) Is an example of an economic Institution dominated 
by the policies of tho developing countries.
Since 1961 four major conferences of nonaligned nations have been 
held. These conferences have highlighted the problems of the Third 
World, expressed anti-colonial, anti-Imperial and anti-Western senti­
ments. Seldom have these conferences condemned the Comunist countries 
for their violation of human rights, the rule of law. Interference In 
the Internal affairs of other countries and their aggressive Intent.
The double standards of the nonaligned nations ha& angered even the 
most sympathetic Western observers. Nonalignment as a policy of con­
sensus Is relative, partisan In a passionate way about colonialism neo­
colonialism and the novel North-South problem. Nonalignment has be­
come the poor, weak and non-Western nation's approach to International 
relations.
YPREFACE
The study of ncneHgmaent as a contemporary forj i ,r. policy development 
Is prloerily a study of thi; Third World ai*d t'.iolr ?:ui%:rvu3 gatherings 
In Isle* Africa and Latin Ac^rlu.
For analytical pur,X)Sttt this studv w ill to divided Into three parts« 
Part One will consist of the Theoretical Frarwwork, Fart Two w ill con­
sist of the Historical DevclopiMnt of Nonallynntnt and Part Three w ill 
be an analysis of the failure or success of t!w policy of nonallgrii^nt 
In International rotations.
I begin this study wttl- thy post Second Work War period In V.e con­
viction that most of tl«o In^ortant elemnts of nonallcrnnant have evolved 
since then. I have confined myself to a treatrent of Asia. Africa and 
Latin America because these areas have playeo a dominant role In recent 
years and I t  was there that a great many of the significant developments 
occurred.
Even wttcn restricted thus,, the subject matter Is to vast and so cou­
ple* that I t  must be a rtif ic ia lly  divided both In matter and In form.
I t  w ill be necessary In some chapters to separate the analysis from the 
contents.
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PART ONE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
I begin this study of noneHgnnent as a mtempopary foreign policy 
#iV»lop»nt with the d ifficu lt problem of semantics. International 
relations has been pUqued by the improper use of Its key terms.
The concept of nonalignment and neutrality are at the core of Inter­
national relations, yet, despite their key roles, both of these con­
cepts are shrouded in ambiguity because of the careless use of these 
terns.
I w ill consider f irs t the concept of neutrality and the manner in 
which I t  is commonly treated as synonymous with the vastly different 
concept of nonalignment. Many scholars and statesmen are prone to
Indiscriminately Integrate and use Interchangeably the two concepts.
Why this confusion in terminology has been perpetuated 1s d ifficu lt 
to explain, for authorities are certainly well aware of the distinc­
tions between neutrality and nonallgment.
I w ill emphasise that the confusion wrought by the misuse of these 
terra has complicated the study of many aspects of international rela­
tions, but Is has especially Impeded the understanding of nonalffmant, 
I w ill maintain that nonallgment is a logical policy development among 
weak non-Western nations and may form the basis for a Third World per­
ception of International relations.
v ill
PART TWO
THE HISTORICAL PEVE'.OPNENT OF NONALIGNMENT
In Chapter 2* I propose to survey the general and historical trend of 
Interest In nonalignment and the Afro-Aslan hovemunt. In order to 
accomplish this I w ill have to be selective. I w ill review the general 
direction of Aslan thought on the subject, I w ill examine the main ele­
ments of Jawaharlal Nehru's contribution and then proceed to deal with 
the most Important stages of the Afro-Aslan movement* I w ill comment 
on the significance of the Bandung Conference and analyse the achieve­
ments of the various Afro-Aslan Conferences.
At Bandung, Jawaharlal Nehru tried to dispel doubts and Impress that 
nonalignment was not neutrality. Bandung was not a gathering of "yes 
men". The new leaders were representatives of Independent nations.
They could not and would not remain neutral when freedom was threatened 
am, justice was denied In many areas of the world. These new leaders 
wished to establish their Independence beyond question; to keep their 
states together; to reduce poverty. Illiteracy and disease and other 
post-colonial burdens within their countries; to make their weak coun­
tries safe from aggression; and fina lly , to show the East and the West 
that the new states desired peace and friendship with a ll nations.
In Chapter 3, I w ill critica lly  examine the origin and development 
of nonalignment as a policy of consensus. While the United States was 
creating new alliances and "containing" Communism; India and other 
states were promoting peace through friendship and cooperation. Nehru 
sincerely believed In peace and thought other Asian leaders also had 
faith In peace and peaceful co-existence.
At various meetings of developing countries and at the United Nations
1x
Nehru, Tito, Nkrumah and Nasser promoted nonalignment as an alterna­
tive approach to International relations. The f irs t meeting of the 
nonaligned nations was held In 1961 In Belgrade, Yugoslavia -  a Cornu- 
nlst country. A total of twenty-eight (28) nations took part, three
(3) of them as observers.
The Cairo Conference of Developing Countries of 1962 was attended 
by thirty-six countries, five of them as observers. Pakistan was the 
only aligned country attending the conference. The nonaligned nations 
as developing nations agreed to act In concert on economic matters and 
to promote trade, aid and mutual cooperation among nonaligned and deve­
loping countries. This economic conference was an Important political 
event.
At Cairo In 1964 more than fifty -fiv e  (63) nations gathered and the 
participants condemned the West but not the East. At Lusaka In 1970 
fifty -fiv e  (55) nations agreed that trade anl vhvolopment were urgent 
problems. The nonallgned nations, Instead of condemning terrorism and 
hijacking, urged greater support for the terrorists. At Algiers In 
1973, seventy-six (76) nations gathered to condemn Israel and other 
Western nations. Many resolutions were passed but l i t t le  has so far 
been accomplished. At the Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in 
Lima, Peru In the firs t week of September, 1975 the eighty-one (81) 
nations concentrated on the economic problems of the developing coun­
tries and admitted Nort: area and North Vietnam as fu ll members of 
the nonallgned conference. The delegates refused to comment when their 
host, Juan Velasco Alvarado of Peru, was overthrown In a bloodless 
coup; because I t  was an Internal matter of Peru.
The developing countries hope to pressurise the developed countries 
through organizations like the United Nations Conference on Trade end 
Development)(UNCTAD) to alleviate the plight of the poor nations. The
XpHmc purpose of this chapter Is to discuss and analyse these organi­
zations and an attempt w ill be made to Illustrate how trade and deve­
lopment will be of critical Importance over th<? noxt few decades.
-/t.
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PART THREE 
ANALYSIS
In Chapter 5, I w ill attempt to recapitulate and critica lly  examine non- 
alignment as a contemporary foreign policy development. I t  w ill con­
sist o f an analysis of the reasons for the success or failure of nonallp 
merit as a policy of consensus. This analysis w ill consist of a compa­
rison of neutrality and nonalignment and the nature of the multipolar 
and bipolar world. An attempt will also be made to predict the possible 
future and collective role of the nonaligned nations In International 
relations.
x l l
INTRODUCTION
WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?
International relations U  one of the new fields of specialization to 
develop In the social sciences, and Its progr especially during 
the post Second World War years, has been phenorcnal. Noman Hill 
emphasizes that what we call International relations Ms In fact a 
complex of the foreign policies pursued by the nations of the world 
coMsunlty, I t  Is the action and Interaction of the policies of a hund­
red and more statesO
I t  Is essential to emphasize that a ll groups are unavoidable and 
omnipresent. Quincy Wright defines International relations as 'the 
relations between groups of major Importance in the l ife  of the world 
at any period of history. In particular those of te rrito ria lly  organiz­
ed nation-states.12
Broadly conceived then. International relations Includes a ll types 
of transactions between governments and between peoples, from, the send­
ing of letters to a recipient In another country to the exchange of 
gunfire between the anted forces of two countries. Foreign policy can 
be defined as the activities of a nation arising from Its dealings with 
other nations, fulskl maintains *A policy Is an external action under­
taken to achieve a particular objective. Foreign policy Is the total 
of a ll those actions, all of them aiming i t  * general objective, I .e .  
the desirable International situation.*3
1. Norman H ill. International Politics. (New Yorks Harper and Row,
1963), pm .TFT*---------------------------
2. Quincy Wright, The Study of International. Relation*. («•» Vorkl
Appleton Century-Croris, TJob), pTTJ
3. W.W. Kul.M , 1 n t.rt.tlonal PolUHci In
York! J. bTTTppfncoffTo. ,  19C4T, pp.37-38
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For Karl W. Deutseh: ‘ tha study of International relation* In our
tine la .........  the art and science of the survival of mankind. I f
civilization is killed within the next thirty years, I t  w ill not be 
killed by famine or plague, but by foreign policy and International re­
lations*,*
The concept "diplomacy* Is often used as the equivalent of foreign 
policy, although this usage Is not widely accepted. Herman H ill empha­
sizes I
‘Actually, foreign policy Is the content or substance of a nation's 
effort to promote Its  Interests vis-a-vis other nations, whereas 
diplomacy Is the vehicle by which policy Is transported abroad and 
made effective; foreign policy Is by nature substantive, whereas 
diplomacy Is procedural. Popularly the word diplomacy Is often 
applied, outside the realm of government, to the capacity which a 
person may have of Influencing others sk ilfu lly , perhaps even mali­
ciously, at Its  worst in this connection. I t  Is according to Sir 
Harold N1colson, "the more guileful aspects of tac t*.*5
Hans J. Morgenthau maintains that International relations have under- 
gene four drastic changes In recent times. F irstly, 'the formerly se­
parate systems of International relations have merged Into one world­
wide system*, Secondly, 'the predominance of the European system has
disappeared*. Before 1914, the International system was essentially
Europe-based containing several great powers. The great powers were 
those countries which were parties to a general settlement of interna­
tional relations, small powers not only had no claim to such participa­
tion, but more often great powers, were the object of revisions In the 
International status quo. Thirdly, 'the possibility and actuality of 
total war dominate tlie International scene,'. Since the Second World 
ear, there has ueen Intense diplomatic hostility and tension between the
4, Karl W. Deutseh, The Analysis of International Relations 
(C n j l .3)! ..-^ r -T T n r ."717
"). Noniav l l l l , im t l 'M a l "'ill tic . C1, ' vor<; "ar,1 r .v, I Row,
19C3 ) ,  p . 22
*1v
Soviet Union and the United States. After the Second World War the 
Soviet Union occupied Eastern Europe and brouoht I t  under Its  control.
The Soviet Union forbade the Eastern European countries under Its  domi­
nation to participate In the Marshall Plan - an American programme to 
rebuild the war-ravaged economies of all willing European countries.
Thus, a clear line was drawn between the East and the West in Europe.
Later In 1947 the final traces of non-Communlst organizations were wiped 
out In a ll the Soviet-dominated East European countries exceot 
Czechoslovakia. In 1948 a Communist coup removed the coalition govern­
ment of Czechoslovakia and made I t  subservient to the Soviet Union.
The United States and the Western European democracies, determined to 
prevent a Communist seizure of Western Europe, responded In 1949 with 
the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, 
the Western European countries became partners of the United States In 
Its  policy of containment of the Communist expansion and Communist te rr i­
torial expansion In Europe came to a halt.
Finally, ‘ the feasibility of universal destruction with nuclear 
weapons has radically altered the function of 'orce as a means to the 
ends of foreign policy. The f irs t  three changes do not effect the dyna­
mics and structure of International rela*.ons, but the last change consti­
tutes a variable revolution, the only om? In recorded history In the 
structure of International rela •ois.*6
2. WHAT IS THE "NONALIGNMENT"?
Since I Intend to confine myself to the study of nonallgnment as a con­
temporary foreign policy development, I t  Is essential that I give a defi­
nition of what I mean by the concept nonallgnment. Nonallgnment Is a
6, Hans J. Morgenthau, "International Relations" in Stephen K. Bailey 
fed.), American Politics and Government. (Washington D.C.i 
U.S. Information Agency, Idcd), pp.%51-252
AV
logical policy development among weak non-Nestem nations and may form 
the basis for a Third World perception of International relations.
When India became Independent in 1947, I t  decided to carry the demand 
for decolonization throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. By the 
mid fiftie s  (1950‘ s), I t  was clear that many colonies would become inde­
pendent and an Important bond and group consciousness began to develop 
between peoples of the world with experience under colonialism. The 
newly Independent nations began to regard themselves as a group and con­
sciously Identified themselves with each other through regular Interac­
tion at meetings and conferences.
The newly Independent group of nations had many common characteristics; 
they were weak, non-Westem, non-White, newly Independent, m ilitarily  
impotent, and economically and politically underdeveloped.
In view of their weakness these new nations fe lt  that they could not 
Join the East or the West without running the risk of becoming "colonies* 
again of the West or "satellites" of the East. They shared a mutual 
distrust of the West as non-Westem and non-White nations. They Identi­
fied colonialism with the West and thus In their anti-colonial campaigns 
they condemned the West. As newly Independent nations they cherished 
their Independence and wished to assert their Independence at home and 
abroad. m ilita rily  Impotent nations they realized that peace and the 
promotion of peaceful co-existence through the United Nations was their 
best safeguard against aggression. As economically and politically un­
derdeveloped nations they needed much foreign aid with no strings attach­
ed from the East and the West.
There Is net a general category of nonaligned states, for each coun­
try must In foreign policy, reflect the realities of Its  particular 
history. Its geography and Its position of power. The tendency to think 
In general terms about nonalignment has led both the critics and the ex-
xvt
ponents back to comnlle their separate categories of the vices and vir­
tues of the nona!toned states, and thus each side has been able to pre­
sent highly biased and exaggerated judgements.
Since nonalignment has no legal framework and there are no legal 
rights and obligations, the new nations fe lt  safe In dectarlno their 
support for nonalignment as an annroach to foreinn policy. The nations 
can pursue nonalignment In their own Interests and nonalignment may 
change with changes of government in a country. The outstanding charac­
teristic  of nonalignment Is Its fle x ib ility  and each nation can evolve 
Its  own brand of nonalignment.
Jawaharlal Nehru regarded nonalignment as the attempt by India to 
pursue an Independent foreign policy by avoiding permanent political, 
military or diplomatic affilia tion  with either tie East or the West In 
the Cold War. He emphasized that the essence of nonallgnnxmt Is Inde­
pendent judgement -  judging each Issue on Its merit. I t  Is a flexible 
approach which cuts accross the rigidities of alignments. India did not 
wish to surrender Its  options to a group dominated by a super power. 
Nehru’ s philosophy of nonalignment and of peaceful co-existence was bom 
out of the Indian tradition of peace and peaceful change as expressed In 
the teachings of the Buddha and Gandhi. Nehru fe lt that the consequences 
of the rivalry between the two power blocs could tw dangerous and destruc­
tive and that blocs were not necessary. India did not favour one bloc 
over the other; I t  tried to Judge Issues In accordance with Its  policy 
objectives.
But the United States turned to Pakistan as the centre of American 
interest In South Asia. The American policy-makers assumed that Pakistan 
would be responsive to their needs and its Islamic connections could be 
advantageous. The Moslem Middle East from Turkey to Pakistan was vital 
for the security of the Western alliance and thus, the Truman Doctrine
m il
was extended to Iran In 1947 and later to Pakistan. India was dubbed 
pro-Soviet Union and nonallipnent was branded as "Immoral" by John 
Foster Dulles.
Indeed, the United States failed to take note of India's policies - 
that the Indian government had taken firm action against Communist In­
surgency In India 1n 1943; that In it ia lly  the Soviet Union's attitude 
to India was not very friendly; that Stalin branded Nebru an "Imperia­
l is t  stooge"; or that i f  India was nonaligned, she was by definition 
not In the Soviet camp; and that India was also a member of the Common­
wealth.
The Soviet Union's attitude to Yugoslavia was similar to the American 
attitude to India. Both the East and the West believed that those 
countries not with them were against them. Since Yugoslavia had not 
fought on Hitler's side, but had been occupied by the Germans, I t  was In 
a different position from that of Eastern Europe and the Balkan states. 
The Yugoslav partisans, led by Joslp Broz Tito, had captured and libera­
ted Belgrade from German control and not the Soviet Union. When the 
Communists led by Tito came Into power In Yugoslavia, they nationalized 
•11 Industries, outlawed all opposition and condemned attempts made by 
Stalin to overthrow the Tito regime by overt and covert means.
Tito declared that Yugoslavia would pursue an Independent foreign 
policy In Its  own Interests and would not be aligned to the East or the 
West. Yugoslavia would pursue a policy of peace and develop peaceful 
relations with all states. When Tito condemned Interference In the In­
ternal affairs of otbor states, he was referring to Soviet occupation of 
Eastern Europe. Tito feared the Soviet Union more than the West. Ti*r, 
survived because he was a genuine national leader, unlike other cr 
leaders who had spent more time 1m the Soviet Union than In their 
countries. Yugoslavia had no common frontier with the Soviet Union and
KVlll
Tito teeeptod Western aid. This promoted Yugoslavia's relations with 
Its  non-Comnunlst neighbours. Yugoslavia shattered the myth that a 
eommlst government, not subservient to the Soviet Union, was a contra­
diction In terms of International relations. Yugoslavia's "secession" 
led to a series of attempts by other Eastern European countries, like  
East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to break away from Soviet con­
tro l. The Soviet Union brutally crushed these uprisings and the world 
accepted Eastern Europe as part of the Soviet sphere of Influence. 
Yugoslavia became the f irs t  European nation to declare Its e lf nonaligned 
and part of the Afro-Aslan group of nations/
S. CONCLUSION
The global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union clearly 
played a major part In determining the pattern of the post Second World 
War world. I t  Is the aim of this study to show that these two nations 
failed in their attempts to align the countries of the Third World Into 
their conflict. Communism and democracy were not the only forces shap­
ing the post-war world, nor was alignment with the East or the West the 
#1y alternative for the weak non-Westem nations. Nonalignment and 
nationalism were evolving in the Third World. This study w ill trace 
the evolution of nonalignment as a contemporary foreign policy development 
and Its  significance In International relations.
7. Stepnan Clssold (ed.), A Snort history of Yugoslavia. (Cam-irldnei 
Cambridge UniversityTres$717GF)"^----------------------
For Yugoslavia's role In nonaligned affairs suet
Alvin Z. kublnsteln, Yugoslavia and the nonaligned world, (Princeton 
n.J.I Princeton UhTwrsVty Tress, 1 '>!)
PART m t  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL THEORIES ON NOftALIfittiEHT
I,  THE PLACE OF NONALIG.WEUT IN CQiTFMPORARY j.fTEPNATIOfiAL RELATIONS
A. THL STUDY UF NONALtGHMENT 
Since the Second World War, the literature of nonallgnnent has swollen 
enomoLsly in both the A fro-Asian States and in the West; in Britain 
and the United States, is well as other countries.
Serious study of the subject has been widely and vlnorously extended, 
with the result that in almost every aspect there has grown a numerous
and comprehensive bibliography.
The Wes tom contributions far outweigh all others, even a ll others 
comined; this Is an easy situation to explain. In so far as the United 
States and Britain have so many long established schools and University 
Departments where studies of the developing countries figure as major 
Items, and thus there exists substantial numbers of teaching and research 
staffs devoted to these countries. The resulting literature is too 
considerable and extensive to permit any sort of survey in short compass 
as can be seen from the bibliography.
The development of nonalignment as a contemporary foreign policy of 
India can be traced through the struggle for Indian Independence. Nehru*s 
sympathy with other struggling nationalities found expression In Pan-Aslan 
Ideas and the promotion of International peace and harmony among nations, 
India under Nehru was bound to be nonallgned I f  only because of the 
opinion In the country was too divided for the country to take sides In 
the Cold War, Nonalignment was the answer and by I t  Nehru gradually 
achieved until the end of his l ife ,  the rank of world statesman for him­
self, and for India, that of a country whose opinion counted even though 
not backed by great military strength.
2From a handful of newly Independent Aslan States, led by India, 
by the end of the 1960‘s the nonaligned community had grown to encompass 
nearly half of the Independent countries of the world. Indeed, the 
sheer number of nations subscribing to the philosophy of nonalignment 
Imparts Importance to the movement. The nonaligned movement was res­
ponsible for shattering the bipolarized pattern of global power and for 
Granting a multi-polar system,
B. THE PROBLEM OF NONALIGNED TYPOLOGIES 
The fundamental characteristic of the nonaligned movement Is its  Ideolo­
gical and semantic diversity. Concepts like "neutralist", "neutral*, 
"nonaligmed", "non-ldenttfled" and "non-engaged* are common to the move­
ment.
The advocates of the nonaligned movement are themselves not clear 
and certain about the meaning of the concepts they use and about the 
elements in their diplomatic philosophy.
I t  seems that a ll varieties of nonalignment are not the same In 
recent years, I*  ' *« cutloo1, and behaviour In regional and international 
affairs, for differs from that of Ceylon. Erypt and Tunisia,
both Arab adherents of nonalignment, take very different positions on 
the many Issues confronting the Arab world.
The political processes, ideologies and Institutional patterns of 
w-ese nonaligned countries are s t i l l  In a formative stage ana thus ere 
fluid end changeable. The foreign pcli<iss of the nonaligned nations
are multidimensional. Nonalignment 1: nrt a foreign policy. I t  is a
way of approaching foreign policy In a multi-polar world.
Why do nations choose to undertake or shun external commitmentst 
There is l i t t le  agreement among political scientists. Many place 
emphasis on the external environment, stressing such factors as the 
structure of the international system or the level of conflict and threat
3wnocg Its  member nations. Others are more Inclined to look also at 
the attributes of the nation, some types of nation* are regarded as 
"alliance prone", whereas others are seen as more likely to remain free
from military ties. I.e . nonaligned.
w;iy do nations elect to join a particular coalition In preference to 
others? One position Is that nations with Important characteristics In 
coanon are more likely to ;ifgn than dissimilar nations. A different 
view Is held by a substantial group of theorists who regard nonalignment 
as the pragmatic expression of transient, albeit urgent* interests, 
rather than as the international manifestation of sentimental ties arising 
from cosmon ethnic* cultural, historical, ideological or other attributes.
the lack of an accepted definition of nonalignment is perhaps the 
f irs t Indication that the literature on nonalignment is characterized by 
a marked absence of agreement on many Issues. Some authors use the terms 
"neutralism", "non-alliance" end "positive neutrality* interchangeably, 
whereas others distinguish among them on various criteria , Nor is there 
agreement on classifying types of nonalignment. But the differences are 
not merely semantic, as authors d iffer in their fundamental conception of 
nonalignment.
C. THEORY Of HONALIGNMENT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
Nonalignment originated In India, says D.N, Maim who quotes a speech 
made by Nehru on September 7, 1946. Nehru Mlled on India's nonalignment 
to prevent Ind.jn self-resoect, national Integrity, sovereignty and free­
dom from foreign domination. India was to pursue a policy of "Hve-and- 
le t-liv e *.
After 1ndependet.ee, the national leaders dedicated themselves to 
achieving goals that they considered vital for their developing societies. 
Self-government and independence was supposed to open great possibilities 
for economic and social development. But with Independence came the
4f irs t period of disillusionment; the f irs t period of dependence on 
extern*! aid for Internal development, the f irs t encounter with Cold 
War rivalries and great power Intrigues,
The new nations believed In peaceful co-existence because only 
through peace Is progress and stability possible. The Cold War does 
not promote stability , the arms race creates International Insecurity, 
International Insecurity arises, and Interventions by great powers pro­
mote tension. Thus, the national Interests of all nations should be 
peace and the safeguarding of peace through the United Nations.
For Ernest W, Lefever the policy of nonalignment Is the policy of 
enlightened self-interest. According to Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah, 
nonalfgnment yields six Interrelated benefits to the m ilita rily  uncommit­
ted nationsi
• I .  Nonalignment Insures political freedom and Independence and 
contributes to the national self-respect and moral Integrity.
2. In contrast to alliance membership, which serves as a restraint, 
nonalignment permits freedom of expression and action.
3. Nonalignment keeps a small nation from getting involved in 
large conflicts of no concern to i t .
4. Alignment would make local problems more d ifficu lt to solve. 
Nehru, In particular, is convinced that almost any problem can 
be solved i f  I t  is not permitted to become a part of the Cold 
War,
5. Alliances Involve military obligations that divert scarce re­
sources from the urgent necessities of economic development.
6. Nonaligned nations are in a position to accept and indeed to 
bid for economic aid from both sides In the Cold War.'I
Among the most widely known theories of nonalignment are those derived 
from balance of power theories, in which the emphasis is almost exclu­
sively on the International svrtem. The motives for nonalignment and
1* Nehru, Nasser, and Hkrurah on Neutralism, In Laurence W. Martin, 
Ed., Neutralism and Nonallgnment! The New States in World 
A ffa l7 s rfN m n o r% ":' m Z )T 13T!)T:--------------------
5for the particular coalition of Third World states derive largely from 
the structure, distribution of power, and the state of the international 
system. Nations join forces to aggregate sufficient capabilities to 
achieve certain foreign policy goals. The following opinions are a 
representative example:
Rothsteln maintains that a policy of nonalignment can only be success­
ful in a particular type of bipolar power configuration.2
Dinerstein maintains that in a balance of power system, only nations 
with no territoria l ambitions or against whom others did not have te rri­
torial claims, can remain unaligned.3
Hans J, Morgenthau maintainsi
*Were the United States not committed to containing the Communist 
bloc, neutralism could not exist as a policy and would at best 
survive as an Impotent desire and a vain hope. For neutralism In 
the cold war, like neutrality In a shooting war, depends upon the 
balance of power. I t  Is a luxury which certain nations can afford 
because.the power of one antagonist cancels out the power of the 
other.'*
For Ernest W. Lefever, nonalignment is primarily a response to the 
Cold War, and only partly a product of rising nationalism. Since i t  
takes three to make a neutral, Afro-Asian neutralism Is a function of 
bipolarity.5
Some authors emphasize one or more national attributes, other than 
power and capabilities, as important considerations in nonaligned poli­
cies, Several theorists have emphasized the Importance of historical 
experience.
2, Robert C. Rothsteln, "Alignment, Non-Alignment and Small Powers
1946-1965", International Organization. Vol. 20, 1966, p.398
3. Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems",
American Political Science Review, Vol. 59, 1965, p,592-3
4, Hans J, Morgenthau, "Critical Look at the New Neutralism",in
Crisis and Continuity in World Politics, ed, -,rga A. Lanyl 
and Wilson C, McWilliams, (New York! Praeoer, 1972), p.61%
5. Ernest W. Lefever, Ib id ., p.116
6Rothsteln maintains that new states tend to pursue a policy of 
avoiding alliances,6
In the contemporary International system, virtually all states which 
have achieved Independence since the- Second World War, have chosen poli­
cies of nonalignment; although not necessarily neutrality* with respect 
to Cold War conflicts.
In American history there are further examples. For a century and 
a half after gaining Independence from Great Britain, the warnings of 
Presidents Washington and Jefferson against so-called "entangling alliances" 
represented the core of conventional wisdom on matters of foreign policy. 
Ironically, John Foster Dulles failed to appreciate that the often moral­
istic  rhetoric of nonaligned statesmen which he found offensive was also 
Important for reasons of domestlu politics In India and elsewhere, as a 
symbolic expression of national Independence by ex-colonial nations.
Many theorists argue that nonalignment tends to have significant 
consequences for domestic politics, not a ll of which are beneficial.
Robert C. Good says that leaders of newly Independent nations w ill use 
a policy of nonalignment to maintain power at home.?
George Llska agrees that, nonalignment and neutralism are policies 
that arise from domestic concerns especially economic needs and Interests.8
George Llska says elsewhere that the greater the Internal d ifficu l­
ties within a nonaligned state, the greater the temptation to go beyond 
nonalignment to militant neutralism.9
6. Robert C. Rothsteln. Ib id ., p.403
7. Robert C. Good, "State Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy
In the New States", 1n Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New
States In World Affairs, ed, Laurence"WVPanin {New York: 
F .ir P ’raeger, W Z j."  pZS
8. George Llska, Nations In Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence
(Baltimore H31 Johns Hooklns Press, p.217
9. Ibid., p.214
?To say, for example, that India conducts Its foreign policy on the 
basis of national Interests Is In Its e lf to say nothing very clear and 
certainly to say something too simple, unless the precise content of the 
Interests are specified. There Is no reason. In logic or experience to 
believe that one factor w ill be consistently self-evident or w ill always 
be paramount - India, or for any other country's foreign policy, assertive 
simplifications take on clear meaning, i f  at a ll,  only in context.
National Interest, like nonalignment, has proved to be a loose and adapt­
able garment for Third World foreign-policy-makers.
One conclusion that emerges from this survey is that the literature 
on nonalignment Is marked by different explanations, none of which appears 
sufficient for a general theory.
This Is not to say that a ll areas of nonalignment theory are equally 
marked by disagreement. We appear to know more about the "unity* of the 
nonaligned nations, for instance, than about the International consequences 
of nonalignment. Nor Is the lack of complete agreement among writers 
necessarily a sign of theoretical chaos. The existence of the "Flat 
Earth Society* does not lead us to conclude that the disciplines of 
astronomy and geography are Inadequate, Yet even where contradictions 
about nonalignment are most apparent. I t  Is not easy to Identify explana­
tions that are the equivalent of the fla t earth theoryi thus even a 
generous appraiser must conclude that the literature on nona14",nment taken 
as a whole fa lls  short of being satisfactory.
Given the extensive Increase In adherents to nonalignment since the 
Second world War, why snould this state of affairs exist? Certainly I t  
cannot be attributed to an absence of interest. The number of books, 
monographs, essays and articles on the subject Is enormous, especially I f  
we Include those that deal with one specific nation's nonalignment. I t  
becomes even larger I f  we add general texts on International politics and 
foreign policy, virtually a ll of which Include some discussion of the Third
8World. The problem, then, is not the lick of attention.
The obvious d ifficulty presented by the large number of nonaligned 
nations needs to be acknowledged but i t  is not a wholly satisfactory 
explanation for t.e  state of the literature on nonalionaent, A compa­
rative study of only a few nonaligned nations can yield some theoretical 
returns i f  I t  is designed with this aim in mind. Indeed study of a 
single case need not be barren of general implications. A critical 
examination of the literature on nonalignment reveals a distinct shortage 
of research that is designed to shed light on central issues of nonalign­
ment theory and Is also documented with data derived by explicit and 
systematic method. Instead a vast majority of the studies fa ll Into one
of two categories. In the f irs t we find essays of a general nature,
usually sustaining a broa<fl>ased theory of nonalignment with selected 
historical examples. The most Incisive of these are indlspensible read­
ing for any serious student of nonallgnmant, but the unscientific nature 
of the supporting evidence usually renders I t  d ifficu lt to assess either 
the proposed theory, or its  strength relative to competing explanations 
of the same events. On the other hand there are large nvmbers of studies 
that te ll us a great deal about nation's nonalignment, but usually with a 
degree of specificity that underscores the unique aspects of that nation's 
nonellgnment. Thus, they make a limited contribution to a more general 
understanding of nonalfgnawnt.
D. THE LACK OF UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED GENERAL THEORY IN THE STUDY OF 
NONALIGNMENT
The concept of nonalignment Is of recent origin and has given rise to 
many problems and much confusion. Nonallgnmant means different things to 
different people. The ambiguity of the roles of nonaligned nations has 
generated lively debates in the study of international relations. This 
controversy continues.
9I t  is not possible. In this study, to present a comprehensive listing  
of definitions of nonallgrwent. Rather a sample of definitions represent* 
Ing the various approaches to conceptualization w ill be given. These 
approaches are not necessarily unique. On the contrary, there Is much 
overlapping and I t  Is evident that different people are simply looking at 
different aspects of the phenomenon.
Numerous leaders have put forward definitions of nonalignment, but 
oddly enough hardly any have adopted the customary practice of the scienti­
fic  world, of starting from what predecessors have written or laid down,
Thr Inevitable consequence Is a multiplicity of definitions scattered 
through the literature of nonalignment and the absence of any measure of 
agreement as to the real content of the subject.
Confusion In the minds of the leaders has obviously resulted and may 
have contributed to the Impatience with which so many leading policy­
makers, both In the East and the West, regard the proclamations, writings 
and declarations of their contemporaries In the nonaligned world. More­
over, confusion Is even worse compounded by disagreements over terminology, 
Nazll Choucrl agrees that o certain ambiguity surrounds the position 
of Afro-Aslan states In International n ll t lc s .  The terms "neutralism" 
and "nonalignment" have been used most frequently to describe their 
orientation.
This study w ill therefore outline some of the popular terms and defi­
nitions In this subject, end justify the term "nonalignment" which Is used 
In this study.
I t  Is d ifficu lt to compile a l is t  of nonellqned nations that will 
command universal acceptance. The only European nation considered non- 
aligned by the Afro-Aslan states Is Yugoslavia. Israel's policy of non- 
identification Is In most respects equivalent to nonaltgnment; yet Israel 
is not accepted as a nonaligned nation by hostile Arab states. Similarly,
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Xalayai* rvyar*.* tu t  I f  •»* iioiittl tijr.ev., ye, I  1i .'i>v wvr.st tiered to ’*.»c uon- 
tltywud uy kiuat mfru-Aaiau stotes, and etru iu iy  1.. recent years not Ly 
Its »i«tci*>r*ourt Ifntoncsta* Cut;«*, vn L-t ot.icr lur.d, participated In a ll 
ti.a noiiali^iiaU cui.rtifvii.cei.
<vt t*iv: i'V*#1fii)5 Ti‘j  o f  t i l *  liO l'tS l i Ofldu iiiUV«P K i l t  «fi t  tV p v S t  jC C O Ik ! « iorlC :
C«r .»cers. Us vHui.vi-ts and s * .v  of Its lutowdn. friends predicted tnat, 
like so ,:any vtner policy trends In liiUrnationfll relations, nonallgrwirnt 
was destined to te Suort-lived. They wen. poor fronnots. The falsity  
of tnolr prognosis can to seen In U.o fact tnat tf** political termino­
logy of tiic Movetmnt can i>c found in standard dictionaries o* contempor­
ary politics. Uortis l ike  neutralise;, I'oaccful co-existence, non alllanca, 
nonallgvjet.t, neo-colonial i s , a nd  uncoil ttr-1, W'ich Its  exponents intro­
duced as Afro*Asian cdi<cc.>ts, .•»*vo Lcun ado, tad a id ar» ascd to give n-*# 
ir*an1nys, raw values to our ,.r.wlvc;,u of Afro-/si an nations and Interna­
tional relation*,
L. "NEUTRALITY* - "N0NALl%4KChT*
The historic policy of Isolationism followed ’>y ti o United States of 
America towards Europa until the Second world tar, stewed from the con­
viction tnat the Anerlcar. society and American way of l ife  were Intrinsic­
ally different frcr Europe. The United States, as a new young nation, 
had embarked on a new course and was experimenting with novel concents of 
government and political tolerance, democracy, '-rosrarity and neacn for her 
people*. Isolationist as a natural outgrowth of America's predominant 
concern with her iowstlc affairs, for example, nitlonal unity, Indian 
uprisings, and torier Incidents. The Isolationist of the 'nlted States 
then neentl noii-1rvo1vtr.<ot In 'urore&r r i l l  tar, alliances; neutrality 
In purely European wsr-i and conflicts; non-intan lament In the political 
quarrels of Lure:' , tv: • >i1ntonarce of re;*ton»hiv sound an.' cordial rela­
tions with i l l  European rations; and Insist* 'Cf that Eurorsan nations
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refrain from projecting and Injecting their ambitions and rivalries into 
the Western Hemisphere. Anerlcan Intervention in the First and Second 
World Wars ended the traditional policy of Isolationism, led the nation 
Into numerous entangling alliances, and led the nation Into the quagmire 
of Indo-Chlna.
Neutrality Is a tenn of International Law referring to the rules that 
states are obliged to follow during a legal state of war In which they are 
not belligerents. Their neutral status Implies strict Impartiality and 
abstention from any assistance to either belligerent and the enjoyment of 
rights of maritime trade with all belligerents subject to certain hazards 
and provisions.
The term neutrality has been variously defined by different writers, 
though all the definitions emphasize the same central point. According 
to Starke:
'Neutrality denotes the attitude of a State which Is not at war with 
belligerents, and does not participate in hostilities. In its  techni­
cal sense, however. I t  Is more than an attitude and denotes a legal 
status of a special nature, involving a complex of rights, duties and 
privileges at International Law which must be respected by belligerents 
and neutrals a like .'*0
According to L. Gppenhelm:
'Neutrality may be defined as the attitude of imparlality adopted by 
third states towards belligerents and recognised by belligerents, such 
attitudes creating rights and duties between the Impartial States and 
the belligerents. 11
The adoption of the attitude of Impartiality by any State towards 
belligerents fa ll outside the scope of International Law, i t  comes within 
the field of International politics.
According to P itt Cobbet: 'Those States which on the outbreak of war
remain at peace with the countries at war art described as neutrals'll
10. F.G. Starke, An Introduction to International Law. (London:
b u t t e r v o r t i r s r i W r r ^ T l ------------------------------------
11. L. Oppenhelm, (ed.) L. Lyuterpacht, International Law. (New
York: Logmans Green), Vol. I I ,  p.oW '
12. Pitt Cobbet, leading Cases of  International Law. (London:
Butterworths), Vol. I I ,  p .339
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According to George Schwarzenberger:
•The essence of neutrality 1, that States not Involved In war take 
an attitude of Impartial abstention towards belligerents and. In 
their turn, the la tter respect the territoria l Integrity of neutral 
states,*<3
Neutrality Is a concept of limited applicability. I t  seems poten­
t ia lly  attractive only for relatively small states like Switzerland. 
Neutrality Is a formal status of permanent neutrality, I t  signifies that 
I t  Is valid In times of peace as well as In war. Austria Is an example of 
self-neutralization. The Austrian State Treaty signed by the United 
States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and Austria In May 
1955 gave Austria her sovereign Independence In July 1955. Thus ended 
ten years of foreign occupation of Austrian territory. In return,
Austria promised to maintain permanent neutrality; to renounce the use 
of major offensive weapons. Including nuclear ones; promised never to 
enter Into a political or economic union with Germany; and the Four 
Powers gave up their claims to reparations.
Nonalignment must be carefully distinguished from the closely related 
but essentially different concept of neutrality and neutralization.
Several criteria were agreed upon for determining which countries were 
nonaligned and which were not. In essence, these were that countries 
attending the Belgrade Conference pursue an Independent foreign policy; 
that they accept the principles of peaceful co-existence; and that they 
support the so-called national liberation of the dependent peoples.
Ideally, nonaligned countries were not supposed to have military ties with 
either of the great powers. However, I f  military agreements did exist, 
these should have been concluded outside the context of the Cold War 
disputes. Significant omissions from the Belgrade lis t  of nonaligned
13. Georg Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International law. (London! 
London Institute of World Affairs), vol. I ,  p.2ft>
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states were: Israel (s t i l l  confronted with Implacable opposition),
Malaya (believed to be too pro-Western), Nigeria (which did not conceal 
Its Ideological links with the West and Its opposition to the views of 
militant African states like Ghana), and the states of French West Africa 
(which continued to maintain close ties with France). Yugoslavia was 
the only European state deemed nonaligned as distinct from being neutral 
(as in the case of Finland and Sweden) or from being a de facto member 
of a cold War power bloc.
Implicit in the nonaligned conception of foreign affairs is the idea 
of diplomatic "freedom of choice”. Permanent identification with the 
East or the West (or, as each bloc has tended to lose Its  monolithic 
character, with powerful countries within them) is prohibited by a policy 
of nonalignment. Temporary cooperation or association with great powers 
in m ilitary, economic, diplomatic or other affairs Is permissible without 
departing from a "nonaligned" diplomatic status. Thus, for India and other 
states espousing this principle, several alternatives are available:
(1) to formulate policies of their own toward major global Issues;
(2) to agree on some issues with the u« t ;
(3) to agree with the Communist bloc on other Issues; and
(4) to agree In part with the West and In part with the East on some
issues, such as disarmament.
Nazll Choucrl maintains that at He1grade the term "nonalignment" was 
used more frequently In speeches, while the word "neutralist" was barely 
mentioned and "neutrality" appeared only now and then. This may Indicate 
that the nonaligned nations perceive a distinction between their own 
brand of nonallgnnent and that of other states In the international system.?*
14. Nazll Choucrl, "The Nonalignment of Afro-Aslan States: Policy,
Perception and Behavior", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. I I  Mo. 1, pp.1-2. -
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F. TilC USCD IX THIS DISSCHTATIOi:
In this study I use tht tern "nonal 1 ^ nriant* which has become a generally 
accepted term. Through the wider professional Interest In the subject 
over recent years, there Is however, gradually evolving a pattern of 
wording In regard to the day-to-day activities of the nonaligned states, 
for Instance, within such organizations as the Arab League, the Organiza­
tion of African Unity, and the United nations.
With the generic terns ■Neutralism'', ■Positive Neutrality" and ■Hon- 
alignment", some shred of controversy persists, but they are no longer 
the battleground which they represented sonc years ago. •Nonallgnmcnt*
Is gaining ground over the three teinis as the general descriptive label» 
undoubtedly because throughout the Afro-Aslan world and the Third World 
the t i t le  "nonailgned* Is widely accepted. In 1M1, at the Belgrade 
Conference of Nonaligned Nations, nonalignment becares established.
I maintain that nonalignment Is a logical policy development among 
weak non-We stem nations and may fonn the b*s1s for a Third World percep­
tion of International relations.
In this study when I refer to the Third World, I speak of those nations 
that are poorer and loss developed economically then nations such as the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Most of the Third World countries 
are located In Asia* Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Indued, 
with very few exceptions (such as Japan, Israel and South Africa), Third 
World c 'tries comprise most of the nations of these areas. The Third 
World tends to be politically Independent of both the East and the West. 
The majority of the Third Wvrld gained Independence from the modem 
colonial powers only after the Second World War. The Third World nations 
deem themselves as a distinct group of countries In competition with the 
more economically advanced nations. The Third World comprises most of 
the nations and people of the world. Thus, the Third World Is non-
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Western, ex-colonial, non-Industrialized, amorphous and an expanding 
entity.
The Third World Is nut hostile to the Last or the West and I t  is a 
self-defined as social, on of independent states. T;mi Third World has 
defined its position at numerous gatherings, such as Bandung, Belgrade, 
Cairo, Lusaka and Algiers among others. At these numerous International 
and regional conferences the Third World countries have formeu confer­
ences and associations to deal with comnxi probler.u. Most Ihlrd World 
countries however, have not yet developed effective, prov.: Institution > 
and some face seemingly Intractable problems.
Nonallgnoent iias become a cornerstone of Third World policy, for 
the Third World nations, nonallgnment does not Imply a passive position 
but rather the active pursuit of international peace throuc;h mediation 
and the United Nations.
The First World has several geographical parts: Europe, North America, 
Japan and Australia. The First World nations are economically advanced, 
technologically sophisticated and are modem capitalist democracies.
Since the Second World War, the United has been the kingpin of
the West - the latter is here taken to Include Northern and Western 
Europe and ita ly , V. ''tad States and Canada, Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand.
The Seccnw World consists of the Soviet Union and all those countries 
Included In t  ’arsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact Is an Important multi­
lateral treaty between the communist states under Soviet leadership both 
m ilita rily  and politically, but l i t t le  Is known about Its Institutional 
structure. The Communist states have :ent.a11v planned economies, strong 
military ties with the Soviet Uni wi and limited Independence.
G. CONCLUSION
It  Is evident that Interest In the Third World Is increasing among Western
16
writers. Different writers use different terrs to dwrte ncnflllnment. 
In this chapter I t  ha' been proved that nonaMnnrent Is not neutrality. 
The la tter Is a ler-nl concert, nonallpnmcnt Is a political notion.
PART TWO
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT Of NONALICNMFMT
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CHAPTER TWO 
THU HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NONALIGNMENT 
THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCES
X« INTRODUCTION
I t  1$ said tha t the goddess Athena sprang forth full-grown and in fu ll 
armour from the brow of Zeus. That is not quite the way nonalignment 
made its  debut on the contemporary scene, although there is a passing 
resemblance. Some of the subject's central ideas trace as fa r back as 
the ancient Asian religious doctrines; but at that time the prospects 
seemed dim that they would ever become practical tools for decision 
makers. Other Important principles were expounded early in this cen­
tury. The body of knowledge that is summarized In this chapter, however, 
y and large emerged during and since the Second World War.
Synonyms fo r  the term nonalignment are about as numerous and tena­
ciously adhered to as dialects of Africa. A frequent American substitute 
is "neutralism* and many American authors use the two names interchange­
ably. The Third World prefers"none!1gnment". The concept and hence, 
the problem of nonalignment is historically, a very recent one, and i t  Is 
not at a ll native to the developing areas, but 1s strictly an Afro-Aslan 
notion, with one exception Yugoslavia.
I t  may be taken for granted that i t  is useful to understand the past 
in order to manage the present and to prepare intelligently for the 
future. I t  is relevant to be familiar with certain landmarks of histori­
cal development and analysis, including the principal stages in the 
history of Afro-Asian organizations and gatherings.
The history of the Afro-Asian movement is a fascinating story. I t  
involves the evolutionary development of the concept of nonalignment into
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th# Institutions for economic, social and political cooperation among 
the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and Yugoslavia,
I I .  BACKGROUND
Since IMS, warfare has never ceased In one or more regions of Asia, 
Internal civil wars, conflicts between the new nations of Asia, the 
Great Power involvement In the Cold War - a ll of these, often Interre­
lated and occurring simultaneously have made Asia an area of Intense
conflict In world diplomacy.
South and South-Eastern Asia, with the exception of the Philippines
(United States) once formed part of the European empires principally of 
Britain (India, Ceylon, Burma, the Malay States and Straits Settlement), 
of the Netherlands East Indies), and of France (Indo-China). Thailand 
was the only sizable Independent Asian state in this part of the world.
During the years from 1946 to 1957 European control ceased and was 
replaced by Asian national states. The Philippines gained independence 
In July 1946, India and Pakistan In August 194#„ Burma in January 194C, 
Ceylo»< in February 1948, and Indonesia in December 1949, Indo-China, 
which the French le ft  In the period 1954-56, has been the scene of conti­
nued conflict. Milaye gained Independence In August 1957.
The zone of eastern and north-eastern Asia comprises mainland China, 
Taiwan, Japan, Korea, end the Soviet Union. Finally, the great landmass 
of central Asia Is dominated by China, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Tibet and
the Soviet Union,
The Communist victory in China in 1S4P, the conclusion of the SIno-
Soviet Treaty In February 1950, the American awareness that the Soviet
Union also had exploded an atomic bomb In September 1949 -  all these
events led to changes in United States policy In Asia and the Pacific,
During the period from 1950 to 1954 the United States concluded that
the threat to stab ility  and peace arising from the possibility of eommu-
19
nist direct attack or subversion was Increasing and could only be met 
by throwing the military weight of the United States behind European end 
Aslan allies w illing to resist aggression. The objective was deterrence. 
The cohesion of the European (NATO) alliance was accordingly strengthened 
with SLtc^antlal military contributions. In Asia a search for new allies  
was Intensified In 1950. But In Asia there was no continuous ring of 
developed nations that could be formed among China's neighbours. Running 
from north to south Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines formed 
am unbroken flank, but In the South China Sea, Malaysia and Indonesia kept 
aloofi south of Indonesia and far removed from China were Australia and
New Zealand! these two joined the United States alliance groupings. On
the mainland of Asia, Thailand and South Vietnam, were associated in
alliances; Cashodia and Laos were never securely brought In, Burma,
India and feylon refused to join In amtWomwnist alliance, but Pakistan 
In 1954 did so; the American arc of defensive alliances against the 
Soviet Union continued unbroken thereafter through Iran to Turkey end 
Greece.
I I I .  THE AFRO*ASIAN MOVEMENT
Peter H, Lyon observes that another remarkable feature of the post-war 
period has been the re-appearance of the formerly Ill-fa te d  Pan-Aslan 
and Pan-African movements; and the emergence of a new and uniquely gran­
diose ran-bi -Contimental 1 sm— the Afro-Aslan Movement.
The Asian phase of the movements was Inaugurated by the Aslan Rela­
tions Conference of March-Aprll 1947* which convened In New Delhi, India, 
The Conference, under the chairmanship of Nehru, expressed Aslan attitudes 
on International affairs, promoted closer ties among Asian nations and 
formed « platform for Aslan opinion,
A second conference was convened at New Delhi, India In January 1949, 
to consider the Indonesian question. The rumored formation of an Aslan
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bloc foiled to mitoHsllze. However* the termination of the Dutch 
police action in Indonesia end the settlement of the same year, can 
partly be attributed to the holding of the Conference and the growing 
Influence of the Aslan community.1
The Asian Relations Conference paved the way for the Bandung Con­
ference of African and Aslan states. Like Its predecessor, the Aslan 
Relations Conference created a permanent organization which proved * 0  
be ineffective, partly because a nunber of Aslan states were wary of 
IndiaH predominance and did not wish to see I t  Institutionalized.
The Indonesian question gave the Conference a distinct anti-colonial 
note, but I t  was divided between the friends of the West and the non- 
aligned nations. This division was accentuated in the following months 
when different Asian leaders took up different attitudes towards the two 
outstanding Asian events of the year -  the victory of Mao Tse-tung and 
coanunlsm in China and the war In Korea. Aslan solidarity promoted by 
Nehru, was proving d ifficu lt to achieve, even on an anti-colonialist 
programme. The British and French campaigns In Malaya and Indo-China 
did not evoke the same reaction ts the Dutch proceedings In Indonesia, 
partly because of the strong communist flavour In the Malayan and Vietna­
mese anti-colonial1st movements.
In the f if t ie s , Aslan nonalignment and solidarity waxed and waned.
Some Asian states, putting their economic ind strategic needs before 
their nonalignment, signed not only economic but even defence treaties 
with the United States or the Soviet Union. In 1954, Pakistan, Thailand 
and the Philippines concluded military agreements with the United States. 
Furthermore, Afghanistan became the f irs t non-communist country to receive
1. Peter H. Lyon, •Strains In the Pan-Continental Movements of Africa 
and Asia, 1943-1358*, Australian Outlook, June 1959. pp.100-103 
passim.
Soviet eld. The Soviet Union el ready hed • trade agreement with India, 
was about to conclude another with Burma, Intensified the diplomatic and 
economic wooing of Indonesia which led to Sukarno's v is it to Moscow In 
1956. Indeed, the great powers were taking a keen interest in Aslan 
affairs but one consequence of this Interest was to make I t  more d ifficu lt 
for Aslan nations to maintain a comwn attitude towards the greet powers 
or to keep their distance as pure nonalignment required.2
Blema S. Steinberg maintains that the Korean War transformed Indian 
nonalignment from a verbal assertion Into a global posture. The necessity 
for the United States to obtain United Nations sanction for Its  Far Eastern 
containment policy gave India, as leader of the so-called Arab-Aslan Group, 
a new Importance to the West, India's policy In the Korean Crisis was 
rooted In the careful assessment of Its national Interests; to remain un­
in wived, which became especially compelling after the Intervention of 
Communist China, and to bring about a peace settlement, India's policy 
produced an additional benefit -  the recognition by the Great Powers, of 
the significance of nonalignment. As a result of the Korean Crisis 
diplomacy, the essentially negative and passive chkraeter of nonalignment 
was altered, India assumed the role of mediator and Impartial arbitrator, 
and no further demonstrations of Its  unique posture were needed to 
establish In fact what Nehru had been proclaiming In theory,3
A number of Important events occurred In 1950, the major one was the 
North Korean invasion across the 30th parallel into South Korea {June 25, 
1950). The other events were the establishment within the United Nations
2. John Spooler. Games Nations Play: Analysing International Polities
(New Yorki P.A," PreegerT W ) 7  n p .^ ^ . i 'a i iT m :
3, Blema S. Steinberg, "The Korean War: A Case Study of Indian
Neutralism*, Orbjs, Vol. 8 (4), Winter 1965, p.953.
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frsmwor* of the bloc-like Areb-AsUn consultative group and the Baguio 
Conference In the Philippines, where frequent consultations between
Asian nations was emphasized.
On July 7, 1960 the United Nations Security Council by seven votes to 
none, with three abstentions (Egypt, India and Yugoslavia - all nonalign­
ed) and one member absent (the Soviet Union), requested all member states
providing military forces In pursuance of the council's resolution to
make them available to a unified command under the United States.
India was one of the f irs t  nations to recommend cease-fire arrange­
ments In Korea t ite r  India chaired the United Nations Repatriation 
eoaiaisslen with the neutral states, Sweden and Switzerland, and the 
Communist States, Czechoslovakia and Poland,
The Afro-Aslan consultations culminated In two 1 important conferences 
In 1954; the f irs t  In Colombo, Ceylon, and the second in Bogor,
Indonesia,
IV, THE COLOMBO CONFERENCE
The Colombo Conference opened on April 28, 1954, two days after tht begin­
ning of the Geneva Conference, 26 April - 21 July 1950, on Korea and Indo- 
Chlns, Neither India, nor any major Aslan country apart from the parti­
cipants In the wars, Including China, was Invited to attend the Geneva 
Conference. This major international conference, devoted to purely 
Aslan Issues, was non-representative of Asia, and the Aslan leaders consi­
dered I t  an Insult to their newly won Independence.
The Aslan leaders attending the Colombo Conference were Nehru of 
India, U Mu of Burma* Muhammad All of Indonesia, and the host Sir John 
Kotewala, Indeed, of a ll the pre-Bandung Conferences this one was the 
most controversial. The participants refused to heed Nehru's plea that 
they should devote themselves to one Issue only - Zndo-Chlna -  and ranged 
over a wide number of subjects. Not suprlslngly, the Pakistani premier
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hastened to raise the question of Kashmir: so long as that problem 
remained unsolved I t  was a l i t t le  presumptuous for the Aslan nations 
represented to teach peace to others,
Nehru Insisted that a resolution condemning Communism was tanta­
mount to taking sides In favour of the West in the Cold War, and was 
therefore Incompatible with India's policy of nonalignment. He fla tly  
refused to accept the draft resolution put forward by Ceylon, which 
declared. Inter a lia , that International Communism was the biggest poten­
tia l danger in South and South East Asia, This argument was to be re­
peated no less fiercely, at Bandung, but there, as at Colombo, a compro­
mise formula was eventually found.
When the cease-fire in Indo-Chlna came into operation, India accepted 
the chairmanship of the Armistice Supervisory Commission for Indo-Chlna.* 
At this same Conference, the Prime Minister of Indonesia proposed 
that the five ministers sponsor an AsIan-African Conference on a broad 
geographical basis. The proposal received tentative agreement at Colombo 
and was confirmed at the Bogor Conference In December 1954,
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State In the Elsenhower Administra­
tion, disapproved of the Geneva settlement; the United States would not 
sign I t  but In a declaration promised not to upset these arrangements, 
Dulles continued to strengthen opposition ♦o :he spread of communism in 
Southern Asia In the face of the Frem.:< military defeat at Dien Blen Phu, 
Vietnam. He conducted negotiations f an alliance of collective de­
fence among the major Powers Interested 1n this region, Britain, France, 
Australia and New Zealand, together with such Asian states as would join 
the grouping. The new treaty would thus extend and complement the secu­
rity  treaty the United States concluded with Australia and New Zealand 
(ANZUS).
4. F.C, Jones, Survey of International Affairs. 1954, p.288.
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The outcome of the negotlatlons was the South-East Asia Collective 
Defence Treaty (SEATO), in Manila on 8 September 1954, together with a 
Pacific Charter of principles. The eight signatories were the United 
States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and the three Asian 
states, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines.
V. THE BOGOR CONFERENCE
The Bogor Conference met in De-ember 1954, to discuss plans for, and to 
agree on who was to be invited to the Atro-Asian Conference. The so- 
called guest l is t  was the subject of considerable debate. The inclu­
sion of Communist Chin* was agreed upon In exchange for the addition of
japan and the exclusion of Israel. No invitations were to be extended
to North or South Korea no* to tho Ch1"«se Government of Formosa. The 
press e of Comunist t;Y;ni as urged by many countries.
The question of . Mna's participation in the oronosed conference at 
Bandung loomed largo from the verv beginning with Puma, Indonesia and 
India insisting on har inclusion. The Colombo talks had taken place at 
thf t i  A of the final assault on 01en 81en Phu. As the talks ended, the 
French posts were beinr overrun by the Communist forces. The Communist
victory had an enormous nsycholoqical Imoact on +h» peonies of Asia,
comparable perhaps to the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905. I t  
placed the Chinese ; rasenee In Asia In a r^nnletelv new oersoectlv- 
Nehru, in nartlculir, had rightly reached the conclusion that mace in 
Asia was bound verv largely to the degree that China was accented into 
the Aslan community. He was determined that Tnd*s and China, as the 
two largest nations of Asia, should live In eenc* and harmony with each 
other. This determination Is reflected in th* oanchshila nr F1ve 
Principles.
The tone and mncral orientation of th' honor final comrvjnlguo was 
interesting. It focused prlmarlv on coneratlog among the Asian and
25
African ststes end the organization of the forthcoming conference.
The document was remarkably void of any reference to the Great Powers, 
although opposition to the Cold War in general was asserted. Almost, 
a l l  issues covered in this communique, such as colonialism and economic 
development, had a direct bearing on regional affairs.
There is general agreement among many scholars that the foreign poli­
cy of China since 1949, like that of all nations but especially those 
which aspire to be great powers. Is concerned, with the task of advancing 
national Interests. But Communist China aspires also to be a great 
revolutionary power, and her foreign policy therefore reflects thlr addi­
tional preoccupation. To some degree the two reinforce one another 
since a victory In foreign policy may enhance the prestige net only of 
the Chinese nation but also of China as the protagonist of world revolu­
tion.
The major power in Asia other than China is India, lea by Jewehariil 
Nehru. Although a very strong Communist party exists in India, Nehru 
maintained very cordial relations with China, which he regarded as a 
strong fellow-Aslan power, worthy of respect and friendship.
Nehru made no serious effort to prevent China from overrunning Tibet 
In 1950, although the boundary between Tibet and India was net properly 
defined. Indeed, the frontier had been delineated by Sir Henry McMahon 
In 1914, China was anxious to push this frontier back to the Himalayas, 
which formed the natural boundary of the state. Nehru, a north Indian 
from Kashmir, disagreed vehemently, but the Chinese Insisted.
VI. THE FIVE PRINCIPLES
tin June 28, 1954 India and Corcnunlst China agreed to perootuate the "Five 
Principles" (PANCHSHILA) designed to promote more cordial relations bet­
ween the two countries. The Five Principles were:
(1) Mutual respect for each other's territoria l Integrity and
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sovereignty;
(2) a non-aggression pledge;
(3) Non-lnterferenco In each others Internal affairs;
(4) Relations based on equality and mutual benefit; and
(5) Peaceful co-existence,
A great deal has been written and has been made of the Panchshlla,
not least by Indians themselves. I t  Is , therefore enlightening to
read the remarks of one of the major architects of India's foreign policy.
Krishna Menon, on this subject.
'When we were discussing the Tibetan Treaty the way we should conduct 
ourselves came up w illy -n illy . After a l l ,  what Is the Tibetan 
Treaty? Tibet, Including the various trade agreements Involved, was 
the only problem we had with China which called for regularization . . .  
The five points as you can see, are not very well drafted, i t  was 
not as though I t  was prepared formula. I t  emerged out of the 
conversations -  that Is a ll there was to I t .
Krishna Menon continued In a later passage?
•When I saw the drafting of the Five Principles I thought i t  had been 
rather badly written. 1 said so to the Prime Minister and he said, 
■what does I t  matter; I t  Isn 't a treaty or anything, its  a preface 
to this Tibetan business*. Quite frankly I t  was only afterwards
that the Fl-.e Principles emergedas a mantra (dictum), •  slogan
a sop.®5
Krishna Menon further pointed out that 'the five points really con- 
U'ned nothing new* that they were 'merely a restatement of those prlnel- 
H?es which we cell nonalignment - what e lse i'5 Thus, at that time, not 
too great importance was attached by the Indians to the F’ve Principles. 
Indeed, i t  was the Chinese premier Chou En-lal who suggested in an ex­
change of letters after the Tibetan Agreement that the Five Principles 
could be made the basis of a reasons settlement of any outstanding
5. Michael Brecher, India and World Politics? Krishna Menon*s
View of the WorTd (London* Oxford University ^ress, 196b), 
pp.T lC T ------------
6. Ib id ., p.143.
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questions.^
The points were elevated to a rank of outstanding Importance when 
Chou En-lat visited New Delhi cm June 25, on his way home from 
Geneva and the two leaders affirmed their agreement with the Five Prin­
ciples as the basis of their In.entlonal conduct.
For India these Principles now became the foundation stone of her 
foreign policy, India sought adherents to the Panchshlla zealously;
I t  was almost as I f  she considered I t  the universal panacea to all evils 
In International relations. Above a ll ,  India saw I t  as a basis for 
friendly relations with China, to which Nehru attached s preme Import­
ance.
Thus, India based her Asian and foreign policy on friendship and 
cooperation with China. On the e- idence of Krishna Menon the firs t  
storm clouds that were already gathering In 1954 in relations between 
India and China were considered of no significance by the Indian leaders. 
They accepted unequivocally Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.8
They considered Chinese probings on the frontiers at Barehotl and at 
the North East Frontier Agency to be ‘smaller territoria l disputes, not 
the prelude to aggression1. 9
Evidently they sincerely believed that the Panchshlla Agreement with 
the Chinese committed China to espousing the same foreign policy objec­
tives as those of India, above a l l ,  non-intervention In the affairs of 
other countries, peaceful co-existence* and broadening the area of peace.
The orientation towards China was all the greater because of the
7. F, Jones, Ib id ., p.245
8. Brecher, Ib id ., p .13"
9. Ib id ., p.144
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vthownc* with which India opposed the efforts of the Western great 
powers to set up a military alliance which, in Indian eyes was directed 
otertiy against China. This can be seen from India's reaction to the 
Invitation sent to the so-called Colombo Powers to attend the tslhs at 
Baguio, Philippines, wilch led to the establishment of South Fast Asia
Treaty Organization (SFATO).
Another very Interesting point In these discussions was that none of 
the so-called Colo^o Powers ralsod the question of Snvlot participation. 
The question whether tne Soviet Union was part of Asia or not, which was 
to bedevil the Afro-Asi»r. states In future, was not even raised at the 
Bogor Conference. Nobody was to defend the ' es l s  that the Soviet 
Union was an Aslan power more vigorously than India In the future, but 
Nehru's silence on this subject at hcgor was to have far-reaching effects
sn the Afro-Aslan ^venent.
Since many ceuntr'es had not granted dlnloratlc recognition to China, 
I t  was agreed that any country's acceptance of the Invitation to attend 
the Bandung Conference would In no way Invoke or even Imply any change In 
Its  view of the status of any other country.
V II. THE BAHDUNfi CQNfTPfNCE
The inception of the policy of nonalignment was aceomnanlnd by the begin­
ning of the great anti-colonial campaign of the African and Aslan peoples, 
manifested throurh tie  activity - legal and 111*1*1 - of Governments and 
liberation movements. A series of meetings between the reorosentatlves 
of these countries and the liberation movements were hold In this nt-.iod, 
(viz. T:m Mfro-Aslan Solidarity Conference, the Conference of Inden*n<kmt 
African States. The All-zfrlcan Conference, among others). The Afro- 
Aslan Conference -f A^rll 11F5, hrM at Bandunn In Indonesia, Is regarded 
as a watershed In the history of th* Afro-Aslan Movenent.
A leading theme of the Conference was the strung!* aminst Western
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lepeHil slut, colon1«11»m, ami neo-col out aline. The conveners expressed 
that the Conference would not be exclusive in respect of the Membership, 
nevertheless they showed great selectivity. For example, they Invited 
•11 the Arab States but not Israel; the Central African Federation but 
not South Africa. Conwunlst China, but not the Soviet Union, the Sold
Coast, but not Nigeria.
The Conference was advertised as an Afro-Aslan gathering but Its  
African voice was w in ly Arab. Ethiopia represented Black Africa and 
the Geld Coast had not yet become. Independent Ghana thus Its delegation
Had observer status.^
The Bandung Communique covered a whole range of Issues and nature, 
but was remarkably void of any direct reference to the major powers, a l- 
tiiough opposition to the Cold War was asserted. Almost all Issues 
covered In this Coci.tunlqu*, such as colonialism and economic development, 
had a direct bearing on regional a ffa irs ,^
V III .  THE RESULTS OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE
Most writers on the Third World agrje that the Pandung Conference was an 
historic event. Even I f  the Conference only met, the meeting Its e lf  
would have been a great achievement. Batidunr proclaimed the political 
emergence In International affairs of nations representing over half the
world’ s population.
I t  was largaly In response to the Jeiends made at Bandung that In the 
wake of the Conference, Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Libya, and Nepal 
were admitted to the United Nations. This was followed. In later year*, 
by many more African and Aslan States, adding greatly to the power and 
prestige In numbers of the Afro-Aslan group at tha United Nations.
10. Lyon, Ib id ., pp.100-111, passim.
11. The Bandunn Conference, Appendix A.
At Bandung, the world became aware of the differences between the 
Soviet Union and Chine, for during the next few years the two countries 
gradually drifted apart, largely as a result of their differences on 
foreign po licy, although these were not made public at the time. At 
Bandung, the Chinese slated the opportunity to Impress Asians and Afri­
cans with their reasonableness and to stress the points o f Interest bet­
ween the Communists and the non-Communists in the two continents.
Chou En-lal reassured the South East Aslan countries that China had no 
aggressive designs on her neighbours, expressed willingness to  se ttle  
outstanding problems concerning the nationality o f overseas Chinese and 
to discuss the Formosan question with the United States,
The Chinese Communists, who had taken a concilia to ry line towards 
the nomallgned states, were not so concerned about the growth of non- 
alignment as Nehru was; in fa c t, they applauded i t  as a means of break­
ing down the positions and Interests o f the Western powers. Their line 
was Afro-Aslan solidarity against Imperialism and colonialism,^
After Bandung, Sukarno regarded Indonesia as the bom leader of what 
he later conceptualized as the "New Emerging Forces" (NEFOS). Although 
his efforts engendered l i t t le  discernible evidence of enthusiasm among 
other numbers o f the Afro-Aslan community, Sukarno repeatedly pressed 
fo r a Second Bandung Conference, China supported Sukarno enthusiastically 
and systematically, and looked forward to exclude the Soviet Union from 
yet another exclusive Afro-Asian gathering. What happened to the Commu­
nists In Indonesia In October 1965, and to Sukarno Is now history.12
11. Mary Knatchbull Keynes, "The Bandung Conference", International
Relations, October 1957, pp.361-376 passim,
12, Cecil V. Crabb (J r .), Nations In a Multipolar World. (New York;
Harper and Row, i96&), pp.438-#5 passim.
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John Foster Dulles appraised the results of the Conference as 
exercising soee restraint on the Chinese Communists. He fe lt  I t  would 
be salutary I f  the Chinese Cjnraunlsts were confronted with the opinion 
of free Asian nations. These Nations promoted peace .nd peaceful co­
existence and were against direct and Indirect aggression.13
The Bandung Conference was significant In that I t  brought together, 
for the firs t time, the new and developing countries ineludlno six 
African nations. The Conference enabled these developing nations to 
formulate their attitudes toward ecynoale and cultural cooperation, 
human rights and self-determination problems of dependent peoples, and 
the promotion of world neeee and cooperation. Moreover, the Cn»f-mmce 
laid the basis for future Afro-Aslan cooperation. The Influence of 
Bandung was subsequently seen In the United Nations where what previously 
had been known as the Informal ad hoc Asian caucusing group, became 
formally organized as the Afro-AsIan caucusing eroup.
Another significant result of the Conference was a realization of the 
potential role that Afro-Aslen states would nlay In the arena of interna­
tional polities. Bandung demonstrated a new and Important unity among 
the African and Aslan nations In a conwon attitude towards the Cold War 
end a common goal concerning economic development and political Indepen­
dence.
The Bandung Conference gave the firs t Indication that Africa was on 
the way to becoming a force In International polities. I t  remained a 
question of time until a sufficient number of Independent nations could 
give a new Identity to African attitudes In the United Nations.1*
13. Ceclr, V. Crabb (J r .) ,  The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of 
Nonalignment (New York* Frederick A. Praeger,
14. Colin Legum, Bandung, Cairo and Africa (London! The Africa 
Bureau, 1 ) ,  pp.l-Td passim.
For Natscr of Enyot, fanduno was an asset. Fn route, he conferred 
with Nehru snd at fendurn hf shared the snot11nht /1th leaders of the 
Afro-fsian w^rld, sue', rr. ru'hm, Chou En- lal and Svl.amo. Indeed, for 
the firs t t i r r ,  since t!« crcroftnco of the rodem Vah states, an Arah 
1«ader received c rle rr n* honour mnonn leading world statesmen; he was 
consul ted as an eoual; Ms prohlem wore hoard snd treated s^msthetlc- 
ally ty nations prominent or- the International scene. Handunn added 
lustre to hassor's reoutntlor as en Ar.sb nationalist leader, not only In 
r.nyft hut also national 1st In Hastenlte Irae. The Conference
further ftlru la to l earlier theirhts Passer hid "Iven to Arab nonallmnent 
In his autoMooranhy - Arah unity and African snaeclnation.^
IX. SUMMARY m  CQtiauSIOHS
The Conferences featured In this Chapter were nethe rings not of nonalign­
ed nations but of Afro-Aslan states. These states ware regionally de­
fined and Included Aslan members of the South Cast Aslan Treaty Organiza­
tion (SEATO). The Communist States, China end North Vietnam were also 
present.
For the Communist states, oartlcitation In the nathering, meant an 
opportunity to Identify their Communist slogan of neaceful co-existence 
and anti-imperialism with the anti-colonialls»' of the new states. Ceylon 
and other memben n* western alliances, sore of whose governments were 
soon to fa l l ,  launched an attack on Communism and warned of the dangers 
of Ccmmlst In filtration.
Nehru and tJ *u of tiuma had Ideas of wooing China away from the Soviet 
Union In en effort to Insulate Asia from the Cold War, Nehru honed to 
lay the foundation for an Improvement In the diplomatic e^nosphere, and
IS. Morton A. ed., Tlw* Pevolutlor 1", 'orld h ill tics ( ‘i-w York:
John Wllwy and C o m p a n y / j ,  no, 170-179T"
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he persuaded the Conference to re-iffirm  the principles of co-existence 
to which Nehru and CScu En-lel had subscribed to In April 29, 195*.
Doclaratlons of mutual goo<kit? *i11 not reduce Intomatlonal tco- 
slon. the Ineffectiveness of fomer declarations of this tyne should 
fxi a sufficient vamlnn. Since the early f if t ie s , however, both the 
Soviet Union and China had waned a vigorous cam  Inn *or bilateral 
treaties In which the rive Principles of peaceful co-oxlstence would be 
proclal ed. The" " iv  Principles v#ere for the firs t tine enshrined 
In * Slno-Indian Treaty slqnad In !954. They have since been reprodu­
ced In several declarations adopted by the Soviet 'inion, China and 
various nonaligned states like India and Yuroslavla.
Declarations add nothing o the customrv duties of states. More­
over, the fomunlst record Is not very encouraglnn In this respect.
India learned the useful lesson from Chin# that International tensions 
cannot N  reduced by solemn promises.
Konallonment as a contemporary foreign policy development suffers 
from the weakness of any policy which seeks to build Its  structure around 
the conference table. In the comfortable. I f  not always elegant hide-away 
where the conferees are carefully protected from the distractions of 
nemel day-to-day existence.
Whan so wny leaders gather together there Is an abundance of sound 
logic, many examples of skilled debate, some heat end as usual some 
fatuous nonsense. Too often, however, Ideas carefully phrased and Topi­
cally developed are le ft to wither from lack of nourishment os the sub­
ject abruptly shift* to a new centre of attention.
I f  the nonaligned conference hoped to find an answer. I t  did not take 
long for disillusionment to sat In. The problems of the nonallgned 
world are so complicated I t  defies analysis In one short conference.
There Is reason to suppose that there Is no answer, only a continuing
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series of accomodations and compromises,
.'lost •Jestwrn saiolars dealing with International relations expressed 
great doubt about tne future of nonalignment and the nonaligned states 
themselves. They cited the great diversities 1i. Asia, Africa and Latin 
America as divisive factors which would make trans-continental co-opera­
tion Impossible. Among the most frequently mentioned factors were the 
nations* dissimilar urltlsh and Frencn colonial experience; a rtific ia l 
and Ill-defined boundaries; weak military machine; and diverse ethnic 
and linguistic groups. In addition. I t  was noted that nonalignment was 
being promoted by only a few leaders, especially .Nehru, Tito, Nasser, 
Nkrumah and Sukarno among others. I t  was generally believed that the 
nonaligned movement could not survive the elimination of these men from 
their positions of leadership.
History has proven the fallacy of these doubts. The Afro-Aslen 
states, despite their dissimilar colonial experience, have a great deal 
In common -  mostly the tremendous problems confronting them. However, 
because common problems require a common coordinated solution, this has 
become perhaps one of the greatest unifying factors In the Third World 
today.
Itch of the early history of the Afro-Aslan nations consists of 
attempts to establish pressure groups. Only when these relationships 
had coalesced and a well-defined number of organizations had been esta­
blished, could the group settle down to work. Gradually the members of 
the group developed friendships and teamwork, and the aggregation of 
developing nations grew Into a formidable group.
The success of tlie conferences depended greatly on the needs and 
Interests of the. participating nations. Indeed, some of the problems on 
the conference table were really not as d ifficu lt to deal with as some 
of the leaders around the conference table. Many leaders have departed
from the International scene, but the baste problems of the developing 
nations remain.
As human history moves toward the year 2000, with Its  awe-inspiring 
problems and opportunities, the subject of nonall^nment Is attracting 
Increasing attention froci scholars. Institutions tnd nations where I t  
was formerly unknown. Whether Its recent discoverers view I t  as an 
unsystematic approach to International relations, cr as ar International 
philosophy for serving human needs, or an a problem-solving state of 
mind, tliere Is no doubt that I t  1s spreading beyond Us traditional 
abode In the great halls of capitals such as Lusaka, Cairo, Belgrade and 
Algiers and becoming t  fashionable subject.
Not only are a variety of nations and leaders snwlng an unprecedent­
ed Interest In noralignment but I t  is rapidly spreading as an Idea of 
Importance to natlon-bui«d1ng. Leaders of developing countries are 
turning out in large numbers to attend meetings of the nonaligned to see 
how tills concept can Increase their effectiveness in domestic and In In­
ternational politics.
At the United Nations, the nonallgncd nations have dominated ti«e 
•eeiw since I960. I t  was the year which witnessed the beginning of the 
end of colonialism. The revolutionary foment which was sweeping the 
African continent and the struggle of the peoples for liberation resulted 
in the admission of many newly Independent African states to the United 
Nations thus making the Afro-Aslan group the dominant force In the world 
organization. The nonaligned nations were at the height of their 
strength. The wind of change was so strong that the administering coun­
tries, with the exception of a few Intrenslglent ones, like Portugal and 
South Africa, became more cooperative and more willing to decolonize.
The mood of compromise which existed In the United Nations prior to 
I960 vis-a-vis the administering countries disappeared. Instead, the
36
anti-co lon ia l nonellgned bloc with a majority of more than two-thirds 
of the votes In the General Assembly became militant and Intensified 
its pressure on the administering countries. In many Instances the 
lenerel Assembly was led to adept extreme and unrealistic resolutions.
How successful have these meetings and conferences been In the
general sphere of decolonisation?
The answer Is that the role of these early Afro-Asian meetings in 
the general process of decolonization has been a major one* The Inde­
pendence o f the new states o f A frica and Asia came as an end-product o f 
a panoply o f diverse Internal and external forces and pressures which 
the Afro-Asian group created and conjure*, up. Among these various con­
tributing factors were the following* a vigorous sp irit of nationalism 
w ith in  the dependent te rr ito ry  I ts e lf ,  generally operating through a 
national political-action party or parties; the clash and rivalry ema­
nating from the Cold War with the Soviet Union on the one hand (conven­
iently overlooking its own Imperialism and colonialism) constantly prod­
ding and challenging the Western European powers over th e ir domination 
o f alien peoples, and with the United States, on the other hand, qu ie tly  
pressing Its allies to adopt a more enlightened position on the question 
of self-determination so as to forestall the violence and revolution 
which the Soviet Union sought eagerly to exploit; a recognition by the 
colonial power o f the heavy cost entailed In sustaining colonial author­
ity ,  in the face of Increasing hostility* In an area far removed from Its  
own metropolitan area renewed scepticism as to the economic benefits of 
colonialism generally; realization by the colonial power that the colony 
might be dispensed with, without In any way seriously affecting the 
metropolitan state's existence, vital Interests, or basic pattern of l ife ;  
and Increasing domestic pressure arising from liberal humanitarian groups 
to relinquish control of the territories. The nonaligned nations gather-
I?
le g s  sem d p d w H ly  to channel the diplomatic pressures that were ex­
tant and to provide the world community with appropriate forums for 
focussing these pressures.
CHAPTER THREE 
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT Of  flMALIfflMEHT 
AS A POLICY Of m v  6US
The policy of nonellgnirwit tracer it i ticvelvp-^'L origin fraos ttw 
actions of a fow countries not bnlo<<c1ny to at y * ' o«; or n llitary  alliance# 
Tnesu nations fe lt  t.Mt suci. .jrounlncs /on not cm.ct.surate or conducive 
to ti.e Interest of peace. In it ia lly , t«w:r countries Included Duma, 
tgypt, Ethiopia; India, later Indonosla and vv "la. Detwcn 1D54 
ar.ti 195G, Urn Headc of Ltetc cf fciese countries rude contacts and exchang­
ed visits with each other, and ffc r tlwsa talks rnr./ tltc idea of coopera­
tion and the pronotion of international peace. The estc doctrine was 
antaxJiod in the principles of active peaceful co-ex1 stereo.
During this In itia l period, nonalignad oolicy was dlrttctod towards 
alleviating bloc tenslo i and countering ool 1 cy r-ursuod r^oic strengtiu 
towards establishing peaceful cooperation l^twcer nations Irrespective 
of social and political system. Active peace-ful co-oxlsto ;*.« p\*ew from 
the rules of peaceful relations wrong nations, which were fomulatod In 
a number of documents dating from 1954-1966. The r«ajor ones are;
- Hie Coeouniguo on t-ie v is it of China's Premier Chou En*la1 to India, 
of 29th April, 19r,4.
- The Joint Cowpunigue of President Tito and Prime Minister dehru of 
22nd Oeceober, 1964.
-  The Joint Comunique of President Tito and the President of the Union
of Roma, U flu, of 17th January, 1955.
- The Joint. Communique of President Tito and f-rlre minister Nehru, of
7th July, 1*66.
-  The address of President Tito In the Indian Parliament and at the 
University of Pnnnonn, Purma, on the occasion of Tito's vis it to these 
countries.
- The address by Prime Minister Nehru in the Federal Assembly In Belgrade,
Yugoslavia, on ?nd July, 1965.
3,
- Thi Joint CoawniqoL ttit ycv«rr..^iit& of >Lgt.r,tiiv1a and tiie Soviet 
iteien, of 2nd Juo*. 1955,«
I .  Tti£ A 'r U 'U J
Th® Si no-Indian /»sro«.r.wiit on T iU t  of 2L ti- / r i l l ,  1-S4 was, La red on the 
fo i l  owl nr, p rin o if U&:
- t&luai raaptct for oacu o tl trs ' . r r i t c r i t l  U .r ity  one sovortifinty;
- utuel non* in ere is i on i
- CuUal nori-ifUrfoixrco in e&u. e .tr's  ii,Urr.tl affair^,
- Lquality eno t-tiloal U ni-fit;
- ronetful co-fcxltLtr.ot.
Tin; Indian rrtsidcnt . rra&i f tLruery' List, 1^ 15 said;
•Tills ayixitinci.t cor.firwtd the frier t’s;n» L.tvtu. tlit-si ti/c groat 
countries which is so 1reportant for the peace o* Asia and the world. 
I p 1..1: agrecnent certair. principles rtn  Ini-' :'rA-ii which arr of 
even wider application and which have teen recognized as such by 
other countries.*'
Trie Chinese Prowler C.»cu E.-Lii said or, '.o-tfccr ZHth, 1f*tiC;
'The friendship end cooperation ! V'tr.t »:n Tr l<--: and China, wiiich were 
the f irs t to Initiate the five principles of peaceful co-existence, 
art of special significance to the prorotion of world peace and 
International cooperation.*1
I I .  TIC NIHRU-TITO ClAiZiUhlVUL
On a state v is it to India in tiecerier 1954, President Tito of Yugoslavia 
reaffirmed his faith in the five principles of peaceful co-axistance.
On this occasion, ttenru and Tito proclaimed ti:at the policy of nonaliyn- 
ment pursued by their respective governments 1s not •neutrality* or
1, Review of International A ffa irs , iie lcra ie . Documentation, Special
Supple ont dsdicatAd to tlu> Consultativ'' ‘entinr of tlv? 'iofi- 
aligmed Countries, to begin on July 1X)9, in Belgrade, p. 
s.v.
2. Lok Sahha Secretariat, foreign Pol1cv r*  I-v!1«, Texts of documents,
1947-59, p.101 ----------------------------
3. Ib id . ,  p .110
fv
j
*n«iitr«11sfft* and therefore, passivity, as aliened <n certain quarters, 
Nenallgiwnt is a positive, active and constructive policy seeklnn to 
lead to collective neace, on which collective security can rest,*
A new stage In the development o f nonallined policy was launched 
when the leaders of Oynt, India and Yugoslavia met on Priori Island 
In July 1956. Vere th« leaders re-afflrred th rlr dedication to non- 
aligned policy and agreement was reached on t l r l *  r^sltlon on the most 
crucial probleffis of n ?c' and security; and th* rrohlems fad  nr the 
developing areas of the world. Thus, an Intirr.atlrnal dimension wac 
added to the police c f nonallgnaent. The T^-lvr Points of the Priori 
resolutions served as a nlatfcrr for coordinating the policies of the r e ­
aligned nations 1;: their c^proacl^s to International problems and Inter­
national affairs.
At Brlonl I t  was drclced to hold regular meetings for purposes of 
mutual consultations ahout International affairs and seeking greater 
contacts with other developing nations. The Idea of conferences of 
nonaligned countries emerged fror these 1 nter-netier- consultations.
I I I .  THE IMTIATI " r-F THE FIVr
The Fifteenth Session of the United Nations Reneml Assemhlw floured sig­
nificantly in the annals of nonailoned policy. t lame m.imher of coun­
tries from the newly Indemndent African continent took mart for the 
f irs t time In U.w. activities.
The President of Vuooslavla, was one of the heads of the nonaliened 
countries to take thp floor In the Oenoral detete. In his address, he 
outlined the positions and demands of non?1 limed ml Icy. primarily from 
the standpoint of the emblems of mace. At the same session, the Heads 
of State of Ghana, Indonesia, Yuooslavla and the t'r1t«d Arab prnubile 
and the Prime Minister r f  India, hevtne consul ten the other delenetions
A]
of nonaligned countries, subri<tted 9 Joint draft resolution. ‘ -dng 
to the rapid deterioration In tlie international situation, the draft 
called upon the leading powers, the United States and the Soviet Union 
to renew their Interrupted contacts and to seek a peaceful solution to 
their problem Ly ' cf negotiation. The In itiative of the five of 
September 30, l i r r ,  ; aKcd tiiv f i r s t  collective stand by the ronellqncd 
countries a t the level of general In ternational '•■ollcy.^
IV. THE CAIRO PREPARATORY CaNFfPENCC, JUNF h-13. 1 0 6 1  
The International context In which this meeting was hold must be borne 
In mind, f irs t .  I t  was the admission of new states, especially from 
Africa, to the United Nations membership in 1^0 that gave Increased 
urgency to celling a neetlno of the nonaligned nations per se. Iraq's 
Western-aligned government had fallen, and Kasslm had declared
his nation nonaligned. Cuba had fallen to fldel fastro*s revolutionar­
ies and had been declared nonailwed by Its new leaders. Tito, Nasser, 
Sukarno, and the somewhat reluctant Nehru, screed to the convening of a 
nonallwed conference In the Yugoslav capital of Relgrnde.fi
The lis t  of Invite-- w'n, however, ll^ltod to ?S states. When the 
commit ten which Issued Inv+tstlons to the **l^rnie Condemn mg <• > 0  
decide who should he invited, thev refused to l-wlto for’munis* China 
(td»n had b'*en a leedlrj" •'irtlcleanr. In the "ee^uno ren^er^nce e* 
because she was ** Innner In th *ir view 3 n^nali^r- ’ •-e'mtr, l hut a 
potential he lllgm nt, % the other hand, v!r»nslevl3 was reeerded as 
trulv nonaligned, h»»3un^  she was no loneer t l^ l to th*> Soviet hloc but 
neither had she «l!1«d herself with the North i t 1 sntlc Treaty n.T'fors;
1. Review of Tntv'rnatlonel Affairs, n*1orado, Pocr^ntatlne, -'.3, 
s.v.
6. Theodore L. Shay, Ib id . , p .240
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she mWslmed t  nonaligned stance between the two blocs.
Few of the French former colonies qualified because they were too 
closely #111 d to France, whereas nations like Nigeria were too close 
to Brit#; Ml those nations which belonged to Western-oriented 
alliances such as CENTO (The Central Treaty Organization) and SEATO 
(The South East Asia Treaty Organization) were automatically disquali­
fied, as were Japan and Taiwan since they were allied directly with the 
United States by treaty.
At Cairo, the following criteria were formulated by the meeting In 
camera on the ew of the f irs t conference of nonaligned nations;
-  The Invited country should have adopted an Independent policy based 
on the co-existence of states with different political and social 
systems and on nonalignment; or should be showing a trend in favour 
of such a policy;
-  The Invited countr concerned should consistently support movements 
for national Independence;
- The invited country should not be a member of multilateral military 
alliances concluded in the context of Greet Power conflicts;
- I f  an invited country had a bi-lateral military agreement with a 
Great Power or was a member of a regional defence pact, the agreement 
should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great 
Power conflicts,
-  I f  i t  had conceded military bases to a foreign power, the concession 
should not have been made In the context of Great Power conflicts.-
V. BACKGROUND
The Belgrade Conference had an atmosphere of crisis about 1t, The 
background to i t  included the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests, the 
French nuclear tests in the Sahara, the abortive Bay of Pigs Invasion 
of Cuba, the Berlin Wall crisis, the Franeo-Tunlslsn clash over Blzerte 
naval fac ilities  and the crisis In the Congo.
The Slno-Indian border dispute was simmering, me Soviet Union was
7, R.Y.R, Chandrasekhara Rao, "India and Nona!Ign-Surmltry*, The 
World Today, September 1970, p.394
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preparing for a dash with China over the borders 1n the Far East.
VI. THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE
The f irs t gathering of nonaligned nations was organized and held In 
Belgrade, Yugoslavia between September 1 - 6 ,  1 9 6 1 ,  . total of 28 nations
took part, three of them as observers. The Belgrade Conference set 
Its e lf two tasksi
- to define positions and sum up demands of the nonaligned countries 
In terms of the most pressing problems of peace, peaceful relations 
among states, and International cooperation;
- to Intervene, by a special and direct action, for the purpose of 
preserving peace which stood threatened by the deterioration and 
aggravation 1n relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union over Cuba,
The Declaration of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries 
Issued at the end of the Conference, and the so-called "In itiative of the 
Five"; contributed to the extension and further evolution of the concept 
of nonalignment. I t  defined the position of this policy toward the 
major problems and outstanding problem areas of International relations.
On many questions, I t  manifested the so-called Identity of national Inter­
ests and solidarity of a large section of the International community.
At most, broad support for the nonaligned nations was iromoted at the 
Conference.
The Declaration laid particular stress on the elimination of all forms 
of colonialism, encouraged the struggle against Imperialism, expressed 
support for the so-called national liberation movements; advocated dis­
armament; reviewed the problems of development In the poorer areas and 
their trade problems; advocated active and peaceful co-existence; pro­
moted the entry of Communist China Into the United Nations among several 
others.8
8. tees1ng»s Contemporary Archives, February 17-24, 1962, pp.18601- 
13605 A-B, s.v.
See The Belgrade Conference, Appendix B.
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At Belgrade there was a greater degree of sophistication than at 
Bandung, for this time, the Afro-Aslan nations met as exponents of a
distinctive approach to the Cold War pressure between the other conti­
nents. Here there was a more selective membership. India was correct 
In emphasizing the importance of giving attention to urgent world 
problems rather than protesting against colonialism. At Be^rade i t  
became apparent that similarity In foreign policy did not necessarily 
mean friendship.
The Bel grade Conference brought to a spectacular climax Tito's ef­
forts to assert Yugoslav leadership among the nonallgned nations, and 
Indeed, In the councils of the world. The constant Yugoslav refrains 
were the cannon struggle for peace and co-existence, repudiation of 
blocs, Identity of views on International problems and cooperation in 
the United Nations, Yugoslavia, after Belgrade, extended loans and em­
barked on modest technical aid programmes In some of the nonallgned 
countries.
According to Cecil V, Crabb, Jr. the American reaction to the 
Belgrade Conference was one of anger. Most of the American blame was 
placed on Nehru, who played a prominent role. The Americans considered 
the Belgrade Conference a psychological victory for the Communist bloc. 
The Americans maintained that the nonallgned nations failed to condemn 
Soviet colonialism and hegemony In Eastern Europe, and the resumption of 
Soviet nuclear testing,9
9, Cecil V. Crabb (J r.), "The Testing of Nonalignment", Western 
Political Quarterly. Vol. XVII, September 1964, p.SZD------
P m sC am n t Comment In the British and American press suggested 
cnat the Final Declaration reflected the moderating Influence of 
K I M V ? 1 by U Nu (Burma), Mrs, Bandaranalke (Ceylon),
T  F ! ! * "  lnd 00 certain Issues by President Nasser
? Republic), President Bourgulba (Tunisia), and King liassan 
(Morocco), wims, the twenty-seven point declaration put forward no 
concrete proposals for the solution of the German Question, and con-
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The Belgrade communique focussed directly on International affairs 
and Issues. The Cold War, the recognition of Communist China, peaceful 
co-existence, the use of nuclear weapons, a ll featured prominently. For 
the f irs t  time, the Third World was expressing Its own views on various 
International Issues. A distinct shift had taken place from a regional 
to a broader orientation.
At Belgrade, the nonallgned nations defined their own Identity. The 
nonaligned nations defined their International role as one of mediation 
between states In conflict in world politics. The nonaligned nations 
defined their International function as one of reducing systematic ten- 
$ ions and stabilizing Interaction processes at tho global level. These 
notions were formulated In itia lly  within the larger Afro-Aslan context 
and restated In Belgrade specifically within a nonaligned framework.
V II. THE CAIRO CONFERENCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Between July 8-12, 1962, a Conference of developing countries was held 
In Cairo. Thirty-six countries attended with five of them as observers. 
With the exception of Pakistan, the participating countries were nonallgn
ad. India, Yugoslavia, and the United Arab Republic were the conveners 
of this Conference.
The original In itiative for convening a similar economic conference 
of nonallgned countries was takgn during the meeting between Tito, Nehru,
i
and Nasser; held In Cairo between November 17-20 and after a later meet­
ing between the three leaders, also In Cairo; broad consultations were
tafnad no reference to the recognition of Eastern Germany, or to 
Indonesia’s claim to West Net. Guinea. Le Honde expressed the 
opinion that "the only real gainer from this meeting was the 
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic ( I.e . G.P.R.A.)", 
which had been recognized by Afghanistan, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, 
and Ghana, and had received promises of future recognition fror. 
Burma, Ceylon, Congo and Cyprus.
undertaken with other nonaligned countries, and this led to the deci­
sion to convene the Cairo Conference.
The Conference passed the Declaration of Developing Countries which 
set out the positions of the nonaligned countries on a ll economic pro­
blems raised by the requirements of their development, and their rela­
tions with the developed countries. Within the framework of the Ideas 
set out In tills Declaration and the conclusions adopted, the to-called 
Group of Seventy members continued the In itiative In the United Nations, 
which led, at the 17th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 
to convene the f irs t  World Conference on Trade and Development In 
Geneva, In 1%4.
At the Cairo Conference the concept of "economic nonalignment" evolv 
ed. Whereas political nonalignment has meant nonalignment even amongst 
nonaligned nations, economic nonalignment means the alignment of the non 
aligned nations to the developed countries of the First and Second World
V III. THE SINO-INPIAN WAR
The year 1962 was a bad year for India. On October 20, 1962, after a l­
most five years of mounting border tensions between Communist China and 
India, Communist forces Invaued and penetrated far Into India's northern
provinces.
Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. has made an Interesting study of the effects of 
the Chinese Invasion of India. He maintains that China In Its  attack 
on India, was assailing nonalignment Its e lf. Host commentators agree 
that China had sleted upon the border dispute with India as a suitable 
pretext for the achievement of diplomatic objectives at India's expense, 
China also wished to consolidate Its  position In Asia. China hoped to 
teach Nehru and nonaligned India a lesson that they w ill not forget; 
that China was the leading nation In Asia and communism will emerge
4?
10triutephan?. war deeoerecy,
W# eta eaaclude that tha dectrine of nonalignment emerged basically 
Intact from the Stne-Indlan conflict. India had leamt that "there Is 
ne nenalfgnment vis-a-vis China*. India would henceforth base its  
diplomatic nontllgnmunt upon a position of military strength, comparable 
to the armed neutrality of Sweden and Switzerland. Nenallgnment should 
net signify military Impotence and the nonaligned nations should not 
depend upon slogans like "the sp irit of Bandung*, to preserve national 
sovereignty and territoria l integrity. India revealed Its  determination 
to resist Communist aggression by relying chiefly upon Its  own efforts 
and resources, t»; contrast to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The 
supply of military equipment to India did not compromise India’ s nonalign­
ment; In fact I t  preserved I t ,  India re-affirmed Its  faith in nonalign­
ment and democracy. No foreign troops or bases were permitted on Indian 
s o il.11
IX. THE CAIRO CONFERENCE
Oy 1944, the strength of the pro-Comeunist Chinese nonaligned nations had 
Increased. Presidents Sukarno and hkrumah had attained the fu ll measure 
of their pre-communist sympathies in foreign policy. Tanzania-Zanzlbar, 
and Mali were openly sympathetic to Communist Chine; and Algeria was 
bulling with revolutionary fervour.
The convening of the Second Conference of Nonaligned Countries, held 
between October 6-10, 1964, In Cairo, was preceded by broad consultations 
among the nonaligned countries. The Idee of the new conference was dis­
cussed at the 71to-Nasser meeting on Drloni Island In May 1963, and at
10. Cecil V. Crabb, (J r .) , *1he Testing of Nonalignment*, Western
Political Quarterly, Vol. XVII, September, 1964, p.523
11. Cecil V. Crabb, (J r .) , Ib id ., pp.540-1
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the meting between President Nesser end the Prime Minister of Ceylon,
Sri 51 rimevo Bendireneike, In Cairo on October 13, 1963. On this 
b ills , other noneligned countries were consulted end e preparetory com- 
irtttH  i t  ambessedoriel level wes sat up. I t  met in Colombo, Ceylon, 
to organise the conference and send invitations.
The composition of the Cairo Conference, * 1th more than twice the 
ntmfcer of participants as the f irs t  nonaligned conference, demonstrated 
the Increase in the nwtoer of countries which have decided to take an 
active part In the policy of nonalignment, and also Illustrated how 
successful this policy had been In winning adherents In the developing 
countries.
The conclusions and positions assumed at the Belgrade Conference and 
the f irs t  Cairo Conference, were re-affirmed at the Second Conference of
Nonaligned Countries In Cairo.
The Cairo Conference warned that the next International problem could 
be the danger of limited and local wars, and other pressures; and co­
ercion, which stop short of war, but nevertheless, undermine the freedom
of smaller countries.
The participant: noted that Imperialism s t i l l  constitutes *e basic 
source of International iinslen and conflict", that "military and other 
assistance", is being given to "certain countries to enable them to 
perpetuate by force colonialist ettemols to maintain unequal relationships, 
particularly in the economic fie ld , are continuing*.
The participants claimed that the United States is seeking "to Im­
pose changes in the political, economic, and social system* chosen by 
the people of Cuba and that "foreign Interference in the internal affairs 
of countries of Indo-China continues".12
12. Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, Documentation, 
No. 488-9. August 5-20 1970, pp.23-25
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The Cairo Conference produced the most comprehensive statement 
ever made t i l l  then about the urgent need of, and for, economic co­
operation among the member countries, and between them and the Indus­
tr ia lly  advanced countries of Europe and America.
The Cairo Declaration tried to cover some ground by evolving the 
principles upon which the nonaligned countries may try to resolve, by 
their own efforts, their own local or regional problems. By the praise 
conferred upon the Organization of African Unity, In the Cairo Declara­
tion, for Its efforts to resolve mutual tensions among Its members, 
the nonaligned nations have Indicated their preliminary preference for 
such efforts in other regions as well J 3
The Cairo Declaration 'totes with satisfaction that the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development came Into being, and within that body 
the nonaligned nations. In their capacity as developing countries, form­
ed a strong and assertive groin, which had come to be known as the Group 
of Seventy-Seven,
There has been frequent and close Interaction between the nonaligned 
countries and the Group of Seventy-Seven, which has helped to heighten 
the awareness of the world, of the economic agencies of the United 
Nations, and not least of the nonaligned nations themselves, of the 
dimensions of this problem, and of the urgent need for cooperation bet­
ween them. The Cairo Declaration (until the Lusaka Declaration), con­
tained a far more elaborate intement of the nonaligned view of this 
aspect of International relations than an earlier document of its  klndJ* 
At the Cairo Conference, Guinea, Indonesia, and Mall appeared bent 
upon upsetting some of the basic principles of nonalignment, such as,
13, Ibid., p.23
14. Ibid., pp.28-29
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ertterts is fomuUted In Cairo In 1961 and peaceful co- 
•xlsttnca. Strong efforts were made by Indonesia to repudiate compe­
titiv e  oo-exlstence and the United Nations. The Cairo Conference 
unanimously rejected these primarily Coeetunlst Chinese doctrinal Ideas*
At Cairo, the sp irit of conciliation prevailed over the forces of 
confrontation. The Cairo Declaration was an exercise In generalities.
The Conference failed to condemn Coawunist Chinese Intentions of deve­
loping and testing atomic and nuclear weapons.
The Calr' Conference clearly indicated that an overwhelming number 
of nonaligned nations did not have any scepticism about India** nonalign­
ment, In the wake of the Slno-Indian War. However, the Conference show­
ed that though India was one of the leading nonaligned nations, she no 
longer retained her former eminence and weight.
Thus, the policy of nonellgnment not only remains the policy of the 
nonaligned countries, but even more broadly. Is becoming the policy of 
a ll those countries that accept the principles of active eo-existence -  
the peaceful solution of International problems, non-interference In 
the Internal affairs of other states, and several others.
Theodore I .  Shay notes that*
*A second Afre-Aslan Conference was scheduled for Ben Bella’s capital 
of Algiers in 1965. After various construction delays, a coup 
d'etat against the host government, Soviet Russia's insistence that 
I t  be included as an Afro-Aslan state. Indonesian Insistence that 
Malaysia not be Invited, mutual Indian and Comunist Chinese ani­
mosity, and finally Peking's sabotage of the meeting, the conference 
was cancelled. Observers fe lt  there would be no further efforts to 
convene either an Afro-Asian Conference or a new, large-scale non- 
aligned meeting.'
X. THE BELGRADE CONSULTATIVE MEETING
A Consultative Meeting of special government representatives of nonaligned 
countries was held In Belgrade from July 8-11, I960. T.te oartlclnants
18. Theodore I .  Shay, I b id . ,  n.241
SI
tn the settings
-  cawdwned power politic*;
- condteewd Intervention end Interference In the domestic affairs of 
sovereign states;
.  urged implementation of the United Nations Declaration on Independence 
for the Colonial Peoples;
® emphasize- the widening gap between the rich and poor nations;
. re-affirmed their faith In the united Nations Charter;
- advocated the admission of Communist China to the United Nations;
-  recommended comprehensive forms of consultations b-stween nonaligned 
countries;
-  dfseus|jd the desirability of holding a conference of nonaligned ma­
in conformity with the Communique of the Belgrade Consultative 
Meeting of nonaligned countries, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or 
Heads of Delegations of the nonaligned countries, mat at the United 
Nations In New York, on September 27, 1'59.
The participants discussed*
•  the activities and cooperation of the nonaligned nations during the 
Twenty Fourth Session of the General Assembly;
-  the preparations for tne Twenty Fifth anniversary of the United 
Nations;
- and the forthcoming meeting of the nonaligned nations.M 
XL THE OAB-ES-SALAAM PREPARATORY MEETING
The Preparatory Meeting of Nonaligned States was convened In Dar-es- 
Salaam, Tanzania on Aorll 13-17, 1970
16. For the integral text of the Communlmue of the Consultative Meet­
ing see*
Yugoslav Survey, No. 3, ISO , pp. 133-6
KMsTnTTTdn&ttorary Archives, Nov. 8-15, 1369, pp.23663-23664 
Waview of TnternatfonaT AffaTfs. Belgrade, Doomentatlon, No. 
488-9. August 5-20 1970, op.30-31
17. Ib id ., p.31
18. Ib id ., pp.31-33, For fu ll text of Final Communique,
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The parti cl pants dlsctrss^d:
- the prevailing world situation;
- the relo of the nonallqned nations;
" the desirability of economic Independence and self-reliance;
- the proposed suralt conference of nonallqned nations.
President hyenoro said to the Preparatory Meetlno of the foreign 
Ministers of Vie nonaligned countriest
«inside Vie power blocs ticre Is obviously a restless movement of 
peoples struggling for peace and freedom -  and Indeed for a l i t t le  
b it of nonallgnmont . . . .  our nonallgnmnt exists. I t  has already 
had, and I t  s t i l l  has, a tremendous importance In the world. I t
has boon a factor In Vie restlessness of -won!,, In satellite states;
I t  has been a factor In reducing the Imminence of violent confronta­
tion between the great cowers; and I t  has prevented the division 
of the whole world Into two- or even three pwerful and bitterly  
hostile grows.1'**
The participants noted M t l i  nrofound diss^nolntmont" that * progress 
towards the formulation of a strategy for the Second development Decade 
has commanded universal International suonort onlv at the level of genera­
lit ie s * .
A special joint communique Issued at har-es-Salaam described "Vie 
continuance of out-dated and Iniquitous pattern of economic relationships 
with the economically advanced countries* as "the real threat* to the 
Independence of Uio nonaligned countries. What Is more serious, they 
added, "In this situation, developing countries are at Vie mercy of 
forces often beyond their control".
President hyerere. In his address, agreed with the participants, 
about the seriousness of the economic threat and denlored the political 
use which is sometimes made of economic aid. "Many of the nations at 
this conference can give examples of lid  being withdrawn as a result of 
their political decisions", he said, and he had to make the admission
19. Ib id . ,  pp.32-33
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t in t "everyone of us agree to l i t t le  compromises here and there when 
we are conducting supposedly economic negotiations. We have no alter­
native." Some of the developing countries responded in kind and were 
not averse to using political levers for increasing the quantity of aid 
made available to them.
The participants recommended measures which suggest that political 
sensitivities w ill be discouraged from coming In the way of economic, 
and In the ultimate sense, politicali good sense. They endorsed the 
Idea of "sub-regional, regional and Inter-regional cooperation between 
the nonaligned countries". Furthermore, they pronoted the idea of 
"negotiating wide-ranging arrangements of ta r if f  concessions, extended 
to a ll developing countries, and clearing arrangements for trade among 
developing countries on a global scale". A novel programme was their 
recommendation that "mutual agreements" should be made "on the location 
of large-scale multi-national and multi-regional Industries" which ob­
viously require concepts of cooperation between new, and therefore. 
Jealously Independent states which have been triad out only rarely. I f  
at a l l ,  as yet.20
X II. THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE
The Third Conference of Nonaligned States was held In Lusaka, Zambia 
from September 8-10, 1970. About half of the Fifty-Five participating 
states were represented by their Heads of State. Several Latin American 
countries sent observers, almost all of the known so-called national 
liberation movements attended, as observers; and a novel situation 
arosei there were two rival Cambodian delegations, one representing the 
legitimate government of General Lon Nol, and the other representing the 
deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk, In exile In reking. Communist China.
20, Ib id . ,  pp.31-33, passim.
V;\t pirtlci-^nts r  -a fflr i ' r-.d attach-3J social Importance to the
following ^rlricirlTS:
tin rights of people arc not j i t  fre t, tc freedom, solf-determina­
tion, and Independence;
- respect for the sovereignty and territoria l Integrity of a ll states;
-  the right of a ll states to equality and participation In International
affairs,
- tha right of i l l  soveralgn nations to doVrMm 1i fu ll frsedor. the 
paths of their Internal political, economic, social, and cultural
.1’ vo lop-sent,
- the right of a ll -'M.iles to to? ’.>Muf1 ts "CO 'T:1c iovelovn.it and 
the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution;
-  refraining from the threat or use of forco;
■ and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes.
At the Lusaka Conference, the number of conference participants far 
exceeded the number of countries represented at the Belgrade and Cairo 
Conferences respectively. An outstanding characteristic of the delega­
tions from the Arab countries was their representatives, who aooarently
C o m m e n t in g  on the Lusaka Conference, th« fort Times said;
The f irs t  question a disinterested observer might raise about the 
stsmlt conference of "nonaligned" nations .lust concluded In Zambia 
Is; What do tiiev mean by nonalignment? their oer.ormance at 
Lusaka I t  Is clearer than ever (before) that they do not mean to 
signify a neutral or evenhandcJ stand " some of the world’s most 
complicated problems. As expected tha "nonaligned" leaders Unttd 
up decisively with tno Arab sld..* in the widdloCEast Conflict* Their 
resolutions contained no ccnsi--j j f  Palestinian guerillas for hijack­
ing aircraft and holding <m.oc;nt iumars as hostages; but they de­
manded tlie removal of Israeli troors from occupied Arab territory 
and Ifolteo Nations actions against Israel for obstructing Middle 
East peace negotiations. Their approach to the South African problem 
was equally one-sided. They condemned Prltaln for Its  Intention to 
resume arms sales to South Africa but de.eted a specific censure of 
France for selling arms to Pretoria for vears In violation of United 
iiatlons resolutions. This represented a successful lobbvlno effort 
by France’s "Independent" African colonies.
Evidently I t  did no violence to the Conference’s "nonallnned princi­
ples to give the floor and Its  greatest ovation to tlie Foreign Minister 
of the Vletcong regime in South Vietnam. Though calling for a with­
drawal of "all fcrnljn forces" from South Vietnam, one resolution 
blamed the American armed forces exclusively for the suffering and 
deaths In the count*1/., There was no resolution condemning the Soviet
did net »;ave thn ssw axtensivi rr'ims-rtatlon :s thnsr w*>o attended 
the r?n!grade and Cairo Conferences. Perhms, were too pre-occu- 
nlad wit!) th»1r on donwstk and strategic prohlers vk-a-vls Israel. 
Another characteristic s* tho Conference was the manlnlty on all the 
nattors under rn v l:/. To a certain extent, tho African states domina­
ted and Influencnl the course of eventt md disc issions. I t  was not 
suprlsln-j t.h >n that mich of the discussion centr’ d on the so-called 
problem, of the struggle agaliut racial discrimination and apartheid 
and tho decolonization of Africa.
The Lusaka >>clar.itIon has iravn up %«rr> s ta ll'd  nroposals for the 
expansion of trade o^rweon tho developing countries and the Integration 
Of th ilr  econcnlcs tn the naxlmjn mutual adv3,’tar' 1. But action on 
these proposals, so far, has h>en very man re. The nonatlnned nations 
must recognize tho Inescapable fact that the primary res-wmslbllttv for 
their development rests unon themselves. Their record of daveloonwnt 
Is dismal, and their record of cooperation Is even loss satisfactory.
XI11. THE MEETING OF FOREIIN MINISTERS -  SEPTEMBER 1-4, 1973 
Prior to the fourth conference of nonaligned nations, the foreign minis­
ters met from September 1-4 to agree on a definite agenda for the forth­
coming nonaligned conference. The meeting agreed on 3rd September 1373
Arcy‘$ occupation of Czechoslovakia. President Kaunda, the conference 
host. Implored the departing "soldiers of nonalignment" to fight for 
freedom end Justice, but Ills government had done violence to both, 
by arresting sixteen reporters for Western news organizations, be­
cause some of them were based In South Africa and Rhodesia. When 
the firs t of these conferences and meeting was held in Yugoslavia In 
1961, i t  seemed to make sense to bring nonallined leaders together 
for common objectives. Including efforts to ease relations between 
the power blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union. Today 
I t  is no longer clear what nonailgnment means, I f  anything, or what 
shared goals the self-styled "nonaligned" can west pursue collectively, 
(New York Times Magazine, September 13, i 370.)
rJ
to ttic attn’.lsslon to full merf'crshlp of the nonal1rr.r‘r! grour the follow­
ing stalest Argentina, rangladesh, Bhutan, Oman, Peru and Oatar.
f'alta was else admitted as a full mrirtor of the no''aligned group.
Indeed, this decision overrode on« of the five original criteria  
for memHrshlp of the nonallgned group - that nemher countries should 
not offer n il  1 tar:- t ascs to other countries. rresunatly, the rowmnent 
of t'alta could have argued that the cirrert r l l l i . a r *  agreement expires 
only in  1:70. TIic I"vlgrade Conference o f nonallrned nations declared 
In 13(1%
*11, *n.e participating countries consider t'e fistabllsiviert and 
maintenance of foreign military bases In the territories of 
other countries, particularly against their express w ill, a 
gross violation of the sovereignty of such States. They 
declare their fu ll surrcrt tc cour.trlt:* which are endeawurlng
to secure the vacation of these bases. They call upon those
countries maintaining foreign baer’S te consider seriously 
their abolition as a contribution to world peace.
12, They also acknowledge that the North American military base 
at Goan tan amc, Cuhci, to the permanence o* which the Government 
and people of Cuba have expressed their opposition, affects 
the sovereignty and territoria l Integrity of that country.
At the Cairo Conference of noraligned countries. In 1064, the parti­
cipants rG-afflrred the basic principles of the declaration of Belgrade 
Of DC1.
Cube participated as a full member at Belgrade, Cairo, Lusaka and 
Algiers despite the vast American presence at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba cannot 
evict the United States from Guantanamo by force of anus, and the United 
States Is unwilling to depart until its lease on t!« naval fac ility  ex­
pires. (By the now famous Platt amendment, the United States was given 
the right to lease or buy Guantanamo hay as a naval base at the beginning 
of this century.)
?talta can similarly claim that I t  can do H t t l *  to sever the military
21, See: The ’3lgrade Conference, Apncnrflx B.
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agreement untl1 1979. But since I t  otherwise adheres to, abides by 
and dedicates Its e lf to the principle* and policy of nenallgmaent as 
expressed at Belnrede. Cairo, and Lusaka, Malta should be allowed to 
participate at the Algiers Conference.
XIV. THE ALGIERS CONFERENCE
The fourth conference of Heads of State and Government of the nonaltf*ed 
countries was held In Algiers, Algeria from September 5th to 9th, 1973,
The Conference took place during the tenth International trade fa ir  held 
In Algiers from August 31st to September 16th, 1973. According to the 
offic ia l l is t ,  76 fu ll members attended. Nine countries sent 0bser»«r3» 
the three neutrals -  Austria, Finland and Sweden - came as guests. The 
following International organizations were also renresented at the Con­
ference! the United Nations (by Or. Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary General) ,  
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League and the African, 
Aslan end Latin American Solidarity Organization.
Representatives of 14 liberation movements recognized by the OAU were 
also present at the Conference, as well as Mr. Yasser Arafat of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization and Mr. Joan Marla Bras, of the Socia­
l is t  Party of Puerto Rico. Cambodia was represented by Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk. The Prlncs appealed to all the nonallgned countries to reco­
gnize his government and, I f  they had not yet done so, to break off diplo­
matic relations with Israel. While denounc^n- continued American Involve­
ment In CanAodla, he claimed that there were no North Vietnamese or Viet 
Cong troops operatine In Cambodia.
President Sadat of Egypt entreated the nonallgned nations to proceed 
from "mare denunciation* to "action* to achieve a settlerent n* t ; ^
East conflict, and tnornttnd tkat sanrH^rr- tim'iV » f in - 'T f t o  ft
Israeli “aggression". tin declared that ■«-*» errrv*s1cn“
allgned country" should he renarded a« a ehallerr" tr all rvch countries
tthlci should t@kj collective to su;" ort t!i., v1 ctl^i of aggression.
The Political Declaration of the Conference fie alt with the detento 
Utib-.'cen tie Gret Po.V'iM» t!ie !>1 ildlo La^t, Latf•: rlca* the 11.oration
novci-enti, Indo-Ctilne and oticr rotten such vs 'Immanent.
The. Lcononlc r-oclaraVcn contained a nurrter of Mreposals for e cowon 
approach cf the riiin;! 1 an*'! othi*r dcvelc' 1:.g cou;:tri*x, to adopted
in future r-ultllatiTal trade v.cgotiatlont• • yx-1', V’.o..c prooostls were
prcferci.ti.il trwLacnt fc,r ti.e developing ccur.trir an extension of the 
general syctci' of preferences, a cede of conduct ’or the activities of 
B<ult1 national and tran.~i.ot1or.pl cunppolcp 'or. t right wO nationalize 
the assets cf foreign f in s  vy any state. The n^allonci nations de­
manded an urgent ctcwr.ln^ cf a joint cenf n ' c: cf t'-.n rood and Agri­
cultural Orsanlzation (f/V)) ai d u;.Cv;.': to vxaidov. the world's food 
shortages.
Tlte Corfu run co adcrtfd a rosolutioi. callin'. +cr a boycott of Israel, 
a resolution recognized the go'/emnont of Prince ^orodon Sihanouk In 
Cambodia, and urged rote ria l support for V- ’ 1! 'ration •w iror.ti In 
Souttiem Africa.
The Algiers Declaration stressed that dotento, dialogue and peaceful 
co-existence between the Last and the Wssst promote peace in tiie First 
end Second World. The Third World areas reiwin centres of v«r, tension 
end economic under-developrvnt. Peace Is confined to tl>e prosperous 
areas of tie world end the gulf between tie  rlc f id poor nations is 
widening. International security cannot ly* acnioved In a world where 
there Is economic insecurity. Ttiua, the roialimicd com-trles nledre 
themselves to promote the principles of economic security In International 
relations.
The nonalloned nations hlamed colonialism. Imperialism, n»o-colon1al- 
ism, Zionism, racial discrimination amonn ct.nr*, for tha failure of ten-
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noinlc progress In the developing nonaligned world. The developed 
countries lack the political w ill to take action to Improve the plight 
of the poor developing countries. The necessary International coopera­
tion has been lacking or was unsatisfactory.
The Algiers Declaration accused the multi-national corporations of 
plundering the developing countries. Inflation and the International 
monetary crisis were causing havoc to the economies of the developing 
countries. Largo sums of money were spent on the arms race and the 
conquest of snace, but l i t t le  was done to aid the growing needs of the 
developing countries. The brain drain from the developing countries 
to the developed countries continues unchecked.
The Algiers Declaration stressed that the share of the developing 
countries In world trade declined from 21,3 per cent In i960 to 17*6 
per cent In 1970. There has been no Improvement 1n the terms of deve­
lopment financing.
The Algiers Declaration contained a number of proposals foi a common 
posture of nonaligned and other developing countries to be adopted In 
future multilateral trade negotiations. These proposals Included! 
acceptance of the principles of non-dlscrlmlnation and preferential 
treatment for developing countries, an expansion of the generalized sys­
tem of preferences, and the Inclusion of preferential treatment for 
developing countries In any reform of International trade.
At Algiers, the nonaligned countries agreed on the following measures*
•(a) The creation of an economic and social development fund open 
to participation by all non-aligned countries for the purpose of 
promoting Investment and financing development projects and techni­
cal assistance.
(b) Prior authorization and government control of foreign Invest­
ments, the securing of assurances that authorized foreign Invest­
ments would rot b<? prejudicial to national development plans and 
would generate new employment, and the limitation of foreign Invest­
ments to non-strategic sectors of national economies.
(c) Reinvested profits from foreign investments to be considered as
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new Investments subject to prior control.
(d) A "Code of conduct* for the activities of "transnational and 
multinational companies".
{«) Reaffirmation of the right of any State to nationalize the 
assets of foreign companies In order to recover Its  natural resour­
ces,
( f )  Co-ordination of the action of memhor-States In order to achieve 
a reform of the world’s economic and financial system.
(g) a demand for the urgent convening of a joint conference of FAO 
and UNCTAD to examine the world's food shortages.,z2
The Algiers Conference also recommends that the nonallgnej countries
should act as a catalytic force In the Group of Seventy-Seven in order to
Increase the effectiveness and solidarity of the doveloolng countries.
The Conference urged the Secretary General of the Uni ted Nations to
convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted exclusively to
the problems of devrloome.it.
XV. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS IEETING IN LI.'IA. m b ,  SEPTE ?3EP 1-7, 1975 
The Foreign Ministers Meeting of the nonaligned countries met In Lime,
Peru for six days and was attended by 81 nonallgnel countries Including 
56 foreign ministers. The main Item on the agenda was the world economy 
and the economic situation of the developing world. However, the con­
ference dealt with the Middle East and tha Arah-Israeli conflict.
Delegates rejected a proposal for the expulsion of Israel from the United 
Nations and adopted a resolution urging Israel to evacuate and withdraw 
unconditionally from a ll occupied Arab territories. Other subjects 
Included were the Intensification of the struggle against colonialism, 
noo-colonialism and apartheid and support for the liberation movements.
The Lima Conference reiterated arguments and proposals made at Algiers 
and other Third World gatherings. The nonaligned countries blamed the
22. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 1-7, 1973, 
PP.26117-26121, X-3. ~
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West for i l l  their problems, accused the Industrialized countries, the 
multinational and transnational corporations of plundering the developing 
world. The Lima Conference urged Increased cooperation at all levels 
between thedeveloped and developing countries. The Lima Conference 
made a review of the development of economic and social conditions In 
the developing countries In the context of the prevailing world situation.
The participants also noted that more than half of the member states of 
the international community representing the majority of mankind were
present at the Conference.
At Lima, Peru the Communist countries, North Vletnar and North Korea were
welcomed as fu ll members of the nonaligned conference. These countries 
had not attended the Algiers Conference of nonaligned countries even as 
observers. Panama mad attended and thus was accepV.J as a fu ll member 
of the nonaligned conference. At Algiers, the nonallgne ; nations nad 
endorsed Panama's claim to sovereignty over ine Canal Zone under United 
States control. The Palestine Liberation Organization had observer status 
at Algiers, but at Lima i t  was also given fu ll membership of the confer­
ence.
The Phllipr South Korea were apparently excluded from parti­
cipating because both governments voluntarily permitted American bases 
and troops on V s lr so il.23
XVI, ANALYSIS Of THE CONFERENCES
The sessions of the Nomaligned Conferences lest only a few days. Since 
many resolutions are passed, i t  Is evl unt that there Is not enough time 
available for a thorough discussion of a ll the resolutions on the Agenda.
In spite of this fact, the nonellgned nations do consider all the 
resolutions on the agenda and take decisions. These decisions are then
23. Time, SeptesAer 8, 1975, pp.18-21.
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taken on to the United Nations General Assembly for further considera­
tion.
Should the duration of the sessions of the Conferences be extended, 
the many distinguished delegates would not be able to attend because 
of more pressing commitments at home. Some leaders dare not stay away 
from their capitals for some length of time. When Hilton Obote was 
away at a conference Idl Amin seized power In Uganda. Kwame Nkrusah 
of Ghana was overthrown while attending a conference,
A brief analysis of resolutions dealt with at sessions i f  the non- 
aligned conferences reveal that the problems of colonialism, racial 
discrimination and Imperialism have received attention at a ll sessions. 
Modem Imperialism, colonialism end racism, are usually associated 
with the West by she nonaligned nations. Today, especially. In view 
of rapid decolonization in Asia and Africa, Imperialism and colonialism 
cannot be identified exclusively with the Western countries. The non- 
aligned nations seldom speak of Soviet control over a large per cent of 
the Soviet population who are of non-Russian descent end of the Soviet 
occupation of Eastern Europe. Was I t  not China that carried out the 
most recent annexation by force of an alien nation - Tibet? There are 
many nonaligned Asian states that have large national minorities which 
are often discriminated against.
Since the Second World War the West has embarked on a policy of 
emancipation and de jlonizatlon; while the Soviet Union has embarked 
on e policy of annexation, domination and subjection In Eastern Europe.
The nonaligned nations adopt double standards to the West and their 
familiarity with Western colonialism only, broods contempt for the West.
Laurence W, Martin, a scholar of Afro-Aslan affairs notes that the 
Bandung Conference was a gathering of both aligned and nonaligned nations. 
He maintains that the Communist states were there to show their opposi-
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tion to leperlallsm end colonlilts#*; end else show solidarity with 
the non-Mestim nations, Nehru and Chou En-lal had their Five Prin­
ciples of Peaceful Co-existence reaffirmed end expanded to ten. The 
aligned countries launched attacks on Censunitr, but Chou-en-Lai adopt­
ed •  diplomatic peace posture and avoided confrontations.24
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE 
A close study of the united Nations Charter w ill reveal that i t  is based 
on the principle of peaceful co-existence although i t  does not use this 
very concept. In Its  oreasfcle, the United Nations Charter, for example, 
states that the member countries undertake •to practice tolerance and 
live together In peace with one another as good neighbours*, and to 
unite their “strength to maintain international peace and security*.
By that, the totted Nations Charter In fact provides for the practice of 
what the nonallgned nations cat I peacefr! co-existence. Some other 
articles of the United Nations Charter are also based on the tacit reco­
gnition of this principle and also on the recognition of such principles 
ass
- the sovereign equality of states (Article 2 ( !} );
- non-intervention (Article 2 (7)};
- the equality and self-determination of peonies (Article 1 (2));
- territoria l integrity (Article 2 (4)).
The most ardent supporters of the slogan of peaceful co-existence 
have been the Communist countries. The Five Principles of Co-existence 
are noble. I f  not quite clear; I f  they were more clear they might not 
sound so noble.
In the Bandung Confere.r m l is t  of principles had swollen to ten.
24, Laurence V. Martin, ed,» Neutralism and Honallgnmont .  (New Yorks 
Frederick A. Praeger, WH?), pp. 14-15 ~
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The f irs t  four principles In the 51no-Indian Treety survive in altered 
or lengthened form. Several new ones Include among otherst
- respect for fundamental human rights;
-  respect for the purposes and principles of tho Charter of the United 
Nations;
-  respect fortthe right of each nation to defend Its e lf singly or col­
lectively In conformity with the Charter of the United Nations;
-  abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve 
the particular Interests of any of the Great Powers;
- abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries;
- and respect for justice and international obligations.
Peaceful co-existence was thus* elevated from -he l is t  of enumerated 
principles to the caption of the l is t  -  The Principles of Peaceful Co­
existence.
We may note certain striking features of these and other lis ts  of 
declarations. Foremost is their ambiguity and the flu id ity of their 
contents. Most of the items stressed end most of the reasons advanced 
for them or in their support have been conspicuous for their failure to 
specify a secondary content - a content that is sufficiently arguable 
to have some meaning. Where the content Is arguable. I t  is designed 
to advance a cause. An example Is the proclamation of the Inalienable 
right of peoples to their natural resources Is loudly silent upon the 
form and extent of compensation or other redress In the event of expro­
priation.
One of the Bandung Principles was the settlement of all International 
disputes by peaceful means such as, negotiation, conciliation, arbitra­
tion, or Judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the 
parties1 own choice In conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 
Indeed, the phrase - "other peaceful means of the parties* own choice", 
can be Interpreted also as to require consent of the parti in each caso 
before resort to arbitration or Judicial settlement, or Indeed, any other
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specified peaceful means. S t i l l , the reference to arbitration and 
judicial settlement. Is there.
Peaceful means were not exhausted when tins Indian take-over of Goa, 
Dio and Daman took place; and the Indian action was praised as the 
righting of historic wrongs. The colonial power, Portugal was at 
fault and not the nonaligned India, The Slno-Indian border clashes 
are regarded as mere aberrations of the Principles of Peaceful Co-exis- 
tence, and not as part of the pattern of Communist Chinese Imperialism 
In South East Asia, I t  Is an Internal a ffa ir of the Soviet Union that 
the massive Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the 
Cieehoslovak debacle Is treated In many nonaligned quarters, Arab agre­
ssion against a solidly nonaligned Israel Is condoned, while Israeli re­
tention of the Sinai and other captir*-;: *reas Is not regarded as preven­
tive counter-action. Indeed, the principles of peaceful eo-exlstence 
are completely Ignored by states in their International relations,
B, THE SUMMIT CONFERENCES OF THE NONALIGNED NATIONS 
Since the Belgrade Conference In 1961, numerous meetings of the nonallgo­
od countries have been held. Thus far, no attempt has been made to 
create a more or less Institutionally built up International organization. 
There Is no Organization of Nonaligned Nations such as there Is an 
Organization of American States (GAS) and an Organization of African 
Unity. (OAU).
The Organization of American States has a Charter that comprises 112 
articles. I t  places tne Inter-American system on a permanent treaty 
basis within the United Nations framework. Articles 32 and 101 define 
the structure and functions of the organization. The supreme organ of 
the organization Is the Inter-American Conference which In ordinary 
session meets every five years, although at the request of two-thirds of 
the members a special conference may be convened. The Charter sets out
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the purpose, principles, duties and rights of the O.A.5., the purpose 
of the organization Is to fac ilita te  the pacific settlement of disputes, 
to strengthen Inter-American solidarity and to raise economic, social 
c.id cultural standards. Provision Is made for collective security 
and enforcement action.
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Is an organization within 
the definition of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government Is the supreme organ of the 
QAH and meets at least once a year. Each member state has one vote, 
procedural questions ere decided by simple majority and resolutions are 
approved by a two-thirds majority. A Council of Ministers, frequently 
Foreign Ministers, meets for consultative pumoses, and Is required to 
do so at least twice a year. I t  Is responsible to the Assembly of the 
Heads of State and Government. Tuerc Is no rrevision for any enforce­
ment action against a member State. Tin emphasis Is on peaceful conci­
liation. The resolutions of the organization are only advisory. The 
OAU affirms of a policy of nonalignment wlta regard to a ll aloes.
I t  must be noted that the governments of the nonallgned nations are 
developing habits of consultation and concerted action or. a range of 
Issues. We have noted that there have been several carefully staged 
meetings, with much fan-fare and public addresses, quiet baekstaee diplo­
macy, and formal resolutions. There Is increasing Inter-capital v,*1ts 
and conferring by heads of state. There Is caucusing before voting In 
the General Assembly of the United Nations. There is a regular Aslsn- 
Afrlcan Caucusing Group, and also smaller caucusing groups of Arab 
states and African states.
However, a ll these patterns are s t i l l  flu id, but certain features 
emerge. The Lusaka Conference (1970) demonstrated that a shared sense 
of weakness could bring together such left-wlnc regimes as Tito's In 
Yugoslavia with such right-wing governments as those of Ethlonla, Neoal,
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end Morocco, The Lusaka Conference also revealed unanimity on the 
desire to mitigate the rigours of economic development and social change.
The leaders of nonaligned countries have faith In the effectiveness 
of International conferences. This is their belief ti«at as African,
Aslan and other leaders get to know each other and are able to under­
stand the goals and aspirations of other nations, the prospects for 
peace and security w ill be enhanced.
The domestic political motivations Involved In summit meetings must 
be emphasised. Nonaligned nations' political leaders have reaped bene­
f i t  from the many Afro-Aslan summit meetings by showing the people at 
home that they were genuinely concerned and earnestly seeking to a llev i­
ate world tensions and by showing that they were leaders of stature, who 
were able to enhance the nation's prestige abroad. Indeed, sheer curio­
sity also sometimes plays a part In leading nonaligned statesmen to the 
Afro-AsIan summit conferences. This motivation Is especially Important 
when there have been revolutionary changes within the Afro-Aslan nations, 
creating a necessity for the new and often temporary leaders to become 
acquainted with their opposite numbers abroad.
However, Afro-AsIan summit meetings, with other techniques of open- 
door and face-to-face diplomacy, have become a permanent feature of 
International relations. From time to time, circumstances may demand 
that they be held, especially as regimes change and as new leaders as
well as new problems emerge.
Indeed, with a ll their deficiencies, Afro-Aslen summit conferences 
must be held regularly. I f  for no other reason than to demonstrate to 
politically conscious masses throughout the Third World that every device 
and avenue Is being utilized to assure global peace.
I t  can be said that the nonaligned nations treat foreign affairs as 
an arena of national and Ideological effort. They make moves on the
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diplomatic chessboard for their oropaganda Impact! to rally their 
friends in the outside world, to win other particular elements in their 
own country, and to ombarass their opponents at home.
The nonaligned nations mako proposals, demands and circulate o ffi­
cial documents that are carefully calculated to show up the "motives* 
of the West but none of the Ea*t; and to mobilize world opinion against 
colonialism and racialism.
Seldom have the nonallgnad nations made protests against Communist 
violations of treaties and agreements, against Communist crimes In the 
area of human rights as defined by the United Nations Charter.
Hidden beneath the veneer of decisions are a whole range of urgent 
problems that are quietly dropped or pigeonholed for future discussion, 
like boundary problems, human rights and legal issues among the non- 
aligned nations themselves.
I t  Is obviously clear that noneligned rations are s t i l l  poles apart 
on several key Issues, and stubborn adherence to "artisan nationalistic 
viewpoints prevents the unity of nonallgnad nations.
The numerous conferences aptly dlsolay the divergent opinions of the 
nonaligned nations on both tig and small Issues. National interest 
s t i l l  reigns supreme and the habit of nationalism s t i l l  runs strong below 
the surface appearance of an International posture. Despite verbal 
professions of lofty goals of unity the nonallgnrd nations remain non­
united.
Indeed, a nonaligned conference would have meaning only to the ex­
tent that I t  poses the necessary questions, proceeds to the required 
analysis, stimulates real discussions and above all asks:
Does nonalignment as a policy exist? And I f  I t  does, what are Its 
criteria? What benefits can the participation nations expect from It?
'"Uhat Is the best ohitosophlcal and practical a-~roaci to the problem?
What are the obstacles along their way? 'hat klni of organization 
Is required for the pursuit of this policy I f  I t  Is Justified?
Posing and attempting to answer those questions, w ill mean advancing 
towards a realistic conception of nonalignment, and at the sane time, 
put an end to the verbalizing that forms a carapace around the problem 
befogging the Issues and making I t  d ifficu lt to arrive at a clear com­
prehension of its Implication.
Is i t  opportune and appropriate for men who are responsible for the 
fate of their nations to come together In some part of the world, with 
a ll that this Involves In terms of the expenditure of time, money and 
energy, simply to make another Inventory of tho problems confronting 
and pre-occupying the developing nations on the International scene, 
since sufficiently well-known tribunes already exist for oratorical 
tournaments.
Indeed I t  Is Impossible to say precisely which states are nonaligned.
I think that perhaps the membership of a future conference should be 
defined along the lines of what the nonaligned states should be. I 
feel that I t  would be Important at future conferences of nonaligned 
states - I f  they are to be effective that the participating nations 
should net be too emotionally Involved In trying to be judges In matters 
to which they are parties. Participating nations should avoid entering 
Into any emotional accusations against other states with which they are 
aggrieved because the proper platform for such accusations Is at the 
United Nations.
Theodore L. Shay conducted an analysis of the nonaligned states attend­
ing the Bandung, Belgrade, and Cairo Conferences and found that Soviet- 
oriented states successfully dominated the membership. We stem-oriented
states either were not Invited to participate or. In the case of the 
■universal* Cairo Conference many declined to attind a breakdown of confer-
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XVII. CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have traced the origin and development, of the policy 
of iwiailgnment as a policy o f consensus. The nonaligned nations have 
undertaken a variety of approaches towards political and economic deve­
lopment. Nonalignment Is essentially a post Second World War phenome­
non. Nonalignment, as an anti-colonial response, Is a logical policy 
development among weak, non-Western rations. Nonalignment is now a 
global phenomenon. The doctrine of nonalignment has adherents in 
Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. More then one third of mankind 
live In countries that pursue a policy of nonalignnent. The nonaligned 
nations comprise a majority of states in the United Nations General 
Assembly, Since each state has a vote in the General Assembly, the non- 
aligned nations have an International forum 1r which they exert a voting 
strength far out of proportion to their real power In International 
affairs. Since the General Assembly Is dominated by their votes, the
25. Theodore L. Shay, Ib id ., pp.241-242
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nonaligned nations promote their causes and Interests at the United 
Nations. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Is 
an example of united action by the nonaliened nations and I t  w ill be 
discussed In the following chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD AND UNCTAD
I.  INTRODUCTION
Since the Second Uorld War, the traditional colonial moire# haw been 
dismantled and a large number of new states have emerged. Many of 
these states claim to be nonallnnel and noov. Another contemporary 
phenomenon Is the growing polarization of the poorer nations vis-a-vis 
the rich ones and the growing political cohesion of the developing 
nations. Despite the vast differences and hostilities which character­
ize many developing regions (such as India versus Pakistan; Iran versus 
Irag; Indonesia versus Malaysia; Ethiopia versus Somalia) they met 
fa irly  effectively and at times in a monolithic bloc In International
economic negotiations.
The post Second World War period has also ben characterized by the 
growth and spread of capitalism throughout the developing world. Inter­
national trade and foreign Investment has Increased rapidly In the world. 
In response to foreign aid, capitalist fOms of production and organiza­
tion have grown In scope and significance within most of the poorer 
developing countries. Indeed, capitalism has also penetrated the coun­
tries be. md the Iron Curtain - such as the availability of Pepsi-Cola in 
Moscow.
Trade ha; become the most vital arena In the field of development. 
Many of the A fro -Aslan states lived largely on the sale of their primary 
products and raw materials to the more developed countries, from which 
they Import finished goods.
An authoritative analysis concluded that although the trade of the 
developing countries was Increasing, I t  was not keening nace with expa.i-
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•Jon olsewhorc. Thnlr share 1i total '-for1 -* trade was thus falUnri, 
and In addition, most of the trade was with the advanced countries 
r, thnr than wlti the wst of the Third World. "hat was worse, the 
pries the developing countries received for their oo*1s was decreas­
ing relatively to what they paid for Industrial and other gods from 
abroad. This degradation a * the terns of trade threatned their very 
existenceJ
Since Independence, tlKt Afro-Aslan and developing countries had re­
ceived much aid from the East and the West to promote their economic 
development. This was at the height of thr Cold War when the Last and 
the West cORf'eted with each other for the loyalties of the dove!oping 
countries. Since this aid was giver for political purposes, the non- 
aligned nations condemned both the East and the West. They maintained 
that the burden of Interest payments and capital repayments became a 
considerable drain or. export earnings. Since aid was frequently tied 
so that the recipient. Instead of using aid to buy what he wanted where 
i t  was available most cheaply, was obliged to accept schemes not on his 
l is t  of priorities or buy goods from the donor Instead of more cheaply 
elsewhere. Many nations maintained that aid perpetuated an economic 
pattern created In colonial tlm ti, when I?it colonics were producers of 
raw materials for their colonial masters. For many nations, aid Imped­
ed the dlwrsl ."1 cation of developing economics erd retarded the Industria­
lization of the recipient nations. Aid was a poor substitute for what 
the Intemat 1 economy and particularly guaranteed prices for their 
products and access to the markets of the developed and affluent world. 
Indeed, the developing nations wished to promote the establishment of a
1. Bronislav Gosovic, “UNCTADt North-South Encounter1, International 
Conciliation. No. 560 (May 1968), pp.5-80,
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mu intanMtien&l •ccmrle order, bssed m  equity* sovereign •quellty, 
Interdependence, mituel Interest end cooperstion eemng i l l  iteles i r ­
respective of their em oeie end social system.
At Belgrade in 1961, and at Cairo in 1962, the usualIgned nations 
expressed concern over the dangers of the continued end Increasing eco­
nomic disparity between the developing and developed countries. At 
Belgrade they demanded steps to close "the ever-widening geo in the 
standards of living between the few economically advanced countries and 
the many economically less developed countries". They invited "all 
comtiies in the course of development to cooperate effectively in the 
econoeric end coaemrciel fields so ts to face the policies of pressure in 
the economic sphere, as well ts the harmful results which may be created 
by the economic blocs of industrial countries".*
The Cairo Conference of Nonaligned Countries of 1964 produced the 
meet comprehensive statement ever made t i l l  then about the urgent need 
for economic cooperation among the member countries and between them and 
the industrially advanced countries. An entire chapter o" the eleven 
chapter Cairo Declaration is devoted to economic cooperation.
When the United Nations Conference on Trade end Development (UNCTAD) 
came into being, maligned countries, in their capacity as the 
developing eeuntKes, forced a strong and assertive group which has come 
to be known *»* the Group of Seventy Seven (77). There has been frequent 
and close 1... action between the nonaligned nations and the Group of 
Seventy Seven (77). This interactipn has helped to heighten the aware­
ness of the world, of the economic agencies of the United Nations and 
not least of the usualigned nations themselves of the dimensions of this 
problem and of the urgent need for cooperation between them*
2. For mere details see; The Belgrade Conference, Appendix B
nThere ere Increeslng signs on the plane of International diplomacy, 
that the world 1$ emerging from the ideological framework that has 
since the early 1950*8 often clouded the underlying realities of the 
bipolar cold war. New poles of power are appearing and new checks end 
balances between these will have to be worked out.
When the Third Conference of HonalTgned Countries met In Lusaka 
from September 6th to the 10th 1970, the participants conferred on the 
problems of peace, Independence, development, cooperation and the demo­
cratization of International re!" u. The Lusaka : uclaretlon asserts 
that Idie balance of terror has not brought peace nd security to the 
rest of the world. The lofty principles of the United Nations, the 
Lusaka Declaration maintains, could be brought to closer realization I f  
the role of the nonailgned countries would be strengthened within and 
outside the United Nations, Moreover, the nonaligned and m ilita rily  
weak nations desire, more ardently than any others, “the dissolution of 
great power military alliances" and genuine disarmament, particularly 
of the atomic powers,3
I I .  BACKGROUND TO UNCTAD I
The f irs t United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
was preceded by almost two years of Intensive discussions and prepara­
tion, Indeed, this pre-conference activity actually determined the 
outcome of the conference.
In 1961 the Second Cornelttee of the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted an amendment to Assembly Resolution 1707 {XVII) debated on Decem­
ber 19, 1961. The resolution was titled  "International trade as the 
primary Instrument for economic development*. The amendment called on
3, Seer The Lusaka Conference, Appendix E
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the Secretary General to find etit I f  member countries were of the 
opinion that e conference devoted to International trade problem should 
be organized by the United Nations. The forty-five (45) nations In 
favour of the amendment were mainly African and Asian countries plus 
the Communist bloc. The thirty-six votes against were east by the 
Western developed countries and the Latin American states. There were 
ten (10) abstentions. At the very outset, the so-called North-South 
sp lit was in evidence.
In 1962 an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolution convening 
am International trade conference and establishing a Preparatory Commit­
tee was to consider the agenda and prepare the necessary documents for 
the conference.
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 178$ (XVII) of Decem­
ber 8, 1962, decided to hold a World Conference on Trade and Development. 
I t  was hoped that some of the problems could be resolved and a mew deal 
obtained for the developing countries. The points under discussion 
would include the need for increasing the trade of the developing count­
ries -  both among themselves end with the developed countries -  in pri­
mary w eed!ties as well as manufactured goods; measures for ensuring 
stable, equitable and remunerative prices for their experts; and measures 
for gradually removing ta riffs  and other barriers which had an adverse 
effect on their trade. Finally, the conference would seek to establish 
any methods and machinery deemed necessary.4
In 1963 the United Nations General Asseemly welcomed a *Joint Declara­
tion of the SeventyFive (75) Developing countries". This declaration 
proposed a novel and dynamic international trade policy, which would en­
able the developing countries to expend and diversify their trade. This
4. Keeping's Contemporary Archives. February 1963, p.19370 A-B,
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would Involve the removal of trade barriers, fa ir  and stable export 
prices, more aid on better te rn  and the creation of new machinery to
Implement the oolley.
In 1964, the main Ideas of the Joint Declaration were embodied in
the Preblseh Report to UNCTAD entitled "Towtrus a New Trade Policy for 
Development8. This lengthy document, known as "The Preblseh Reoort", 
became the basic policy document of the conference. Both the diagno­
sis and reforms advocated by Preblseh develop Ideas originally present­
ed In the Joint Declaration.
On December 30th, 1964, the nineteenth session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, Resolution 1995 (XIX) established
UNCTAD as an organ of the General Assenfcly, The existence of groups 
was partly recognized by this resolution. For the purpose of elections 
to posts the membership of UNCTAD Is divided Into four lists of states*
A. Africa, Asia (excluding Japan) and Yugoslavia.
B. Western Europe (Including Turkey, Cyprus and Malta), the United 
States, Canada, Jaoan, New Zealand and Australia.
C. Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean.
D. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.5
From the outset, nations In UNCTAD took sides and three basic groups
crystallized.
A. the Group of Seventy-Seven (77) African, Asian and Latin American 
countriesi
B. the Market economies of Western Europe;
C. and the centrally planned economies of the Eastern bloc.
A. THE GROUP OF SEVENTY-SEVEN (77)
The three groups defined along lines of relative wealth and socio-economic
systems were to be . continuing feature of future conferences. The Group
5. Branlslav Gosovlc, Ib id ., pp.1-16, oasstm.
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of Seventy Seven (77) he* become the saetn entity for the expression 
of the demends of the developing countries.
In it ia lly , the Group consisted of Seventy Five (75) countries, 
but by the end of the firs t Conference, the developing countries num­
bered Seventy Seven (77). At the present time the Group consists of 
about 98 countries, but for political and psychological reasons the 
name Group of Seventy Seven (77) has been maintained/'
6, The Group of Seventy Seven (77) was constituted durlno the firs t  
UNCTAD Conference in Geneva, 1964, comprising the following 
countriesi
Afghanistan
Algeria
Argentina
Bolivia
hraiil
tiumo
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Control African Republic
Ceylen
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Conge
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Dahomey
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Mexico
Morocco
f'.pai
(icaregwa
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Gabon
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Jamaica
L edan
Ke. >a
Korea (South)
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Liberie
Libya
Madagascar
Malaysia
Mall
Mauritania
Syria
Sudan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobaoo
Tunisia
Uganda
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam (South)
Yemen (People’s Democratic 
Republic)
Yugoslavia
Zaire
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Alfred S. Frtedeberg hes studied the United Nation* Conference on 
Trade end Development of 1964. He stresses the feet that UNCTAD was 
a political event rather than an economic conference. The existence 
of the Group of Seventy Seven (77) has given UNCTAD its political 1m- 
pert4tt.ee but i t  has also created many of its  problems. The Group 
comprises states of diverse political regimes from three continents, 
ranging from the very poor to the modestly rich a d the coalition of 
developing countries has common interests only at a high level of 
generality.
In reality, the Group of Seventy Seven is a weak coalition of three 
regional groups -  African, Asian (the Arabs are divided by continent, 
aid in addition* Yugoslavia meets with the Asian group) and Latin 
American (Including the English speaking Caribbean). Decisions on 
Issues 're made in the three regional groups and added together rather 
than debated and sorted out at meetings of the Group of Seventy Seven
(I? ).
By 1972 the following 19 countries had also joined the Group, 
to bring the total to 96,
Bahrain
Barbados
Bhutan
Botswana
Cuba
Equatorial Guinea
F iji
Gambia
Guyana
Ivory Coast
Lesotho
Malawi
Maldivet
Mauritius
Qatar
Singapore
Swaxiland
Yemen Arab Republic 
Zambia
The following countries are expected to Join the ranks of the 
Group;
Bangladesh
Mozambique.
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For exwple, «t Algiers, the signs ef •  petentiel i t  Hence of 
leest developed Latin American and African states were eliminated by
imposing the principle of regional group discipline. Thus, to many 
Western observers, the Charter of Algiers was a collection of demands 
rather than a realistic negotiating programme. The Group of Seventy 
Seven (7?) is held together primarily by the belief that rigid disci­
pline vis-a-vis the rich states is the best weapon the poor states have. 
The result however, is a long and inflexible set of maximum demands with 
unclear priorities presented by group representatives of the developing 
countries with the l i t t le  authority to compromise.7
The developing countries are highly differentiated from the point 
ef view of cultural traditions and socio-economic conditions. They 
have scanty intra-trade relations and links, and there Is l i t t le  soli­
darity in advancing common interests, social and economic development. 
All socio-economic disparities occur in their most extreme form in 
these developing countries.
Indeed, these countries are increasingly becoming aware of their 
backwardness and are developing counter-measures. Inadequate living 
conditions, widespread hunger, malnutrition and man's inhumanity to 
man create and foster wrest and c iv il disturbances. These forces can 
net only jeopardise internal order and national equilibrium, but also 
threaten International equilibrium and order.
Many developing countries are feverishly searching for ways of sol­
ving their present difficulties. This process takus place under con­
stantly increasing internal pressure. However, this pressure Is not 
necessarily the strongest in countries at the lowest economic level
7. Alfred S. Friedeberg, The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development of m a i The Theory of the Peripheral Economy af 
H e tenter of International Political discussion* (hottemmt 
Hat tertian university Prass, 1989), passim.
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{such as Mall, Chad and Somalia) quite often the opposite Is true 
(example: are Zambia, Botswana and the Congo). At the same time, the 
overwhelming majority of the developing countries have not, as yet, 
chosen a strategy for overcoming their present d ifficu lties. Indeed,
In cases where I t  has been made, the choice Is not necessarily wise and 
stable.
Indeed, I t  is am over-simplification, but I t  Is basically true to 
claim that tn Asia, Africa, Latin America and the near East, economic 
existence has not materially Improved for the average Inhabitant for 
generations. Indeed, for many of them I t  has worsened -  the poor get 
poorer.®
B. THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
The countries of the Western developed market economy also pursue simi­
la r Interests. They have organized their position through the Organisa­
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development. But since the wealthy 
states also form a very diverse coalition (such as the divergencies of 
French, American, German and Japanese trade Interests), they tend to 
agree primarily not to embarrass each other’ s weak points -  which means 
a position of minimal concessions confronting the Croup of Seventy 
Seven’s (77's) maximal demands.
8. For a further discussion of the Third World see*
Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (Eds), The Polities of the 
Developing Areas. (Princeton. New JerseyT Princeton Unfver-
iW 'F re is, I9W)
Edward Shils, Political Development In the New States. (The 
Hague* Moutbh '«i'd Company, 19Si)
Paul E. Slspufid (Ed), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations. 
(New York* F M r l H i r n ^ e r r W ^ r   ------------
Peter Horsley, The Third World. (London* Weldenfeld Paperbacks, 
1 9 6 4 ) --------------------------------
This group of countries, with homogeneous patterns of civilization, 
linked by a solidarity of economic Interests, has the highest economic 
standard of living and has at Its  disposal both political and m ilitary 
resources to maintain Its  advanced position. Their greatest advantage 
lies In their advanced research In science and technology. These de­
velopments have enabled them to maintain self-sustained progress and an 
extensive rate of growth.
However, the development of these countries, at the present rate, 
could not te sustained without access to the large raw material resources 
of the major part of the world. Indeed, control over these resources 
and their direct exploitation, not only ensures high rates of growth, 
but also provides many advantages such as profits, control over prices, 
and a lever for political bargaining and negotiation for the developed 
countries. This is the greatest bone of contention between the develop­
ed and developing countries.9
C. THE EASTERN BLOC 
The third major group In UNCTAD, the centrally planned economies of 
Eastern Europe, are equally organized. They have everiless to offer be­
cause they plead that their planned economies, Intermediate level of
9, More about this section on Developed Countries in:
Morton A. Kaplan (Ed), The Revolution In World Politics, (New 
Yorki John Wiley and company, I9 6 Z)
Hans. J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations. (New York; Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1966)
Adam Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia since World War n  
(New York: Wking Press, 1971)
83
development, end their absence of e colonial pest ■excuses* them
from respondInc to most of the demands of the developing world.
In reality they account for only some 15 per cent of world trade
compered with nearly 73 per cent for the developed market economies.
This fact helps to explain why the Soviet Union and Its satellites
play only a minor role In UNCTAD and their unyielding position to
the developing world
'In  the post Stalin period, thu Soviet Union advocated ■peaceful 
co-existence" between Communist and nrn-Communlst systems. This 
Implied a willingness on both sida* to renounce or sharply lim it 
the pursuit of their goals by reliance on military force*, i t  
Implied no diminution In Ideological rivalry and hostility or In 
competition between the West and the Communist bloc In economic 
affairs. In the Ideological and economic realms, the Soviet 
Union In effect advocated "competitive co-existence* or "peaceful 
competition*, the boast of Communist officials that they would 
"bury* capitalism sprang from the conviction that Marxism would 
ultimately win this competition. Except for a tacit agreement 
not to rely upon massive military force, the Marxist conception 
of peaceful co-existence has l i t t le  In common with the nonaligned 
nations' conception of the same idea. 'H
The Soviet Union has often claimed to be the most reliable friend 
of the nonaligned and developing nations. According to the Soviet 
Union, the world of today Is not divided Into the "big" and the 
"small", the "rich* and the "poor*, but between the forces of socialism, 
progress and peace, and those of Imperialism, colonialism and reaction 
facing them.
The Soviet Union thus reject t.v Communist Chinese thesis that 
the world is divided Into rich poor countries, and also the views 
of those who believe that for the Third World, there was no fundamental 
difference between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both of 
these states sought to defend the Interests of their states rather than
10. For an Interesting study see;
Adam Ulam, The Rivals; America and Russia since World War I I  
(New Tort; Vltinq Press, TbTiy
11. Cecil V. Crabb (J r .) , Nations In a Multipolar World, (New York;
Harper and tow, laCTTTCTW  ----------------
. *1 . —__'t.
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thOM of tiiotr Ideologies.^
I I I .  UNCTAD I
The f irs t  United Nations Conference on Trade end Development (UNCTAD I)  
ms held In Geneva. Switzerland, In 1964, I t  began on 23rd March end 
continued until June 16th 1964. I t  was the largest conference ever 
held and over 2,000 delegates from 116 courtrl-s attended. The main 
outcome was a new form of international machinery. This Is UNCTAD and 
i t  is technically described as a periodic conference. Membership of 
UNCTAD is open to a ll countries who are members of the United Nations 
or its  specialized agencies. As a result, countries such as the 
Federal Republic of Gem-any, Switzerland and South Korea, non-members 
of the United Nations, & *  members o; UNCTAD. Yet UNCTAD has a perme- 
nwr; secretariat wltHir tie  United Nations secretariat and i t  Is a 
special body of the Jolted Nations General Assembly, Each member 
would have one vote. Decisions or matters of substance would require 
a iwe-thirds majority of those present and voting, but procedural 
w l'e rs  would be decided by a simple majority vots
At Geneva, a ll the countries present pltJgad themselves to pursue 
Internal and external economic policies tiesl-ined to accelerate economic 
growth throughout the world, reduce the gap batween the respective 
standards of living in developed and developing countries and rawer as­
sistance to developing countries. All the countries should cooperate 
in creating conditions of international trade conducive in particular 
to the achievement of a rapid Increase In export earnings of the deve­
loping countries.
At Geneva, the developing countries demanded that new preferential
12, Adam Ulan, Ibid.
13. Keeslng's Contemporary Archives, February 13-20, 1965, pp.20581-
20683 A-B.
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concessions, both ta r if f  and non-tariff, should be .nade to the develop­
ing countries as a whole and such preferences should not be extended to
developing countries.
International Institutions and developed countries should provide 
more material, technical, financial and econoulc assistance to the deve­
loping countries. There should be no strings attached to such aid. 
Instead of spending vast sums of money on arms, the developed countries 
should use such funds to tne promotion of economic development In the
developing countries, bpeclal attention should be paid ta the least
14developed countries of the world.
At UNCTAD I  in Geneva, the developing countries pressed a demand for 
a scheme of tempore# preferences on Industrial products for their ex­
ports of manufactured goods This demand was strongly opposed by the 
United States, primarily on the principle of non-d*serialnation In In­
ternational tradei but subseouently the United States teversed Its  
stand under pressure from the Latin American countries.
The developing countries are aware of the damage done to their export 
potential by the agricultural protectionism of the developed countries. 
Through UNCTAD they have sought higher and more stable prices for their 
agricultural products. Experience has shown that international cowmod- 
1|y agreements are extremely d ifficu lt to negotiate and operate, and 
they da not premise an effective solution to the Income problems they
ere supposed to solve.
During the Conference a number of ■welk-outs" took place at the 
attendance of Smith African delegates and the delegation from Portugal. 
Protests were made when the Portuguese delegates came forward to speak 
on April 7th, 1964, end again on the following day -  April 8th, when the
14, Kaeslng's Contemporary Archives, February 13-10, 1966,—p^siT-imm-ir, pssiffir
South African Minister of Finance, Dr. N. Mederlehs, addrtssod the
Conference, On both occasions, the Conference President end delegates 
of the Afro-Aslan countries, the Coeewnlst countries, end some Latin 
American countries le ft  the Conference chamber.
The delegates from the Communist countries also le f t  the Conference 
cheater m  April 1st, 1964 during the speech of the delegate from Nation­
a lis t China (Ta iw an), On April 8th 1964, the Algerian delegate c r it i ­
cized the absence of delegates from the Chinese People's Republic, East 
Germany, North Korea, end North Vietnam
iv. Ttir fqou* or srvrniT srvr1* !??) in Ai.rirr^, al^fria 
I t  has become customary, both before «nd during sessions of UNCTAD, for 
the three geographical growers to meet to co-orilnate views and positions. 
This has led to a polarization of views prior to contact between the 
groups.
Prior to UNCTAD I I  In New Delhi the three geographical groups under­
took extensive consultations among themselves. The Group of Seventy 
Seven (77) developing countries held a ministerial meeting as their mein 
preparation for the second conference.
Thir meeting, in Algiers, Algeria In October 1967, was preceded by 
the wet* of a co-ordinating committee and by meetings within each deve­
loping region. On the basis of these regional submissions the Mtolstc** 
la! Meeting of the Group of Seventy Seven (77) formulated the Che. ter 
i f  Algiers.
A. THE CHARTER OF ALGIERS 
The Charter of Algiers points out that "the share of developing countries 
in the total world export declined from 271 In 1963 to only Is.IK In
16, Keeslng's Contemporary Archives, February 13-20, 1965* p.20581 A
. . . "  the punuMistpg power of export* from owveloptng countries 
has oeen steadily declining . . . . .  the «os* in purchasing ,>ower auounted 
annually to approximately billion dollars, whlc.i represents nearly 
half of the flow of external puulic financial resources to developing 
countries. This has aggravated the proole^ of tn. increasing lixieut- 
eduess of ti«e developing countries. In* axton-al public dabt alone 
has increased from 10 pillion dollars In l>i#v to 40 billion dollars In 
1966* Niille the debt service demands averaged half a billion oollars 
annual 1> in tne uid luow's, tiwy nave already, inci'vasec to 4 Pillion  
dollars and way offset toe entire transfer of resources before thu end 
of tills dacade I f  tiie present trends continue, I i«:y already equal the 
entire amount of grants and grant-like contributions ...»  While in 
1961 tie  flow of development financing to developing countries amounted 
to 0.378 of the gross national product of developed countries. I t  came 
down to 0.62X lit 1966 - or only a l i t t le  more than half the Urget of 
U  of national Income which was unanimously accepted at the target of 
financial aid to be provided by the developed to the developing coun­
tries.
Thus, the Algiers Charter was actually an Inventory of the short- 
range and long-range demands of the developing countries.
The Charter of Algiers adopted by the Ministerial Meeting of the 
Group of Seventy Seven (77) in October 1967, records a further worsening 
of the plight of Um developing countries. In snlte of a ll that was 
said at IWCTAb I no new cooteodlty agredmant o* prl xry products exported 
from the developing countries have decreased by 7f s1.v : 1951?, those for 
primary products exported from the developed countries have Increased by
1®* United Nations Document, TD/38, 3 November, 1967, pp.5-10, passing 
Leo Mates, Ib1o,, pp.456-475, passim.
39
In the same **Hod; as a result of the proliferation and oromo- 
tton of synthetic substitutes in the developed countries, the market 
for competing natural products of the develuplng countries has shrunk 
and their prices have fallen; no progress has been made by the deve­
loped countries in the recommended transferability of credit balances 
held with them by the developing countries; with a few notable excep­
tions, the terms and conditions of development finance arc becoming 
more and more onerous, the proportion of grants is declining, interest 
rates are Increasing repayment periods are being shortened and develop­
ment loans are becoming Increasingly t ie d .^
The Algiers Conference was convened to prepare the Group of Seventy 
Seven (7?) with a negotiating stand for the New Delhi Conference, One 
of the principal pre-occupations at Algiers turned out to be the discus­
sion of problems within the Group of Seventy S^ ven,
At the Algiers meeting, the move from the general declaration of 
demands to their concretlzatlon made i t  necessary to face more seriously 
some o f the main cleavages in the Group. In general, the principal 
lines o f division within the Group of Seventy Seven are those caused by 
the special ties that some developing countries and those between group 
members who are at different levels of economic development. These 
conflicts were manifested in Algiers on the question of the relationship 
between general and vertical preferences; and the question of special 
measures for the least advanced developing countries. At present, for 
example, eighteen African countries received preferential treatment in 
the EEC, on the basis of the Yaounde Convention. Developing countries 
that are members of the Commonwealth enjoy preferences In the United 
Kingdom and some other Commonwealth countries.
17. Leo Mates, Ib id . ,  pp.456-475, passim.
89
A sped it  relationship also exists between the Latin American 
countries end the United States through association in the Organization 
of American States and the Alliance for Progress,
At Algiers, the Latin American countries continued their pressure 
wi the 18 African states to give up special preferences that they enjoy 
In the EEC in favour of a generalized system of preferences for a ll
developing countries.
On the second issue, the least advanced countries were striving to
have their special status recognized by the Group of Seventy Seven,
ito substantive progress was made on either question, and consideration
i f  both was postponed.
The Algiers Conference demonstrated that the members of the Group of
Seventy Seven, despite very serious differences and obvious clashes of 
interest were motivated by the need to maintain their unity prior to the 
New Delhi Conference - UNCTAD I I .  The Group is exposed to outside pre­
ssure tnrough bilateral channels and is politically weak*
The Charter of Algiers embodied a general statement of the current, 
u n fa v o u ra b le ,situition for sustained economic development. The progra- 
* *  of action called upon the developed countries, to support the deve­
loping countries1 efforts regarding commodity problems and policies; 
expansion of exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures; development 
financing; Invisibles including shipping; general trade policy issues; 
trade expansion end economic integration among developing countries; 
and special measures to be taken in favour of the least developed among
the developing countries.
The Charter of Algiers accepted a great deal of f le x ib ility  in the 
formulation of the preferential system and also provided for specific 
coemitments for technical and financial assistance for the least advanced
countries.
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V, UNCTAD I I
Ths seomd smslon of UNCTAD, was held In New Delhi from February 1st 
to March 29th, 1968, The Conference was attended by delegates f rm  
119 of the 132 member countries of UNCTAD, Seven United Nations spe­
cialised agencies, 21 inter-governmental organizations and 11 non-govern­
mental organizations were also represented.
The Conference adopted the following 11-point agendas
(a) trends and problems in world trade and development;
(b) commodity problems and policies;
(c) expansion and diversification of exports of manufactures and semi­
manufactures of developing countries;
(d) growth, development finance, and aid (synchronization of International 
and national policies);
(9} problems of developing countries in regard to invisibles. Including 
shipping;
(f)  trade expansion end economic integration among developing countries, 
and measures to be taken by developing end developed countries -  
Including regional, sub-regional, and Inter-regional arrangements;
tog their economic and social development;
(h) general review of the work of UNCTAD;
m  the world food problem - its  relationship to international trade and 
to the export earnings and economic development of developing count­
ries; measures to assist these countries to increase their fooo 
production and to improve the conditions for Its  distribution and
marketing;
( j )  special problems of the land-locked countries;
(k) transfer of technology including know-go and patents.^8
During the Conference a number of "walk-outs" took place In protest 
at the attendance of South African delegates and on March 28th, 1968 a 
resolution was adopted by 49 votes to 18, with seven abstentions, reeem-
18. KeeslnVs Contemporary Archives, August 31- September 1 1968, 
— p p .m M TM T — --------------
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■ending the United Nations General Assembly to amend I t  resolution 
govern ing  the membership of UNCTAD In order to suspend Snith Africa 
•until I t  shall have temimated Its policy of racial discrimination and 
until that fact has been duly confirmed by the General Assembly*.?*
According to UNCTAD membership end voting rights, the membership of 
the Conference would be open to all members of the United Nations and 
the United Nations specialised agencies. Each member would have one 
veto. Decisions on matters of substance would require a two-thirds 
majority of those present and voting, but procedural matters would be 
decided by a simple majority vote.
The timing of the New Delhi Conference could not have been less for­
tunate * I t  coincided with the Tet Offensive In Vietnam and the orId 
monetary crises. The rich states were not only absorbed In these crisis, 
but also were affectej by the changed climate of International politics 
since the early 1360’s when UNCTAD was conceived.
Politically there was a Usscnlno of the Ideological sharpness ,f the 
East-West cleavage between the Soviet Union and the United States; and 
a growing disillusion In both camos with the short-term political Im­
portance and development prospects of the Third World. This change was 
reflected in diminished domestic support In the rich countries for aid 
development abroad - Including UNCTAD's use of trade measures for aid. 
Thus, the problem of UhCTAD Is not one of obstructive leadsrs and national 
offic ia ls , but that there Is currently l i t t le  domestic supoort In most 
rich countries (for UNCTAD measures).
Economically, the developing countries' proportion of world trade has 
continued to decline, and although their exports Increased at a rate of 
80 per cent higher than that projected by UNCTAD, an Increased burden of
19. Keesln^s^Contemporary Archives, August 31-September 7, 1968,
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debt i*r>1e», higher cost of invisibles, end declining «1d meent fchst 
the cruelel rete of Imports Increesed et only the same 4 per cent rate 
as In the late f if t ie s . Although the economic situation remained 
serious, political responsiveness of the rich states had declined,^0 
At New Delhi, the aspirations of the developing countries, were shat­
tered by the compromises finally agreed upon by the developed countries. 
The developed countries came to the Conference with a major contribution 
In the field of ta r if f  preferences, but In other areas, many of them 
were hampered by such problems as balance of payments d ifficu lties, the 
conflicting requirements of domestic budgetary demands, and a lack of any 
adequate o ffic ia l and public support and understanding far the changes In 
developed and developing areas which must follow meaningful contributions 
to the development of poor nations.
At New Delhi, i t  became apparent that the positions of the developing 
ewmtrles and both the centrally planned and the market economies were as 
far apart as ever. The Group of Seventy Seven tried to Impose the points 
I t  had proclaimed in the Algiers Charter such as, the failure of the ad­
vanced countries to aid the poorer nations, agreements to stabilise com­
modity markets and prices, among others. Soon a deadlock was reached 
and the rest of the Conference was spent covering up differences.
At New Delhi, no commitments for preferences on primary and manufac­
tured goods had been attained. Indeed, the time had not even come for 
the actual negotiations. The only apparent accomplishment was to Insert 
in the new l is t  of aims a series of 'argots that had no more chance of be­
ing attained than the previous ones. For example, despite the wnmlstake- 
able Indication of the advanced nations that they would not be able to in­
crease their aid to development for many years to com, the Final Act
20, Isaiah Frank, "Kcw Perspectives cm Trade and Development*, Foreign 
W e irs , Vol. 45, April 1967, p.525 --------
93
rst std the Isw t i f  §M requested to wm per emt of gross nstleml 
pmdwct. Tbs only point on which the nonsHgned notions received otls 
fictisn wes somewhat exferansous to the debates -  South Africa *rs sus­
pended from UNCTAD for Its  policy of racial discrimination.
According to Raul FreMsch, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, the pri­
mary causes i f  disappointments at New Delhi were the opposition In the 
developing w tttries  to the Introduction of reforms In their economic 
and odal structures, to a modification of attitudes end policies, and 
to the discipline of sound economic planning, end the view of developed 
countries that the development problem Is a residual one, which, in the 
absence of political requirements to do otherwise, cam be dealt with hep- 
hosardly,**
Haul Preblseh summarized the results of the New Delhi Conference as 
follows;
•Limited and Incomplete results concerning the fundamental problems 
of preferences end finance;
Seme positive results in the spheres of trade expansion among deve­
loping countries, trade with socialist countries, shipping the food 
problem and policy In relation to least developed and land-locked 
countries;
Virtually m  results In the access to markets; and 
No oonglbwtlom to the formulation of a global strategy for develop*
V I, THE GROUP Of SEVENTY SEVEN 177) MEETING IN LIMA, MENU 
The Group of Seventy Seven {now mustering 96 members free Asia, Africa 
and Latin met in Lima, Peru from October 28th to November 8th,
1971. For the f irs t time Cuba attended a session of the Group of Seventy
11. •UNCTAD, The significance of the Second Session of UNCTAD*, Report
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, TD/96, 7 May 
1968, pp.2-3 and 9.
12, Ib id ., p.3
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%mm m i  this was as a result of the initiatives taken by Peru, As 
is customary* in itia l positions had already been taken up 1m a series of 
three meetings among the countries of Asia in Bangkok, of Africa in Addis 
Ababa, end of Latin America and the Carribean in Lima* Peru. Financial 
and monetary problems were the main topics of discussion and the plight 
®f the least developed countries trade in raw materials and commodities 
also featured in the discussions. At Lima, a l is t  of demands to be made 
of the industrialized countries was drawn up.23
111. UNCTAD 111
The third session of UNCTAD was held in Santiago, Chile on April 13th 1972, 
The session was attended by about 3,000 delegates from 141 countries.
The People's Republic of China attended -  its  firs t major conference is 
•  member of the United Nations. During the meeting i t  was decided to
admit Bangladesh as a member of UNCTAD.
I t  was pointed out at the Conference that the developing countries1 
share of international trade had been reduced between 1960 and 1969 from 
21.3 per cent to 17.6 per cent and the developing nations accounted for 
8 0  per cent of the world's population, but had only 12 per cent of the
gross product at their disposal.24
Hie timing of UNCTAD I I I  held in Santiago, Chile in 1972, could not 
have been less fortunate -  both the developed end developing countries 
were caught up in the devastating effects of the international monetary 
crisis. The primary effect was that the developed countries, beset by 
their own economic problems, were even less disposed than before to make 
major concessions to the developin' countries.
23. Kotina's Contemporary Archives, July 22-29, 1972, pp.25376 
— I W T T X   -----------------
24, Ib id ., pp.25377-26378 A-B,
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The s t il l  outstanding Issues of preferential ta r if f  treatment were
deferred until the opening of the world trade conference scheduled to 
begin sometime In 1974 and to continue Into 1975. Action on the losses 
In the developing countries foreign exchange reserves, caused by devalua­
tions aid revaluations of developed world currencies, was likewise post­
poned until the world monetary conference, also tentatively scheduled
for 1974.25
the developing countries require a major and sustained Input of ca­
pital. I f  the developed nations cannot meet the needs of the vveloping 
countries for capital, technology and markets, the two will be driven 
s t i l l  further apart. Tils too was repeatedly emphasized at Santiago.
the developing countries dislike the role they are being assigned - 
is agricultural and raw materials areas -  for the developed nations.
Host of the developing countries are exporting relatively Inexpensive 
agricultural and mineral raw materials and Importing expensive finished 
consumer goods from the developed nations.26
The Conference expressed recognition of the fact that the developing 
countries were primarily responsible for their own economic development. 
The industrialised countries were asked not to Interfere with the e f f i­
cient mobilization of the developing countries' own resources. With 
reference to multinational and trans-national corporations and the recent 
spate of expropriations by the developing countries, a resolution was 
passedi
needsi
(b) expressing concern at the financial outflow brought about by 
private foreign Investment, and
15. Ib id ., p.25378 A-B
26. Ib id ., p.25380 A
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(c) urging developed countries to take steps to reverse the tend­
ency for an outflow of capital from developing countries. tCJ
I t  Is Important to now consider a revol. clonery development 1; inter­
national economics, based not on exchange, but on the International pro­
duction of goods and services. The most Important agency for interna­
tional production Is the multinational corporation.
A. THfc LEAST DEVEtOPtE COUWTMES 
UNCTAD 111 drew up a lis t  of least developed countries on the oasis of 
a number of factors Including:
(1) a per capita gross domestic product of tlW  or less;
(2) a share of manufacturing In the gross domestic product of 10 per 
cent or less, and
(3) a litera ry  rate among persons over 15 years of age of 2n per cent 
or less.
The lis t  Included 10 African countries, they art: Botswana, Uurundl, 
Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mall, Niger, Ruwanda, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Upper Volta. There are eight In 
Asia and Oceania, they arc: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Laos, Maldives, Nepal, 
Sikkim, Western Saoao, and the Yemen Arab Republic. There Is one in 
Latin America -  Haiti. Thus, there are 25 least developed countries.
The developing countries maintained that these 25 least developed 
countries should be granted special treatment. A unanimous resolution 
adopted Included recommendations In the fields of commodities, d iversifi­
cation of economies, access to markets and other commercial policy measur­
es, restrictive business practices, development finance, transfer of 
technology shipping and trade promotion. The resolution further Includ­
ed suggestions for actions by the socialist countries of Eastern Europe 
International organizations and regional economic groupings. With ref­
erence to the establishment of the special fund, the conference suggested
11*  Ibid. , ,
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thst the United Natlonr Economic and Social Council should study the 
desirability and feasibility of the proposal and report Its  findings to 
the General Assembly.28
V III, THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF UNCTAD
UNCTAD has Had some effects. The pressures uxurtsd by UNCTAD have affec­
ted other organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and made them more 
sensitive to the damnds of the developing countries. VhCTAD Is also 
partly responsible for the char. In the American position on preferences, 
although the final economic benefits of the scheme remain to be seen. 
UNCTAD has also brought International attention and pressure on shloplng 
oractlces, UNCTAD has nelned set m an international sugar agreement.
Un the Issue of ^references, thi develonM canltallst countries had 
made a major departure from traditional cc.ncrc1a1 policies based on 
•most-fevoumd-natlon* treatment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). At UNCTAD I In 1964, most <1rYe1o''ed countries, and 
particularly the United States, opposed any •'reference sch«>tie as a viola­
tion of the "most-favoured-netIon* clause In RATT.
However, by 1967, as a result n, b PTAO and Latin American pressures, 
the United States reversed Its position and supported a svstero of world­
wide preferences for manufactured products from thn developing countries.
The ImofcCt of UNCTAD on International relations Is evident. The 
rich countries have been male aware of tlm problems of the poor countries. 
I t  has stimulated other organization1 tn Intonslf” thel- efforts but Its  
main contribution to economic progress Is th it >>y brlnplno trade, aid 
and finance orohl* ,s Intr one nrf>1t I t  s'to /s concern for coordination 
In the sphere of dnvelorrmnt.
Ib id ., t '
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IX, ANALYSIS
Most authorities on organizations agree that UNCTAD Is an unwieldy and 
frustrating organization and the larner the meeting, the more unwieldy 
11 is. Since any member of the United ■ jettons or Its specialized agen­
cies Is eligible for UNCTAD membership - there are over 140 member states 
-  the attendance at UNCTAD Is v e ry  high. For example at UNCTAD I I  In 
New Delhi, In 1965, about 1,5^0 d l-gates spent eight weeks accomplish­
ing very l i t t le .
Aware of these limiting factors, the Trade and Development Board sug­
gested at Its  7th session In 19^9 that In future the World Trade Confer­
ence should lim it Itse lf to deal with matters r>* principle only. I t  
should Indicate objectives and the general way In which this global stra­
tegy for aid and trade Is to bo aoproached. I t  should refrain from dis­
cussing the long and varied shopping lis t  of demands emanating from the 
developing countries. The task of working out practical and acceptable 
detailed solutions should be le ft  to the board.
UNCTAD*s pressure group role seems to be running Into diminishing re­
turns, et least until there are changes In the domestic political attitudes 
In the rich countries or changes in the Intern.tlonal political structure 
which could return the Third World countries to the temporary and I l lu ­
sory position of Importance that they held In the early 1960‘s.
UNCTAD cannot u;cape Its rigid group system or Its past reputation of 
partia lity and double standards. These haw doubled the determination of 
the most important rich states to negotiate only In OATT (General Agreement 
m  Tariffs and Trade) and restrict UNCTAD to general rhetoric,
A major function of UNCTAD has been to change the general philosophy 
of International trade to favour developing countries. Indeed, such 
changes rarely appear In the short run. Political negotiations at UNCTAD 
meetings result In vaguely worded resolutions designed to bridge the gap
9 "
In , *o',hy that sermrnte? thn rich end nocr n a tio n s .^
While the resrlutlons of iP)f?An hive consider*!1e morel force^ the 
organization had no means of Irplenentlng Its  recomendatlons and deci­
sions. The executive power lay elsewhere - In tne developed worlv.
The developed states today dominate ar Intemzif.lon'1 economic system 
which they created to *wet their own needs and rational Interests.
These states are post riluc r t  to relinquish the control they have ever 
International economic ml a tv  is and thus to <itve In to the demands made 
In U1 CTAD resolutions would an mt to economic suicide. The dev loped 
states w ill make minor concess' ns, but on the whole tney w ill not move 
In the direction that UNCTAD v ■ ntr. thrr to move. Indeed, this Is parti­
cularly relevant, since *\e mld-sl vhen the Cold War no longer com­
pelled the East and West to woe, the /eloping nations. By the mid- 
sixties cleavages within the West and the Fast, tne emergence of a lim it­
ed detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and over a de­
cade of experience with not too successful efforts to bring the develop­
ing countries Into the Cold War alignments a ll combined U  decrease 
Soviet and American attention to the problem of the Third World.
UNCTAD constitutes the best expression of modern acentric thinking 
end of new concepts of International cooperation. The problem, there­
fore, Is no longer of an Institutional nature. The? question Is whether 
the Institutions are being adequately utilized. For In the final analy­
sis Institutions are meaningless I f  Governments are net truly determined 
to achieve the objective that they have set themselves through such me­
chanisms. Accordingly I t  is essential that Institutions should undergo 
such adjustments as are necessary to meet new problems and changed drew*2
23, J, Nye. "UNCTAD: Poor Nations' Pressure Group" In R, Cox and
H, Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence. (New Haveni Yale
University Press, i i / i ) ,  pp.J34-liAII,‘~pass1m.
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stinces.
Sine* 1964 UNCTAD has becewe the major forum for what Is often ecrt- 
monloys and b itter debate concerning the economic status and relationship 
of the rich and poor countries. At UNCTAD I no one debated the fact 
that between T9S0 and 1960 the developing world’ s shere In the money 
volume of world trade; dropped from 30 per cent to 20 per cent. In 
the same period the Western developed countries Increased their share 
from 60 per cent to 66 per cent, and the share of the Soviet Union snd 
ttie East European Communist countries rose from 8 per cent to 12 per 
cent.30
UNCTAD I Illustrated well the gap which exists between the r id  .uid 
poor nations of the world. %e recommendations of the conferenc e cover­
ed the major economic problems of the developing countries. The reco­
mmendations took tne form of requests to developed nations to undertake 
new policies and make adjustments In their own economies to foster the 
economic development of the Third World.
However, I t  must be emphasized that the lack of progress within 
UNCTAD was a reflection of the inability of the International community 
to reach agreed solutions to problems which cut at the heart of national 
Interests and existing International arrangements and practices.
The recoemendations that emerged from the New Delhi conference repre­
sented a compromise between the positions of the developed Industrialized
and developing countries.
The activities of UNCTAD are predominantly research-orientated, a l­
though actual negotiations In the fore of the comodity conferences spon­
sored by UNCTAD have received wore publicity. I t  Is d ifficu lt to assess
30. Escott Reid, The Future of the World Dank. (Washington D.C.I
International teank for Reconstruction and Development, 1965), 
pp.36-37.
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the activities of UNCTAD. What UNCTAD has done, Is to Impress upon 
the Industrialized rich countries not only the problems of the poor 
countries but also their potential power.
Raw materials are unevenly distributed and dispersed over the earth's 
surface. The capacity to extract and process these raw materials Into 
finished form Is even more unequally distributed and Is overwhelmingly 
In the hands of the technically skilled minority of the world population. 
The rate of raw materials exportation threatens to exhaust or drastic­
ally restrict the availability of a whclr. series of major minerals with­
in one generation.
Just as the developed world struggled for access to raw materials In 
the building of Its economy, s < the goal of development for the rest of 
the world necessarily Implies a comparable struggle. I t  w ill be a 
struggle for their re-allocation, for a repossession of their ownership 
and management, for a re-channeling of their output Into domestic Indus­
tr ia l production, and for a repetterolng of world trade away from raw 
material export by the developing countries and manufactured exports by 
the developed countries. The objective of the developing countries Is 
a world trade pattern In which they produce, consume, and export their 
own manufactures, thus building their own Internal wealth, raising the 
level of their Internal consumption, and putting an end to the situation 
of chronic International price disadvantage that has characterized the 
economy of raw material export.
The world Is confronted with the dreadful prospect of a widening gap 
of per capita Income and productivity between the rich and poor nations. 
At present, the low Income areas of the world contain about 70 per cent 
of the world's population but less than 15 per cent of the world's total 
output of goods and services. The population of these areas Is expected 
to grow more rapidly than production, resulting In further expansion of
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91grin Malthusian spectre of malnutrition, poverty and disease.
The United Nations system was developed at a time In history when 
information on the problems of economic and social development was rela­
tive'. tree and the coordinate nature of the strategy of development 
wa ' widely recognized. The result has been that some of the Institu­
tions in the United Nations system have developed an exceedingly specia­
lized orientation. They tend to base their entire approach to the 
question of development on the assumption that the problems pertaining 
to their own special field of competence can La Isolated and dealt with 
separately from the general issue of promoting overall social and economic 
progress. Contemporary research Indicates that I t  Is extremely naive 
to assume that the problems of agriculture and food production can be 
Isolated from tne general problem of economic development In the develop­
ing areas of t',u - .r id . Indeed, the problem of agriculture Is actually 
the basis of the problem of economic development per se In most of the 
developing countries. Furthermore, the problems of education, science 
technology and industry In the developing areas cannot be Isolated and 
considered separately from the general problem of economic and social 
development. The d ifficulties Inherent In a ll aspects of economic and 
social development are so Interrelated and intern,oven that they consti­
tute an Integrated whole. Thus, the strategy by which to overcome 
these problems and promote effective development must also, of necessity, 
be a unified and coordinate one.32
A large number of the developing nonaligned countries do not have
I I ,  For more on this aspect seat
Barbara Ward and Rene Out os. Only 'arth, (New York: Norton, 
1972) —
32, A, Segal, "The Integration of Developing Countries", Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. V, March 1067, pp.Z52-2S2, 
passim
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et their disposal sufficient qu^lifUt' narrower tc follow ccmrlex !:NCTAD 
luattfcrss their political ar.d s e d o lls t  level Is le v ,  and their tresencs 
often Is new fe lt at International meetings. Furthermore, there 1* a 
lilcjl, "turnover* of personnel In nany delegations, v.hlch Is a great dis­
advantage In an organization whore Issues are ( x t r c v ly  r .-rf'lex and re­
quire continuity of a tte n tio n . Tim unfar H la r lty  of scne delegates 
with tl^c Issues on hand, coupled v.lth the lack o f precise Instructions 
from the- hone ministries often leads to Improvisation and excessive at­
tention being paid to marginal Issues.
The future of VHfT/'!? w ill, to a great extent, depend on*
(1) when the policy onians of the organization become aware of the various 
problems, difficulties and deficiencies confronting them;
(2) what corrective measures are devised to resolve these Inadequacies;
(3) when these prooosed solutions ere actually Implemented;
(4) how and by who this Implementation Is undertaken;
{$) the effectiveness of the corrective measures In adequately resolving 
the difficulties confronting iriCTAD.
Some of the attitudes of tu: dovoloplng countries, particularly those 
related to the real or fancied vestiges of colonialism, w ill continue to 
trouble the West In th* future. Tie relatively 1#>; lovol of economic
developnwnt of iwst of the devalo.'lng countries, am the continued de­
pendence of these nations or t.M developed nations for ca Ita l and techni­
cal assistance, w ill tend to prolong feelInns of Inferiority and tc 
breed suspicion that the advanceJ and developed rations am uslna their 
superior position to doi’lretc the nooror rations.
Indctu, Internal crises have only escalator* Into International crises
when tnere has been Intervention fron outside. In the form of communist
and Imperialist actions, and organized gucrrlla terrorism.
All then problems are Interwoven with the global crlrls of tlie popu­
lation explosion, • 1ch Is itse lf linked with modem technology, without
K4
RCicrr, raulclnc and tlruy:., dlTijrs ncult not be alive. The r ls ln n  
population In the '> vet op Inn countries is lOf't-tli;;'; which arouses duti­
ful cries cf alar, f t  regular intervals, but ifcl:cnt actually getting 
something dene about i t .  About a century ago, the earth's population 
was approximately 1 ,vun Million, having taken ' v .t years or
so to reach this Ivvcl. In the fo ll&  ino '10 years, the copulation 
toubled, and will have doirled oral.’ by I 1 7 p -y the end of tills cen­
tury - barring global disasters - trdey's children .'111 be sharing the 
globe with 6,(K>C' nil 11 Ion or 7,0vX, p il l io n  others. They w ill see, be­
fore they die, a world population c f About l?,Cr'° 111 Ion. By then, 
the population crisis i l l !  be truly global. Predicting from current 
trends, the real horrors of urban life  will be centred In the developing 
regions, v here there Is an urban explosion with nor.c of the capital and 
technology which barely allow the cl tins c* advanced countries to cope.
The current situation In Calcutta, India Is indicative of th> shape of 
ti 'ngs to come. 33
X. CONCLUSION
One way of progress toward the kind of International community that the 
nonaligned nations and many others desire may be found In the United 
Nations addressing Its e lf to novel and timely concerns that have arisen 
In both tin# most developed end developing countries, the solution of 
which cannot depend merely on arms control and generally accepted poli­
tical power balances. Anxieties over the population explosion are grow­
ing again, although they vary in Intensity and are approached In different 
countries, by different oroups of experts In widely differing ways.
33. George F. Kennan, "To Prevent a World Wasteland", Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 43 (April 1-370), pp.401-41J, passl.T,
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UHCTAD eould net haw amwcpllshed wch had the nonallgned Rations 
not switched their emphasis from political matters to economic develop­
ment. The nonaligned nations as a group pressured the United Nations 
for the creation of UNCTAD. Many nonaligned nailers realize that In­
dependence Is meaningless I'" tvnc no vi.noclc growth and development. 
The priority task of a poor country Is the attempt to feed Its people. 
Slogans do not f i l l  and nourish the people. The poor country cannot 
cease being poor unless there Is a joint effort by the poor and rich 
countries to make sufficient food available to meet the needs of the poor 
country. Nonalignment then Is a tool used by tlte weak and developing 
nations to assist them In the tast of nation-building and i t  the same 
time to provide a certain degree of security for themselves by remaining 
aloof from the Cold War.
p m  t m i
m ,T $ is
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYSIS
No fu lly  tdequati end op-to-deti ssieiw ifit of India's noniHgnmsnt ex­
ists, but one could not m at without careful analysis of the many 
apparent ambiguities and/or Inconsistencies of argument and action - 
ouch as the avowals of Independent unewitted judgement and yet the 
examples o f strong partia lities at particular times, the disavowal o f 
military force and yet Its  employment In Goa and In Kashmir.
The concept o f nonalignment raises more questions than I t  answers.
In specific situations, adherence to the concept te lls  us a great deal 
about what Afro-Aslan spokesmen are sayingi but I t  te lls  us l i t t le  or 
nothing about what they are doing. Nonalignment has almost become an 
incantation, which repeated sufficiently, gives nonaligned officials  
sufficient Insight Into dealing with the West, the Cowmmlst nations, or 
with the Republic of South Africa.
I t  Is Idle to talk. I f  talk Is a ll .  The proposals of the nonaligned 
leaders bear no convincing relation to the problems they discuss, des­
cribe and face. Consider, for Instance, their advocacy of the use of 
force for overthrowing the so-called minority regimes In Southern Africa, 
They grossly underestimate the military might of these "minority regimes"; 
furthermore they grossly underestimate Western revulsion against such so- 
called wars of national liberation against White-ruled nations.
The diplomatic goals of the nonaligned nations are expressed In re­
sounding declarations of Idealistic principles, typified by such documents 
as the Penchshlla, the Addis Ababa Charter, the Lusaka Manifesto and the 
United Nations Charter; which also expressed goals towards which, I t  was 
believed, the International community was moving. The current demand for
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m  a n * «i*argo against tne Republic o f South Africa Is one o f the glar­
ing examples of foreign policy being shaped In response to emotional- 
moralistic pressures, without any regard for the long-range politico- 
strategic Interests of the African continent. For the West, an embargo 
of arms against South Africa Is antithetical to the balance of power 
principle because, the Cape sea route Is vital to Western strategy and 
defence. Western interests cannot be defended by an unarmed South 
Africa, nor can I t  be defended by a nonaligned Africa. This view Is 
shared by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London.
Raymond A m , Hans J, Morgenthau and many others note that In compari­
son to the nineteenth Century, irrational and unpredictable factors have 
come to the forefront In International relations, whereas the concept 
Rule §f Lew has tost ground and occupies the back-*eet. The emergence 
of Communist China as a major power undoubtedly poses an unpredictable, 
and thereby a dangerous problem in present international relations, A 
resurgent and powerful Communist China, even In the United Nations, pro­
vides a new dimension to the problem of peace and security in the world.1
Cecil V. Crebb, J r ., emphasises that there are certain obvious lim i­
tations In Identifying the basic nonaligned motivations and goals.
F irstly, I t  Is easier to do so In respect of a country whose objectives 
are clearly related to Its  actual capacity than In respect of one whose 
so-called power is s t i l l  In the process of development. Nonaligned ob­
jectives and goals are likely to vary over the years In accordance with 
the development of their diverts capacities.
Secondly, both as African and or Aslan nationalists the nonaligned 
leaders* view of the world largely reflect an Astan-centric bias.
1, Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations 
(New York* Doubleday, 19dd)
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York* Alfred A, 
Knopf, 1966}
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Thirdly, there Is usually a gap between the highly polemical non- 
aligned declarations and their policies In action.
Fourthly, the external International environment Is not likely to re­
main static. The problem Is therefore one of Identifying basic nonalign­
ed objectives In the changing context of a changing frame of reference.
I t  Is possible, thus, to Identify them only by relating historical prece­
dents with contemporary trends and accents In the nonaligned foreign 
policy.2
A possible explanation of nonaligned foreign policy responses rests 
on the assumption that the nonaligned nations do not regard the struggle 
between the East end the West at being of primary Importance to their 
future. Their responses to the problems of Intematlwal concern are 
quite often determined by their divisions of the world Into pro-colonial 
and anti-colonial blocs.
Their emergence from dependence to Independence, meant an Increase In 
the number of states belonging to the anti-colonial group In the United 
Nations. Since then these nations as a group were able to control the 
voting on a ll colonial Issues. 8ut of primary Importance was the crea­
tion of a state of mind In the United Nations which considered that colo­
nialism -  In a ll Its forms and manifestations -  would be no longer accept­
ed and tolerated.
Their consistent espousal of anM-colonial1st doctrines at the United 
Nations and In other world forums and their verbose statements about non- 
alignment, are central tu he rhetoric of most of the nonaligned states 
However, In their often desporete efforts to win support, they have made 
claims that are simply unrealistic.
2, Cecil V. Crabb (J r .) , Nations In a Multipolar World. (New York* 
Harper and Row, 196S), pp.AlMSfl
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Furthermore, since each of the nonaligned nations has a vote In the 
United Nations Gwneral Assembly they have an international forum 1n which, 
particularly In recent times, they exert a voting strength far out of 
proportion to their power In International affairs. They are encouraged,
I f  not compelled, to positions on a wide range of problems and Issues, and 
to pursue an active international policy. Since the General Assembly 
Is dominated by their votes, the representatives of the nonaligned states 
view I t  as an instrument to defend the small and weak nations against 
the large and powerful nations. Conscious of their weakness 1n physical 
power, they have resisted attempts to dilute the effectiveness of the
United Nations; since I t  remains the best forum for the exercise of moral
pressure by them upon the Great Powers.
For example, with the creation of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development {UNCTAD} In 1964, the developing countries had an 
International organization with a permanent secretariat embracing, Indeed 
In some ways defining, a common Third World view on reforms needed at the 
systemic level. Since Its creation UNCTAD has become an Important In- |j
tervwner on behalf of the developing countries In their relations with the 1 L
advanced Industrial states. i!
I
For example, two historic resolutions were adopted by the General i
Asseetly declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The firs t reso- {
lutlon was adopted at the twenty fifth  (XXV) session on 16th December -
1971, end the second at the twenty sixth session (XXVI) on 15th December
1972, Both were adopted by an overwhelming majority without any opposl- ’ 
tic. although the two super powers end some other nations had abstained
from voting. The groundwork for these resolutions had been laid down at 
the Lusaka Conference of Nonaligned Countries In 1970 and the Singapore 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers1 Conference 1n 1971. The principle was re­
affirmed at the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Nonaligned
i
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wtwitHM held i t  Georgetown totyint In Auguit 1972 end the Conoonweelth 
Fsrlleeientary Conference held i t  flin ty  re in  October 1972.
The firs t resolution wes actuated by the need to consider and respect 
the Indian Ocean as a nuclear free zone and zone of peace from which the 
Cold War rivalries were excluded. I t  was thought desirable to ensure 
peace In the area by nonaligned means rather than by military alliances. 
The General Assembly declared the Indian Ocean a zone of peace for all 
times.
The second resolution after recalling the f irs t resolution noted 
that the consultations envisaged therein did not take place and agreed 
that further steps should be taken towards the Implementation of the 
f irs t resolution. I t  therefore appointed an ad hoc Committee to study 
the Implications of the resolution end to report on I t .  The later de­
liberations of the Committee were mostly exploratory.
Although the United States and the United Kingdom did not opoose the 
resolutions by the General Assembly declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone 
of peace, the United States has begun to build and enlarge a naval base 
on the Island of Diego Garcia In agreement with the United Kingdom to 
whom the Island belongs. Since the resolutions of the General Assembly 
are not mandatory like the decisions of the Security Council, the United 
States has chosen to pursue Its  national Interests and Ignore the two 
resolutions on the Indian Ocean,
The United States realizes that while thermonuclear pwer Is awesome 
and represents virtually unlimited potential destructiveness, I t  has 
proven to be a limited diplomatic Instrument. its uniqueness lies In 
that I t  Is both an all powerful weapon end also a very Inadequate weapon.
Hie fact that the Soviet Union and the United States can mutually 
destroy one another - regardless of who strikes firs t - narrows the 
range of Soviet aggression which American nuclear forces can effectively
I l l
deter. Desp'te American nuclear monopoly In the early postwar period, 
the United States was unable to deter the Soviet Union's pressures 
•gainst Berlin, or Soviet support of aggression In Korea. Current 
American nuclear superiority does not deter all forms of Soviet support 
of Conmmfst Insurgency In South East Asia and prevent defeat In Indochina.
The lesson of Indochina Is that the United States and her allies re­
quire substantial non-nuclear forces to cope with I pv-sI s of aggression 
that massive strategic forces do not In fact deter. This has been a 
d ifficu lt lesson for both the United States and th* West to accept, since 
there Is m strong psychological tendency tn regard superior nuclear for­
ces ns a simple and final solution to security, and an assurance of vic­
tory under any set of circumstances. Indeed, American nuclear strategic 
forces do play a vital and absolutely necessary role In Western security, 
but I t  Is an Intrinsically limited role.
Thus, the United States and her allies must maintain substantial con­
ventional forces, fu lly capable of dealing with a wide spectrum of lesser 
forms of political and military aggression - a level of aggression against 
which the use of strategic nuclear forces would not be to American advan­
tage, and thus a ievol of aggression which these strategic nuclear forces 
alone cannot effectively deter.
For Jan F. Triska and Howard E. Koch, J r ., the emergence of am Aslan- 
Afrlcan alignment within the United Nations, which, when united, musters 
formidable strength. Is in event of exceptional significance. The 
alignment has already demonstrated Its ab ility to Influence the course of 
events; I t  Is conceivable that under favorable conditions the bloc might, 
press the General Assembly s t i l l  further In the direction of becoming a 
quasi-legislative body. The Implications of this are already troubling 
the Foreign Ministries of the ’tost - and mosslblv the Fast. The bloc 
stands as a challenge to the Great Powers, whose position has been under-
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itned. A esse in point Is the considerably altered position of the 
United States, which in conjunction with the friendly Latin American 
votes, once controlled one-third of the General Assewbly's vote. Under 
the Charter this meant a virtual American veto in the General Assembly.
At present, this vote represents only one-fourth of the Assembly’s mem­
bership. On the other hand, the Aslan-African alignment with a few 
friendly votes, often available and preferred - was acquired the position 
formerly held by the United States.
The problems posed &y the existence of this novel regional voting 
bloc has great significance in determining the future of tie  United 
Nations,
The coalition of Asian and African states Is a phenomenon of the last 
decade, but a sense of co^on Interest and even identity had long been 
shared by many colonial peoples. The evolution from the recognition by 
isolated national movements of tho need for mutual support ( i f  only 
morel) to an alignment for political action Is in large measure fcne his­
tory of the international relations of tsia and Africa since the First 
World war.^
Jan F. Triska and /toward il. Kocn J r., observe that events in Pakistan, 
dunaa, Iraq, Thailand, Sudan, and to sone extent, Indonesia, suggest that 
for the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa, datfcocracy aiey be a 
luxury they cannot afford, a contradiction in terns, an illusion. Each 
nas attempted to make its  way within the framework of parliamentary demo­
cracy, only to abandon the experiment in favor of a less but rare e f f i ­
cient military dictators:.!? or some otlior fore of authoritarian regime.
3, Jan F. Triska and Howard L. Koch (J r .) , "Aslan-African Coalition 
and International Organization: Third Force or Collective 
Impotence?", The Review of Politic s . April 1v5r , pp.tlJ-4u
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A fta r h« been gaining ground In Asia tnat tha party system of tne
constitutional denocraclus, wnlle excellent In some environments, 
canr.o* provide the controls necessary for a progressive national l ife ,  
TnH concern has been rain forced In many cow.trl.s by the spectacle of 
parliamentary Instability, and Irresponsibility ageInst a background of 
severe social and economic disorder. And, In t i*  process, socialism 
in Its various fores, within the framework of a mare controlled political 
environment, Is becoming the universally acknowledged *means* rather than 
a free economy suuject only to the noderate controls of democratic socie­
ty, Throughout mucn of Asia and Africa, I t  would be d ifficu lt to find 
an Intellectual who did not consider himself a socialist or a party 
which did not espouse socialist economic doctrine rugardtess of Its  place 
on the political spectrum.
Apart from what socialist doctrine offers In an economic sense, I t  
has a very definite appeal In that I t  represents a break wU« the so- 
called capitalist exploitation of the past. Thus, Asian and African 
nationalism has cow to have an economic appendare.
Indeed those factors tend to establish a se.hv of Identity among 
those countries In which they are present. To m irly  a ll of the coun­
tries In the Aslan-African community Uv:y have u-'.. a stimulus tc unity 
that has compensated considerably for the manv ; iltlc a l and cultural 
elements of discord. In some, those c< m n factors have encouraged the 
policy of nonalignment, a policy which us i cen sur'tfrted by s t il l  otn»r 
Influences I the desire to trade and develop economic relations with all 
possible partners; exhaustion fm r past conflict' and the fear of war; 
an opportunism which seels advantages normally unattainable - all of 
these receive further support from the acts, both of omission and com­
mission, of the former colonial poftri, and cl os-: proximity to a strong 
and overtly close friendly Soviet Union and Comuni$t China. Those two 
states present themselves sympathetically as societies, which also have
11<
undergone revolution*; In an effort to ernrne fror. snclal stagnation and 
to catch up wit*, the nodem world/
John Spinier observes tnat, tiie nonallrncl notion, like the many de­
veloping nations, Is undergoing a process of social, economic, and 
political development, Tn this process thv nonallnned nations face 
fundamental intra-socletal strains: political, rcwonlcal, social and 
psychological as well as extra-societal prer.survs from oth?r Internation­
al systems; namely the United States and the West, the Soviet Union and 
the East; and Cttnmr.tst China, In their quest f :r technological devo- 
lopment and progress the nonaligned nation’ s decision-makers rely heavi­
ly on the United States and the Soviet Union for the neeessarv aid to 
achieve their objectives. In the meantime technological and financial 
aid becomes a major factor In the power strunnlr not only between the 
United States and the foviet Union, but also between the la tter and Com­
munist China.
The pattern of development 1$ complex and the effect uron I t  of for­
eign aid Is s t i l l  unde to mined, but I t  Is cl (far that the relationship 
usually assumed to exist between aid and nravth Is too simple. In 
general, foreign aid lias neither accelerated erowth nor helped to foster 
democratic political regimes. I f  anything, aid :*ay have retarded deve­
lopment by lea  dine to lower domestic savings bv distorting the coeipost- 
tlon of Investment a.id thereby raising the capital output ratio, by frus­
trating the ecsrgenee of an Indigenous entrr'rcncurli! class, and by In­
hibiting Institutional reform. Precisely bow w idespread and strong are 
these negative Influences s t i l l  remains to be determined, but the limited 
evidence available suggests that aid programmes, as currently administered,
4. Trlske and Koch, Ib id ,, on.429-421).
i n
and In so far as thay are concerned wlti the economic development of
a country, frequently are counter-productive.5
I t  Is In the Interest of the world community that the developing non-
aligned nations raise their living standards as rapidly as possible. I f
the Increases are fairly substantial, they w ill Increase the likelihood 
that development w ill be peaceful, they w ill advance the time when these 
countries might be substantial trading partners, and they might even 
work to enlarge Immediate Investment opportur'tles there.
George LI ska contends that, after the Second uorld War the United 
States and the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant and competing poles 
of power in International politics. Each side constructed a series of 
alliances seeking to define Its area of major security Interest. The 
United States entered Into agreements which did not Irrevocably bind I t  
to fight for Its  a llies, but which Indicated that American decision­
makers, nevertheless, viewed I t  as a distinct possibility. In 1947, on 
the basis of an historical tradition of Involvement In Latin America for 
ever a century, the Unitod States signed the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance (Me Pact), undertaking to assist In mertlng an 
attack* against one of the other American states. In 1949, I t  partici­
pated In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Sato). In 1911, the 
United States was a party to the Austral1a-Mew Zealand-United States 
Security Treaty (ANZUS), the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty 
(SEATO) In 1964; and bilateral agreements with Iran, Pakistan, and 
Turkey In 1959, which brought I t  Into relationship with the Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO).
During this period, the Soviet Union acted similarly. In 1950 I t  
concluded a treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with
5. John Spenter. Ib id ., pp.364-411, passim.
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Communist China, and In 1955, I t  joined with other seven Eastern Euro­
pean states in establishing the Warsaw Treaty Organization,
The nations of the Third World ilso established International orga­
nizations with alliance aspects. While security activities tend to be 
only one facet of these multi-purpose Institutions and while the nations 
which composed them could not begin to match the sophistication in wea­
pons and technology of either of the superpowers, such groups remained 
significant as expressions of solidarity. They included the League 
of Arab States, which Incorporated security tasks through the Joint 
Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty of 1950, and the Organization 
of African Unity, established in 1963,
In the 1950*s several nations of South East Asia declined joining 
alliances with the West and adopted a nonaligned posture. This was to 
demonstrate to Communist China that i t  was not being encircled by hostile 
pro-Western powers. As the strength and influence of Communist China 
grew in international relations, many nations in South East Asia adopted 
pro-Chinese attitudes. The small and weak nations believed that through 
a policy of friendly relations and acquiescence to Communist China they 
could avoid internal subversion or external attack, and a situation in 
which they might become a battlefield for the great powers.
Over the years many of these bodies began to show signs of deteriora­
tion, Military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Communist China 
began to decline during the late 1950*s and during the 196C*s the b itter 
polemics were punctuated by periodic border clashes between the two com­
munist countries. The Albanian government, by 19C1, had ceased to fu lly  
participate in the Warsaw Pact. During 1959, Iraq withdrew from the 
Bagdhad Pact, which was subsequently redesignated as the Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO), In 1965, France began a military "withdrawal" 
from the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and in 1966 did the
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Sim  from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1967 
Pakistan began a progressive disengagement from the South East Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO). Indeed, this disintegration of unity with­
in the great alliances which emerged after the Second World War Is an­
other spectacular development In recent International relations.
However, the post-war alliances may endure In some form for some 
years, but I t  seems unlikely that political relations within them can 
ever again take the form that they had during the 1950's, Indeed, the 
discordant personalities and political styles anonc American, French, 
Soviet and Chinese leaders have contributed to the disintegration of al­
liance unity.
Frederick L. Schunan maintains that . . . .
In a State System of competing Powers, the primary objective of 
foreign policy In peace and In war is neither war nor peace but some­
thing common to both! the enhancement of the power of your f  ate to 
resist the w ill of others end impose your w ill upon them and the di­
minution of the power of others to resist your w ill and Impose their 
w ill upon you. In "war* this goal Is pursued by overt violence, and 
In "peace* by bargaining supported by threats of force. Arms and 
allies are the tools of power. The task of diplomacy is to keep the 
powder dry and to win friends and Influence people.'6
The foreign policy of each state is based on factors which are more or 
less stable. They have to be taken Into account I f  foreign policy Is to 
be successful and realistic. The current political trend Is character­
ized by the conflict between Western civilization and the Communist 
pseudo-religion, as embodied In two super powers with their allies and 
sate llite , a conflict which has the nature of a civil war because Its 
front lines goes through all nations.^
6. Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: The Western State 
System in MId-Centufyr ’I Si r T orki Mcgriw""K in . 19111 fifth
E d it io n , p,Z53
7. Cecil V. Crabb, (J r .) , Nations In a Multipolar World. (New fork: 
Harper and Pow, 1 9 6 ^ " 4 1 1 -4 5 3 , $m .-----------
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W# can pota the questions In whet sense$ I f  et e ll* »re nonaligned
states •neutral•t8
Traditionally, titere nas been Much confusion over the differences 
among such concepts as neutrality and nonalignment. In one sense both 
signify the sane type of foreign policy orientation, where a state w ill 
net cosnrit Its  military capabilities, and sometimes Its diplomatic sup- 
pert to the purposes of another state *on-willingness to commit m ili­
tary capabilities to the purposes of others Is the hall-mark of aonallgn- 
wmt as a foreign policy strategy, but there are some variations in the 
circumstances by which a state adepts a nonaligned policy*. I t  Is hare 
that neutrality and nonalignment have distinct meanings.
Mchard Ogley observes that as a legal Institution neutrality is a 
product of the classical period of the community of states (1648-1914)
In which the balance of power, In different form, was the organisational 
principle. In the league of flattens, the firs t attempt to base Inter­
national relations on collective security Instead of balance of power 
was made, yet I t  broke down In the USO's. After the Second world Jar, 
however, this endeavour was renewed In the United Nations Organization, 
The new system of collective security which forbade the use of force 
In International relations and made any disturbance of International 
peace and security a breach of the United Nations Charter to be met even­
tually by tite collective force of a ll peace-loving states, has. In pure 
theory, no place for neutrality, whether casual or permanent. Its ef­
fectiveness depends on the active participation of a ll member states.
The League of latlons had made an exception of Switzerland In permit­
ting this neutral state to become a member while maintaining Its oerme-
*• 3 '% S £H ' ,d -
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iw itly  M iitrftl lU tys . Hwiver, 1m Ihe Chipfer, the statys sf p#r- 
eeneot meilrsllty Is In rnvttlb le  with the prlrtdples declered 1m Chip- 
U f  I  psfesftphs 5 end 6* In that, no stste cm i fs i l  Its e lf of ti<e 
status of pemmemt neutrality to be freed f rm  the obligations of the 
Charter,9
Cyril E. Black and Ms associates note that Austria's position Is
different. Although I t  Is mot aligned to any military alliance, I t  Is 
eoeltied to the principles of Western democracy and is part of the cul­
ture! pattern of the Western world. But I f  I t  Is to guard Its  indepen­
dence among the political and military blocs, I t  must determine alone Its
attitude toward each Issue.10
I t  is Impossible for a nonaligned state to be objectively neutral In
a world of East-West competition and conflict. Mo nonaligned state can 
be compared with the neutrality of Switaerland. Swiss neutrality Is ft 
product of tradition, a favourable combination of geographic, economic* 
m ilitary and political factors In the present multi-polar system. 
M s s  neutrality Is ft variable posture only when I t  Is not threatened 
directly by either side, there is no doubt that the West would never 
threaten M ss-neutrallty, In fact I t  would safeguard i t  from violation 
by the Communist bloc,
J.W. Burton emphasizes that neutrality Is mot nonalignment and the 
two concepts are poles apart* fake for example the general guest!on of
the recognition of a government Involved In Cold War diplomacy. The 
position of a neutral would be that recognition is accorded I t ,  and only
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p r w im  S e t this nwber Included et least the w in contestants or 
their allies In any noeer conflict which might be current. I f  there 
were two rival claimants for recognition, supported by two rival blocs, 
then the neutral government would refrain from the recognition of either.
the nonaligned nations, on the other hand, accord recognition wher­
ever In their view the government Is In undeniable control of the poli­
tical Institutions of the country concerned. They have been prepared 
to act, regardless of the views of any great power, and entirely on 
their own Judgement as to the status of the new government. An example 
Is the recognition of Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s regime In exile In 
Peking, China.
’Most policy decisions that nonaligned governments must take Impinge 
upon the Cold War, and many may be even more unneutral. Recognition 
of e new government can be accorded on the formal ground of effective 
control. Most other decisions of necessity reflect In some degree 
an assessment, an evaluation; touching upon the nature of the con­
f l ic t .  and the merits of the issues being debated. Policy decisions 
In relation to nuclear testing, disarmament fighting In Korea, dis­
putes over Formosa, the future of Laos, the war In Indo-Chlna; all 
reveal political attitudes, and even sympathies. The traditional 
neutral government would endeavour to remain stric tly  neutral in a 
dispute touching upon the Cold War, and i f  necessary even to refrain 
from casting a vote in the United Nations. But the nonaligned na­
tions claim the right not to be indifferent. In respect of any issue. 
Far from being Ind lf' the no aligned nations feel strongly about
the Issues at stak ilm the riant to express themselves to
intervene with pro: ,r the settlement of disputes.111
There are factions within the nonaligned nations who are postulating 
a world that does not r  1st yet; and i t  seems that they are assuming that 
the Cold War was deliberately started by the West, and thus could be call­
ed off by the West at will Instead of being a product of the policies pur­
sued by the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc.
Their rejection of power politics Is consiuL .le . The Indo-Chlna 
war and the Middle East Crisis has enhanced their rejection and coloured
11. J.W. Burton, "Rights and Obligations of Nonallgnnent", Australian
Outlook, V.16(3), Decanter 1962, pp.293-294
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their outlook on foreign policy. Their opinions ere besed on e nega­
tive foundation -  namely, a total repudiation of and dislike for the
West, especially the United States.
Host of the nonaligned nations would deny that they are pro-Soviet 
or pro-Chinese simply because they are anti-American or anti-Western. 
Indeed, many of their attitudes and slogans are parallel to those of 
the Communist countries -  such as their Inv'ttse hostility, for instance, 
to the Republic of South Africa, Israel, Portugal, Spain and Rhodesia,
•the nonaligned nations both suffer and profit from the existence
of the Cold tier; but they probably profit more, at the
short-run, than they lu ffer. By playing one side against the other, 
consciously or unconsciously, they have received economic aid from 
both. I f  there were r , Cold War the nonaligned nations would he 
getting less outside help. They enjoy an additional advantage be­
cause of their military non-Involvement in either camp; by remain­
ing nonaligned their defence budget may be smaller than U  other­
wise would La. As a result, they can devote a larger portion of 
their national resources to economic development,
s seeBoth the United States and the Soviet Union tend to deter each other 
from attacking independent states. This so-called extended deter­
rence provides a measure of security for the nomallgned and neutral 
states, security they would otherwise have to buy through membership 
in an alliance, through a bigger defence establishment or through 
both. Thet, the nonaligned nations among others, are protected as 
well as endangered by the Cold War. In the long run, tho Cold War 
nay, of course erupt into a not nuclear war, In which the w»pie world, 
including the nonaligned and the neutrals, would su ffe r.'u
In this rationale, the contingency of war with Comewnlst China was 
largely ignored by India. The tendency to view military matters in 
terms of war and peace naturally made Nehru, India's chief oollcy-meker, 
to opt in favour of peace, with results which require no further elabora­
tion. In retrospect, the policy of friendship with Communist China was
12. Ernest W. Lefever, in Lawrence W. Martin, (ed.l, neutralIsm and 
honalignmentt The hew States i n World A»fairs. (New Tor*: 
Frederick A. Praeger, T5F7j*, pp.117-11%.
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really based on India's o ilftary weakness, the desire te avoid pro­
voking Ceewmlst China at all costs, the failure to understand the Im­
plications of a strong Coasmmlst China having expansionist tendencies, 
the absence of an Indian In itia tive  In the Himalayan region, and fina lly , 
the fallacy of a peace posture based on a so-called toothless diplomacy.^ 
J.M. Burton stresses that*
'Nonalignment, then can be construed as a peacetime status I t  re­
lates to acts and attitudes of nations Involved In a power conflict 
short of war. While neutrality i.ws control the behaviour of govern­
ments and dtlxens, nonalignment Is a matter only for governments end 
there are no obligations on citizens or limitations on their freedom 
to express themselves or to negotiate commercial and other transac­
tions. In the event of open warfare between the main power blocs, 
nonaligned countries may or swy not declare themselves as neutral. 
Those that chcoseneutrality w ill Immediately be subject to the re­
straints, and nave the rights and duties associated with neutrality. 
These could over-ride rights claimed under nonalignment, for at that 
stage even the expression of Judgements made on the merits of the 
dispute could be Interpreted by one side as.prejudicial to the con­
duct of war, and therefore an act of war.*
The claim of nonaligned countries to represent the so-called unbiased 
conscience of Humanity, Is somewhat tarnished by what appears to Western­
ers to be a greater readiness to condemn Western misdeed than those of 
the Soviet Union as well as by the nonaligned nations support for the use 
of force, as In the case of Gao. Examples like India's attitude on 
Kashmir, on Morocco's claim to Mauritania, Indicate that on questions af­
fecting what are considered to be their vital national Interests, the non- 
aligned nations are no more likely to defer to Inter . tlonal morality and 
opinion than do the more powerful nations who they upbraid for thoir im­
moral behaviour. Yet, despite the fact that no nation is ready to abjure 
the use of threat of the use of fbrce, the very military weakness of the
13.
14. J.W. Burton, Ib id ., po.294-23
nations, which letds then to adopt a moralistic attitude, also makes 
amed conflict eaonn ther less likely, oroyfded the p m t powers restrain 
themselves or are restrained from becoming deeply Involved In their rival” 
Has,
John Spanler explains why the new states exercise the degree of In­
fluence they do.
•The f irs t  Is precisely that these nations are new, non-Westerm, non- 
White and ex-colonial. For an older. Western white nation with a 
legacy of colonial control to attempt to coerce or use force eoainst 
one of the new stales Is politically nearly Impossible In an age when 
national self-determination is universally recognized. A second 
reason is that these new, highly nationalistic states can, i f  need be, 
organized along revolutionary war of defense. Refore the French
Revolution and the birth of nationalism, the lack of popular partici­
pation and Involvement with the state meant that military conquest 
need not be followed by the task of pacification. Today this task 
1s so d ifficu lt that the cost of using force for this purpose tends 
to be very high, i f  not excessive. Third - and Vietnam again demon­
strates this power -  Western military doctrine and forces are ortho­
dox not geared to fighting guerilla armies. Thus, the combination of 
balance between the super-powers. Western inhibitions against using 
their superior power In such a way as to appear to be acting as bull­
ies, and the capacity of the nonaligned to resist allows at least some 
of them to exercise a degree of influence disproportionate to their 
actual power.**’
Nenallgment serves the national interests is a claim that Is often 
made by Afro-Asian leaders.
* l f  a prudent regard for the national interests Is the determining 
consideration, I t  follows that the nonaligned leaders pursue a strict­
ly  neutral course only when i t  serves their interest, and depart from 
f t  when I t  does not. Under the pressure of serving the national 
Interests, their attachment to nonalignment Is pragmatic rather than 
doctrinaire; Instrumental rather than absolute; and transitory rather 
than permanent.11®
The nonaligned nations Insist that they be le ft  alone to regulate their 
internal and regional affairs among themselves. The examples of the Congo, 
the Arab-Israeli War, and the Nigerian Civil War. demonstrate that the major
15. Jrhn Soanfer, H id , , p .230
16. tm est a lte r  Lefever. In Laurent* a rtln  (e d ,), lo td . ,  cr .110-
117
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powers way not Ue willing to comply to this dc««n\1, partlculsrly when 
f t  Is put forward by countries with ambitions of their awn In the areas, 
Moreover, t i *  belief of the non’illgned nations In thv principle of non­
intervention Is not an absolute, Thti A fro-Aslan states have pressed 
the Western countries and especially the United States, to take action 
•gainst Western allies like PortugaJ, who s t i l l  holds colonial territor­
ies. Non-intervention Is a doctrine to be applied to legitimate regl­
uts, but not to colonial or reactionary governments.
‘The contribution of the nonailwed and neutral nations to the pre­
servation of International peace and stability Is severely limited. 
Their efforts to mediate greet power deputes are effective ovsly when 
the greet powers are willing to compromise their differences. I f  
that willingness is present, an agreement  can probably be reached 
through normal diplomatic channels, without mediation. When the 
great powers do agree, the nonaligned nations can often make an Instru­
mental contribution by providing personnel or armed forces for an Im­
partial observation team or • United Nations police force,
a
Theoretically, one nonaligned state, or a group of nonaligned states 
could play a role as balancer, but In the present situation of nuclear 
bi-polarity, with the great disparity between the nuclear and non­
nuclear powers, this role Is not feasible. Furthermore, the non- 
aligned nations do not possess enough unity to form a coherent and 
viable bloc.**'
NanaiIgnment, with its  emphasis upon peace and peaceful co-existence, 
may thus be construed as a sort of strength through weakness philosophy, 
espoused by small, m ilita rily  vulnerable nations, unable to compete with 
the great powers in the making and acquiring of arms. I f  such countries 
are unable to acquire arms end powerful armed forces, then their diploma­
tic  voices eventually w ill become Influential to the degree that armed 
forces themselves are rendered less decisive in the conduct of Internation­
al relations.
Theodore I ,  Shay found that:
•The number of nonallnred nations which ore cenmlttwd to a pro-Soviet 
orientation Is small, but Is not for that reason to be discarded as
IT . Ernest W. Le fever, in  Lawrence W. M artin  ( ed . ) ,  I b id . ,  p .118
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negligible. These states cannot be charged with subservience to 
the Soviet Union, nor are they the so-called camn-followers, How- 
yer, the presence of large number of Soviet military and technical 
advisers and equipment, does make one winder the possible fate for 
that country's Independence and nonalignment. The case In point 
Is the United Arab Republic. The Sovlet-Eqyptlan Friendship 
Treaty of June 1971 requires closer study and can be regarded as a 
fern of alliance, however unholy.
The leaders of the nonaligned countries have Indicated their oppo­
sition to revolutionary or subversive activities; by a major power 
of either bice. Vet, here too, there Is a difference between the 
attitudes of the moderate* and the radicals. The Ccmmlst Chin­
ese lost support throughout the nonaligned world when their Foreign 
Minister declared that tftc African continent was rlpr for revolution. 
The Chinese attitude was denounced with particular vehemence by the 
ewrrate leader of the Ivory Coast. Western attempts at subversion 
ttwfl 0  be the objects of attack by the radicals and f t  was as a 
Met ter i %::^ t the overthrow of Ml 1 ton Obnte and Kwame Mkrwah was 
seen by the more radical African spokesmen. The distinction which 
has been made between the Western oriented and pro-Cemmlst leaders 
may be subtle and exaggerated, but I t  may have some basis In fact, 
even though both groups may claim to be neutral.'
The right not to be Indifferent Is exercised furthermore. In relation
to the fundamental assumptions of the newer conflict. The nonaligned
nations do not accept any rights to employ power, to threaten the use of
force, or to exercise economic pressures, as legitimate Instruments of
national policy arising merely out of tho possession of superior powers.
They e «  net against the use of force by an international organization or
even by a nation; but they do not agree that possession of power confers
any special rights. They I t  seems, devalue proer. They claim a status
that does not rest upon the existence of a power rivalry, as no neutrals.
They claim that the policy of nonalignment should be the policy of a ll
sovereign states. Including greet powers, and should be the basis of an
international structure. They are, therefore, not merely attacking the
day-by-day policies of the great powers according to the merits of each
case as they see them; but they are also denying the rights which the
great powers have always assumed to be theirs, as an Integral part of
18. Theodore L. Shay, I b id . ,  oo.??8-?4S, passim.
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their sovereignty, end nitionsl Interests.
In addition to their role is the so-celled moral conscience of human­
ity , the nonatIgned nations also view themselves as a balance or Inter- 
Medlary between the power bloc*,. Nationalist nonaligned thinking ha; 
added the theory of the Third World countries to the older bl-polar view 
of international politics. Like the bl-polar view, this view of inter­
national politics overlooks the olurallstlc elements In the West and, 
especially since the sinewing Slno-Sovlot Ideological division, in the 
East as well; but I t  serves the purpose of establishing a separate Iden­
t ity  ana special role in international affairs for the new nations. Yet, 
the Wo roles - that of Independent moral conscience exercising an unbiased 
judgement on each case, and that of the balance wheel located precisely 
midway between the position of East and West - need not lead to the same 
conclusions. The conception of themselves, as the man between the ex 
trades, typical of the thinking of nonaligned nationalists, leads to an 
almost automatic assumption of a riddle ground on Cast-West questions, 
with different results from the attempt to make an Independent assessment 
of the moral worth of the claims of the two antagonists.
J.O.B, M iller cautions that:assKMgp
ethnic origins, languages, and colonial backgrounds. encompass
a wide range of economic circumstances, from countries in sAlch the 
worst Malthusian forebodings seem to be cowing true, to those that 
s t i l l  have ample resources of land .'*'
Scholar, p.592, s.v.
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The neeellgned nation's endorsement of support for the so-called wars 
of national liberation -  a diparture from the Charter of the United 
Nation's conception of permissible use of force - provides a complex ex­
ample of unintended consequences flowing from an original departure In 
doctrine and practice frcei legal expectations. Among the consequences of 
such a departure Is that I t  weakens the Impact of nonaligned objections 
to the more militant 0 0 $tore of the Soviet Union and Cosrmnlst China and 
to the Interventlonary anti-Comunist policies ant.' practices of the United 
States, Likewise the unilateral scale of tW United States role In sup­
port of the government of South Vietnam Is generating precedents - with 
regard to outside participation In c iv il wars - that seem to Impair exist­
ing precedents of neutrality and limited Intervention that might have been 
strengthened had the United States government chnsnn an alternative course 
ef action.
Most nonaligned nations prefer to talk In term of ethics In their pro­
nouncements on International affairs. They have been alert to point out - 
what they believe to be -  the delinquencies of other notions, and especial­
ly those of Western nations. Their spokesmen re+er to racial discrimina­
tion and colonialism In Southern Africa with a display of moral Indigna­
tion. Fast as they are to make the most of the moral delinquencies -  or 
what they way chose to call moral delinquencies - their leaders do set 
bother about their own. Indeed In point of theory, they are quite willing 
to discard a ll moral standards In their dealings with other nations, sim­
ply on the ground that the end Justifies the means. Let I t  not be Implied 
here that the nonaligned nations have a monopoly on unethical conduct in 
International affairs. Other nations are far from guiltless.
•India under Nehru set Its e lf up as spiritually superior, as the shining 
example of the virtue 0 * practicing nonviolence In International 
affairs, and offered the United States frequent lectures on power poli­
tics and the Imnoral use of force, to the United States had attribu­
ted Europe's wart to petty jealousies end rivalries so too did India 
see the causes of the Cold Yar. Meanwhile a4 'one (where another form
■ mJ .........   *
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of se? m a tt  on. the caste sysW , has been oart of India's tradition­
al culture for centuries ana, though legally atollshed, s t i l l  has 
great social force.), the new nation had some second thoughts about 
trying Its own hand at power politics. even resorting to the use of 
force in Kashmir and ,iea.,?0
Indeed, there is nothing particularly moral about a policy of non- 
elfgnment. Nations which decide not to commit themselves to either side 
In the Cold War make the decision In their own national Interests. Non- 
sllgtvnent is not a pious refusal to take part In power polities, nor Is 
I t  based on a rejection of the use of force, end modem weapons of war.
Too often, non e It  gown t  is associated by Its exponents with virtue In In­
ternational affairs. Nonallament has nothing to do with morality and 
nations which espouse I t  operate on the same principles of national self- 
interests as any utlon In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
J.W. Burton maintains that:
'Honaliereaent Is a policy which can be followed to Its  logical conclu­
sion only by a deliberate attempt to be professional about internation­
al relations; and the technical aspects of those relations. I t  Is 
In this respect thet the no-aligned nations have failed. I t  is said, 
that at the Geneva discussions on disarmament In 196?, only two of the 
seven nonaligned and neutral nations appeared to have had specialized 
technical advisors. Surprisingly, they were discussing and making 
suggestions on some of the most highly technical questions. -•
However, the nonaligned nations have supported efforts for the elimi­
nation or reduction of nuclear weapons with humanitarian arguments; show­
ing l i t t le  concern for the merits of alternative proposals for dealing with 
the problem.
Hans J. Morgenthau and John Spanler point out that one of the most pro­
nounced characteristic of the conduct of nonallnned foreign policy Is Its  
amateurishness. This Is fostered by the leek of Influence of the profes­
sional staffs -  I f  any -  of the foreign Ministry - I f  any - and the depart­
mental obstructionist: of the Cabinet or the ruling clique. Monallgned
20, John Spanler, Ib id ., p.39>
21. J.W. Burton, Ib id ., p.296
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diplontcy tends to b« one of reaction. Uften ti»u search for an answer
Is one of a floundering nature.
Ferelyn policy Is primarily a policy of “puLltc relations" designed 
not as In the advanced countries, to sustain the security of the state 
or ennance Its power among other states, but to 1 throve the reputation 
of the nation, to make others heed Its voice, to rake then pay attention 
to I t  and to respect I t .  The "world", tiie "lnVKrtalist world*, remains 
very mucii on the minds of tiio In to llecfcuals of tin* new states. I t  re- 
mains tiie auctonce end tiie Jury of the accorrlHhr.titits of the nation 
which the Intellectuals have done so much to cr«utt.
Prudent decision-making requires knowledge of the subject-matter to 
be handled. Sucii knowledge Is more often d ifficu lt to obtain In poli­
tical affairs. This Is true, In particular, of International politics. 
The major powers have therefore developed largo Institutions for the col­
lection and evaluation of Information In tht field of International af­
fairs. The nonallyneU nations must fot obvious reasons try to pet 
•long with much more restricted means.
However, I t  is of particular Importance for a small nonaligned nation 
to keep Informed about the views and Intentions of the Interested great 
powers, with respect to Its e lf end Its  region, and this Is en almost im­
possible task. I t  can rarely obtain much current Information beyond 
what appears In the press and what Is stated by the representatives of the 
relevant great powers. Study of the available political literature and 
source material Is , In this case, of particular Importance.
The global character of Intematltnal affairs creates needs to obtain 
Information from almost every part of the world, hut for the smaller non- 
aligned nations which itave necessarily limited resources for diplomatic 
and Intelligence activity I t  may bo p’*udent to concentrate them primarily 
In those regions and states which are most relevant. Otherwise they may
lose unduly In efficiency.22
Michael Brechor a student of Indian affairs, notes for example, that 
the conduct of Indian foreign policy was saved by the dominance of such 
forceful a personality as Nehru. Through private correspondence and 
personal contact, he could conduct a fa irly  effective foreign policy over 
the built-in Inertia of the collective responsibility of the Indian Cabi­
net, which at many times was opposed to some of his private actions.
Another factor of salvation was thy length of t l r i  he remained In office. 
The foreign minister's office was one office that was not rotated among
the Indian Cabinet.
ro* the developing nonaligned nation, a systematic approach to foreign 
policy formulation - with effective planning of strategy - is Just as 
essential at for the advanced nations and the >oat Powers. The basic 
question Is not whether a nation can survive without sophisticated, cor­
porate, long-range policy planning, but whet!,-r I t  can survive without 
clear knowledge of Its purpose end Its  strategies. Political strategy 
serves the purpose of providing guidelines for developing new and wider 
International contacts and of determining the individual major factors 
necessary for the nation's achievement of Its  objectives.
Hobart C. Good stresses that:
• I t  Is very Important, for the developin': nonaligned nation to start 
thinking In terns of relatively simple national planning and building. 
In a number of key elements such as, a clear knwlodge of the Inter­
national environment, a clear statement of Its objectives; the c ri­
teria by which future courses of action can be assessed. I t  must 
also tidy up the operations planning of the national economy, covering 
economic development, the provision of new markets, supply of foreign 
Investment capital, and the productive utilization of manpower.
Trade and Industry must form part of the national affairs Is comier- 
clal f irs t , then political. Politics should not be an obsession and
I t ,  Hans J. Momenthau, Ibid.
John Spanler, Ib id ., Chapter 12, p.364-411
23. Michael Brecher, Ib id .
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supercede the national Interest*.
Today, the nonaligned country Is politically weaker because Its 
central administration Is In disarray. Centrifugal tendencies toward 
regional1sr, whlth have repeatedly fragmented rary a developing country, 
era at work and might produce tragic results. The country Is also 
weaker than the smaller developed countries, In sophisticated weaponry 
and an Industrial basu for the production of modern weaponry.
Paradoxically, the nonallpnod country’ s relatively backward economy, 
taken with Its  dispersed population, means that I t  is not as vulnerable 
m ilita rily  as advanced Industrial societies. In terms of defence, then, 
the smaller nonaligned country Is not a formidable force to be reckoned 
with. Thus, I t  has no offensive potential against neighbouring coun­
tries, and Is not capable of doing significant damage. However, the 
International weaknesses of the state does provide a standing Invitation 
for foreign powers to Intervene.
Seymour Martin Upset notes with reference to leadership In the non- 
aligned world. I t  Is characteristic of the radical nonaligned leaders 
that In them the quest for popularity and power Is great. In their dis­
cussions, the radicals are not exploring the questions that are 
troubling the developing nonaligned world. They are not concerned with 
whether there Is peace, freedom from hunger and want, economic development 
and social change, and progress. They do not care enough about their 
societies to bum the midnight o il over them. They are too Indolent In­
tellectually to do :he tough work of eanlorlnn and solving the problems 
to which they pretend a concern. Theirs Is the egoism, the personal 
chauvinism of the nationalist self. Tleirst Is the windless, obsessive
24, Robert C. Good, "State-dulldine as a iktarmlnant of Foreign 
Policy In the New States", In Laurence W. Martin (ed,).
Neutral tin and Nonalignment. (New York! F.A. Preeger, 19*?), 
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quest for power,?5
Suffice I t  to isy* that In recent years, their speeches at nonallgned 
gatherings anti ether International foruws haw reaciiod new heights of ab­
surdity, The use of such terns as yenoclda, racist, imperialist anti 
ethers, is disturbing, for i t  betrays a lack of historical perspective, 
a provincial Is* end narrow-mindedness so monueienU I as to make rational 
discourse and even dialogue. Impossible. I t  wy jo rooted partly In 
the post-colonial Afro-Aslan hypociKeidrla - Vis itotc of ctnd In which 
any economic* physical, or social affliction; real or Imagined, turns 
Into a fatal Illness.26
Perhaps, I t  has to do with the post-colonial Afro-Aslan naivete and 
the surfeit of Idealism - engaging qualities In themselves, hut poten­
t ia lly  dangerous. They reflect a predisposition to be taken In by dema­
gogues like the late tiwame Mkmmah, the late hasor, the late Sukarno, 
the late Nehru, and the very ,wch alive Tito, find their slogans. How 
else can one explain the much publicised enthusiastic support given by so 
Many well-aeanlnq nations, like the hatnerlends, Sweden and even the 
World Cornell of Churches, to causes and movennts which, below a thin 
veneer of progressive, anti-colonialist, a n tl- iT  r lo lls t, anti-racist 
verbiage, are unmistakably pro to-fascist or ->v*" nrote-comnumlst In charac­
ter and which, I f  given success and power, would establish a reign of 
terror and oppression sv^h as Africa and thn world, has never known.
The world has known of many demagogues who have demanded freedom and 
power to the people, ar ive promised freedom, epuallty and power to the 
people, and have promised freedom, equality and fustlce to everyone.
26. Seymour Martin Upset, Politica l Man. (Londoni Mercury Books, 
1953), P.41%
26. Ib id ., 9.416
133
Bui, no ieoder want* to hear about history and the experience of the 
past of other countries, f t *  leaders are not prone to blindness end con­
fusion* The object lessons of the past are meaningless. I t  Is this 
unflinching acceptance of slogans which is perhaps so frightening about 
the current trend in Afro-Aslan politics; and even International poli­
tics.
Samuel P. Huntington, In a study of ewerqlrin nations notes the* In 
the past century, ti.rougii the liv trvwcntalltlcs cf nationalism, numerous 
countries acquired politicization, Ixcludlnu ti.t vOvUt, Chin so, 
Vietnamese and Cuban nationalist movements, nearly all of the nationalist 
movements In the post Secont. World War pcrlcc, luvv teen exprcrlisted by 
the bourgeoisie elites. The reasons for this arc that the bourgeoisie 
Is more deft at perceiving the dynamics of power • Its dialectical turns 
am. " ists - and at steering events and situations, symbolically and em­
pirically , In directions favourable to, or et Uast not destructive of, 
bourgeois concerns. A case In point Is the confrontation lie tween 
President Kaunda and the radical Simon Kapepwe 1n vhlch the la tter lost.
This bourgeoisie has fostered a world of rnks-N'lleve. I t  is pre­
cisely this neglect of reality which forces us to relegate to the cate­
gory of propaganda all th >astful claims nf successful leadership. 
Most of the speech* s are .arlatlot.s on the th*»-e of speech - making as an 
exercise In nations''st fantasy, executed with *11 th*» usual revolution­
ary rhetoric and an.. *o$t ranting. However, thore aro exceptions.
I t  seems tiiat one function of the nonaltoned nations* leaders* use of 
polemical excess Is to fac ilitate  ties with radicals In their countries 
and with the Communist world. The use of such excess Is rooted In the 
articulating styles of the nationalist movements1 political sub-culture, 
one of which Is a tutored proclivity to give the Impression of being that 
which you necessarily really are not, hoping thereby to derive a certain
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quick and short-run advantage and leeway.
Furtheiierei vari>al excesses, along wlut other sty listic excesses, 
are basic to the nooaligned leadership style, one Is, Indeed, parcelv- 
ed by one's followers as deficient unless one Indulges In tiiese excess­
es* Without the daily evidence of anti-capitalist, atitl-imperialist 
violent rhetoric and syybollsfii, which Is amply and grotesquely provided 
by their controlled news media, the leadership would be without a major 
vicarious outlet fo r  their revolutionary fan title s .
The leaders, rearwd and schooled In t illonalist i-cvwc. «s poli­
tical sub-culture where pretense Is In fact the ■•ain mod* cf providing 
the people with vicarious or spurious satisfactions, would he poor ex- 
eeples of leadersnlp they failsd to exploit tills situation. The pay­
off provided by the raving pivlotarlat arid sore radicals Is simply enor­
mous.2*
The leaders' polemical excesses perform an unintended and personal 
function for tire leaders. The polemical excesses enable the leaders to 
exercise certain Inner tensions, stresses and strains -  Indeed certain 
demonic feelings - which stem from the "unique" frustrations these persons 
experience In an International society which, through tire Western iwp*"
M il 1st Instrumentalities, somehow restricts the development end moderni­
zation of their nations.
The arrogance of the leaders' views are matched by what I believe to 
be a serious and deliberate breach of objectivity with regard to the Com­
munist world. Of Us failure, deceits, and belll^ronce, they have 
l i t t le  to say. They dismiss as feeble and Insufficient the West's assis­
tance end efforts to reconstruct the econonlc and social fabric of their
2 7 , Samuel P. ! bunting ton, ' Political development and Political Decay", 
World Politics, Vol. XVII, 1965, pp.196-430, Msslm.
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rution*. They spplsyd tne Communist essistance In the form of expen­
sive military hardware. Nowhere in their speeches do we find mention 
of the bloody Communist role in the post-war world, other than as pro­
posers of freedom and self-determination - this in the face of Communist 
subversion in South East Asia, their Incursions into India, their inva­
sion of Czechoslovakia, tneir clandestine support of left-wing govern­
ments in Africa, and their massive and blatant Intervention in Vietnam,
'Policies always take the form of rules of comparison. The common 
practice of stating *polices" in the form of simple injunctions to 
seek peace* or "preserve the country's natural frontiers" is most 
unacceptable. First, i t  tends to ignore the costs of trade-offs 
related to each of the actor's choices in a situation. ?tore im­
portantly. I t  Is very likely that even a small number of sucn In­
junctions (two or three) could ue maintained for any period of tine 
in the natural environment I f  they generated meaningful Implications 
for specific situations. Thus the use of the Injunctive form tends 
to re-Inforce the tendency to use vague, general, slogans which are 
unbeatable and beyond criticism, hence cannot be improved or refined. 
The foreign policy of a national government, or any othc- agent, 
taken in the aggregate sense, w ill be a collection of particular 
policies, solutions to specific problem situations, not a set of 
formal derivatives from some set of general axioms or principles 
created a priori ty policy-makers. The situation is prior to the 
principle. Internal consistency Is essential, of course, but them 
will be overlapping and pans in the structure cannot be avoided. 
Further, men's capacity to create new concepts, new standards, new 
ways of looking at the environment, must be respected I f  we are to 
avoid ossification.'**'
John Spanier emphasizes that the most Important political aspect of 
the nonaligned state is the urge toward nationalism. This has both prac­
tical and ideological Implications. I t  is the nationalism encouraged by 
the state machine to sustain itse lf. In most eases i t  develops out of 
that anti-colonial nationalism that flourished before the transfer of 
power, but i t  is different in a variety of ways, because its emphasis is 
on construction and legitimacy, not on destruction and defiance. I t  
places greet emphasis on national unity, and on state symbols, such as the
%% VvGVf . t  t ' -l  ‘ 1
fleg, the anthem, the armed forces,, the head of state, and the national 
boundaries, even when these are the product of the rost arbitary and op­
portunistic actions of nineteenth century imperialism. I t  cultivates 
suspicion of the foreigners, and blames them for whatever goes wrong;
I f  they are local residents like the unfortunate Chlnesr In Indonesia, 
or the less fortunate Indians In Burma and East Africa, they may be sub­
jected to persecutit' In the name of the new nation. I t  Is opposed to 
colonialism In its public statements, and gives primacy to the anti- 
colonial causes in Its foreign policy; but I t  Is amenable to suggestions 
from businessmen, and is anxious to secure arms from whoever will make 
them available promptly and most cheaply. I t  stresses economic growth, 
which Is often linked to protectionism. I t  shows reluctance to enter 
large groupings of states, unless i t  w ill be able to dominate the group, 
or the organisation is so weak as to make anyone else's domination Impo­
ssible. Plus or minus an element or two, this form of nationalism is 
cowon to all emerging states, and Is also to be found in the older ones 
like Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iraq; whlcn are in similar economic and social 
circumstances. This sort of nationalism is supposed to oe strong and 
self-supporting, A change is unlike!/ In the foreseeable future.1,^
•Since nonalignment Is not rooted in an absolute principle, but rather 
in an outgrowth of circumstances, we may expect constant adaptation In 
the foreign policies of nonalioned states in response to changing condi­
tions. Nonaligned leaders, like political leaders of other states, 
are responsive to the changing Interpretation of the sources end 
nature of primary and secondary threats to the safety and security of 
their nation, honetW"* it as a position or a policy will be dis­
carded when i t  no lonoei serves the national purpose.**'
The hidden crisis in the politics of nonaligned nations is their Inabil­
ity  to reconcile the crisis In international relations. International trade.
29. John Spooler, Ib id ., pp.364-411, passim.
30. Ernest Walter Lefever, In Laurence w. %art1n (erf.). Ib id ., PP.IIS-
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end the ere* met, end their netlonel Interests end priorities. The 
problems In the intametionel erene will resolve themselves, but the 
problems of the nonetigned netIons ere cspebte of netlen-rending explo­
sions, The crises the nonellgned notions telk the most ebout ere the 
degeneretion of intemetiomil reletlens end the threst of rece prejudice 
to world pence. However, meny nonetigned nation* face graver problems 
In the inter-commune! and Inter-governmental relations area, than even 
before. Their points of view are elusive, end as they probe and meddle 
into other nations* affa irs, they obscure and wish away their own. At 
International gatherings some of them adopt a belligerent stance and ask 
provocative questions; but none of them can supply the answers. This 
is part of the hidden crisis in the politics of the nonaligned nations.
Thus, i t  can be Justifiably questioned, whether the contemporary 
foreign policy orientation of the nonaligned nations Is part of t»V» larg­
er pattern of policies through which developing nations pass compulsorily 
in moving from one period In history to another.
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CHAPTER FIVi 
CONCLUSION
Foreign snd de**»t1c politics p»s«rt>Io the oosltlve end negative com­
ponents of an electric current - eliminate one and the other w ill not 
function -  they produce power only when they are combined* Although 
Issues of domestic Interest stay exist, rarely are there significant 
ones not affected by world conditions and a nailon$s position vis-a-vis 
other nations. There are good reasons why foreign and domestic poli­
tics have almost merged Into one concept - technology and Ideology have 
chanysd, perhaps even shifted the foundation upon vhlch tne nation- 
str were built.
tonalIgnment a new concept In International relations which Is 
Hie direct m a l t  of the struggle between the non-Communlst world and 
tie  Communist bloc, as I t  developed after the Second World War, I t  Is 
confined mainly to the developing states of Asia and Africa. Latin 
America Is nonallgned only In part; the Organization of American States 
cannot be called nonallgned, because Its Interests coincide with those 
of the western world, a fact which was clearly demonstrated In the Cuban 
Crisis when the Organisation clearly opposed Soviet penetration of Cuba 
and in virtual unanimity voted to take measures agslnst Castro’ s align­
ment with the Soviet Union.
Although nonalignment implies a certain opportunism - because i t  
does not preclude a nonaligned state's tratil ig and maintaining relations 
with components of the opposing blocs - we can understand the nonaligned 
nation’s desires not to Jeopardize their newly won sovereignty. Also, 
as long as they remain nonallgned, tney receive assistance from both 
sides, for the East and the West are eager to be In their pood graces.
mForeign policy In the Sixties Is characterized by the wooing of the 
ttoeallgnedt the Coemunfsts do I t  to get them on their side; the West 
retains satisfied to keep them from Joining the Communist camp.
A policy of nonalignment, however. Is no guarantee of national se­
curity aa India teamed from its experience with Communist China.
Indeed, India was a strong exponent of nonalignment, which became Its  
national policy. Yet the Communist Chinese attack on the contested 
Slno-Indian border areas In 1962-63 compelled the Indian government to 
retreat to some extant, from its nonalignment by accepting Western m ili­
tary aid, India also received massive Soviet aid in its  confrontation 
with aligned Pakistan and this contributed substantially to the defeat 
of Pakistan.
the Communists believe that the nonaligned areas hold the key to the 
defeat of the West, tty liberating them from so-called neo-colonialism 
and converting them to the Socialist camp; they hope to end Western 
access to the Coasaunist States; thereby isolating the West both p o liti­
cally and economically. In such circumstances, i t  can be said that 
nonalignment contributes to a country l i t t le  more than a reprieve from 
actual Involvement in the Cast-West conflict.
The nonaligned nations believe that the priorities of international 
^elation* are the population explosion, malnutrition, low agricultural 
output, the problems of urbanization, of adverse terms of trade, and 
human degradation.
Indeed, these are realities that are age-old and recurrent. The 
nonaligned nations believe that tliey have, by their numbers alone, be­
come sufficiently Influential to assume that their pleas would be heard 
end that soma of their demands would be met.
However, the study of international relations w ill continue to  be 
affected by the urgency of war, c iv il strife and peace problems. There
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w ill be continue! chenges In the developing countries and these w ill 
change the pattern of International relations. The developing coun­
tries w ill swell the number, size and Importance of Inter-governmental 
and non-governmental organizations.
Since the problems of peace and war are so complicated, and Have 
such a profound bearing on International relations, they will not be 
solved merely by slogans like • peaceful co-existence", "area of peace*, 
and the numerous declarations of the African and Aslan states at con­
ferences of the nonaligned nations.
The paramount concern of the nonaligned nations Is peace, especially 
International peace. There Is no Indication that this concern w ill not 
continue In the future.
The nonaligned nations attach great significance to moral-ethical 
values In their conduct of International relations. I t  seems they will 
continue to do so In the future in spite of the fact that the Great 
Powers do not care much for moral-ethical values.
The nonaligned nations1 belief that nonalignment is a constructive 
force In the resolution of International tensions and In the maintenance 
of peace, w ill continue.
The bi-poler world of the post Second World War period has new been 
replaced by a multi-polar world. But, the majority of the nonaligned 
nations are m ilita rily  weaki and neither now nor In the future w ill they 
be in a position to threaten or challenge the Great Powers in the acqui­
sition of military and economic strength as decisive Instruments of for­
eign policy.
However, minor armed clashes among nonaligned nations themselves and 
with other nations In alliance, cannot always be ruled out. For, ore 
of the things we have learnt from hard experience Is that we cannot always 
expect rationality in international relations. In fact, we can forecast
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IrrttlO M lfty  is •  logical Instnm nt In sow eeontHes1 promotion of 
tholr R atio n a l Interests.
nation-bulling t i l l  continue to be a major pre-occupation of the 
nonallgneet nations. Thus, they w ill attach special Importance to the 
right of all sovereign nations to determine In fu ll freedom, the paths 
of their political, economic, social and cultural development* They 
will else promote the right of a ll peoples to the benefits of economic 
development and the fruits of the scientific and technological revolu­
tion.
The questions of colonialism, recti! discrimination, and the problems 
of underdevelopment In Asia, Africa end Latin America, w ill continue to 
dominate the attention of the non/illgned nations.
Nonallgnment as a contemporary foreign policy development Is here to 
stay as part of the pattern of the post-war world.
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX A
THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE
The Asten-African Conference, convened by the Governments of Burma, 
Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, met In Bandun<i from the 18th to
24th of April, 1955.
In addition to the sponsoring countries, the following twenty-four
countries participated In the conferences
Afghanistan, Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, 
Thailand, Turkey, the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, the State
of Vietnam and Yemen.
The Aaian-Afrlcan Conference considered the position of Asia and 
Africa and discussed ways and means by which their peoples could achieve 
the fullest economic, cultural and political cooperation.
Free from distrust and fear and with confidence and goodwill toward 
each other, nations should practice tolerance and live together In peace 
with one another as good neighbors and devel. lendly coope ation on 
the basis of the following principles;
1. Respect for fundamental human r l ■. and for the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territoria l Integrity of a ll 
nations.
3. Recognition of the equality of a ll races and of the equal1 tv of 
a ll nations, large and small.
4. Abstention from Intervention or Interference In the Internal 
affairs of another country.
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend Its e lf singly or
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collectively In conformity with the Charter of the 'JnUed Nations.
6, a Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense 
to serve the particular Interests of any of the big powers, b. Ab­
stention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries,
7, Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of 
force against the te rr ito ria l Integrity or political Independence of 
any country.
8, Settlement of a ll International disputes by peaceful means such 
as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, as 
well as other peaceful means of the parties1 own choice In conformity 
with the Charter of the United Nations,
9, Promotion of mutual Interest and cooperation,
10. Respect for justice and International obligations.
The Aslen-Afrlcan Conference declares Its  conviction that friendly 
cooperation In accordance with these principles would effectively con­
tribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and 
security, while cooperation in th  f- omonlc, social and cultural fie ld  
would hel? irg about tfn 'omno' prosperity and well-being of a ll .
The Asl'in African Conference recommended that the five sponsoring 
countries consider the convening of the next meeting of the Conference 
In consult?ui m with the participating countriesJ
1. C. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung, pp.92-102 pass In.,
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APPENDIX B
THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE
DECLARATION OF THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE 
The conference unanimously adopted on the 6th September a twenty-seven- 
point declaration setting forth the views of the participants on major 
International problems, as follows!
(1) The conference reaffirmed Its  support for the resolution on 
colonialism adopted by the 15th session of the United Nations General 
Assembly and condemned a ll types of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and 
Imperialist domination,
(2) The conference demanded the Immediate ending of a ll armed 
action and repressive measures directed against dependent peoples; 
freedom for a ll dependent peoples to exercise their right to complete 
Independence; and respect for the Integrity of their national te r r i­
tory, I t  condemned a ll aid given to a colonial power in scch suppress­
ion as contrary to the United Nation* Charter, and called for scrupulous 
respect for the te rrito ria l Integrity of a ll States.
(3) The participating countries supported the Algerian people's 
struggle for Independence and the integrity of their national te rrito ry , 
to which they would extend all possible aid. They were "particularly 
gratified that Algeria Is represented at this conference by i ts  rightful 
representative, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of 
Algeria”,
(4) The bloodshed and ■Intolerable measures of repression" In 
Angola should be ended Immediately, and a ll peace-loving countries 
should assist the people of Angola to establish a free and Independent 
State without delay,
(5) Where the te rrito ria l integrity of Aslans, Africans and Latin 
American countries had been violated, a ll colonial occupation should be 
terminated immediately and a ll foreign forces withdrawn.
(6) The French armed forces should be evacuated Immediately from
Wr whole of Tunisian territory ,
(7) The world community should do everything In its  power to erase 
'•he consequences of the tragic events In the Congo, to prevent any 
further foreign Intervention, and to respect the sovereignty, unity and 
te rrito ria l Integrity of the Congo.
(8) The conference condemned South Africa's apartheid policy and
a ll forms of racial discrimination as a grave violation of the United
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
(9) The rights of ethnic or religious minorities must be respected,
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md In particular such minorities must be protected against the crime 
of genocide.
(10) The conference condemned "the Imperialist policies pursued in 
the Middle East* end declared Its support for the fu ll restoration of the 
rights of the Arab people of Palestine, In conformity with the Charter 
and United Nations resolutions.
(11) The conference condemned the establishment and maintenance of 
foreign military bases In the territories of other countries, particu­
larly against the le tte r’s express w ill, as a gross violation of their 
sovereignty; declared Its  fu ll support for countries endeavouring to 
secure the vacating of such bases; and called upon those countries 
maintaining foreign bases to coneiier seriously their abolltfo , as a 
contribution to world peace.
(12) The conference recognized that the United States base at 
Guantanamo, In the permanence of which the Cuban Government had express­
ed Its  opposition, affected Cuba’ s sovereignty and territo ria l Integrity.
(13) All nations had the right to determine their political status 
and freely pursue thsir economic, social and cultural development with­
out Intimidation or hindrance. All peoples might "freely dispose of 
their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations 
arising out of International economic co-operation, based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit and international law*. In no case might a 
people be deprived of Its  means of subsistence. The right of Cuba, as 
of any other nation, freely to choose Its  political and social system 
should be respected.
(14) "No intimidation, Interference, or intervention should be 
brought to bear In the exercise of the right of self-determination of 
peoples. Including their right to pursue constructive and Independent 
policies for the attainment and preservation of their sovereignty."
(15) General, complete, and Internationally-controlled dlsarmawmt 
was "the most urgent task of manking".
(16) General and complete disarmament should Include the elimina­
tion of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of errs, and 
Institutions for military training, except for purposes of Internal se­
curity , and the total prohibition of the production, possession and 
utilization of nuclear, thermo-nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical 
weapons, as well •$ the elimination of equipment and installations for 
the operational use of weapons of mass destruction.
(17) All States should undertake tr se outer space exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. An international ..<cy should be established to 
promote international co-operation In ate peaceful uses of outer space.
(18) The great powers should "sign without further delay a treaty 
for general and complete disarmament, In order to save mankind from the 
scourge of war and to release energy and resources now being spent on 
armaments for the peaceful economic and social development of all 
mankind*. The nonaligned countries should be represented at all future 
conferences on disarmament; a ll discussions on disarmament should be 
held under United Nations auspices; and general and complete disarma­
ment should be |earanteed by an effective system of Inspection and
control, the terms of which should Include representatives of nonalign­
ed countries,
(19) An agreement on the prophlbltlon of a ll nuclear tests should 
be urgently concluded. Negotiations for this purpose should be Imme­
diately resumed, separately or as part of the negotiations on general 
disarmament, and the moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons 
should be observed by a ll countries,
(20) The U.N. General Assembly should adopt at Its  sixteenth 
(XYlth) session a decision on the convening of either a special Assembly 
session on disarmament or a world disarmament conference under U.N, 
auspices,
(21) Efforts should be made "to close, through accelerated economic, 
Industrial and agricultural development, the ever widening gap In the 
standards of living bitween the few economically advanced countries and 
the many economically less developed countries". A U.N. capital deve­
lopment fund should be established for this purpose. The participating 
countries agreed to demand just terms of trade for the economically less 
developed countries; "constructive efforts to eliminate the excessive 
fluctuations In primary commodity trade and the restrictive n asures
and practices which adversely affect the trade and revenues of the newly 
developed countries"; and the application of the fru its  of the scienti­
f ic  and technological revolution In a ll fields of economic development.
(22) All countries In the course of development should "co-operate 
effectively in the economic and commercial fields so as to face the 
policies of pressure In the economic sphere, as well as the narmful re­
sults which may be created by the economic blocs of the Industrial 
countries*. The countries concerned should convene as soon as possible 
an international conference to discuss their common problems and to 
reach a reement cn the most effective measures to ensure the realization  
of their economic and social development.
(23) The recipient countries must be free to determine the use of 
economic and technical assistance which they night receive, and to draw 
up their own plans and assign priorities 1n accordance with their needs,
(24) The U.N, General Assembly should, theough the revision of the 
Charter, find a solution to the question of expanding the membershlo of 
the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council In order to 
bring their composition and work Into harmony with the needs and th^ 
extended membership of the United Nations.
(251 I t  was "absolutely necessary to evolve a more anrronrlate 
structure for the U.N, Secretariat, bearing In mind equitable regional 
distribution",
(26) Those countries participation 1n the conference which recogni­
zed Communist China recomended that "the General Assembly at Its  
forthcoming session should accept the representatives of the r-overment 
of the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representative 
of that country In the United Nations".
(27) The German problem was "not merely a regional rreMnm but 
liab le to exercise a decisive Influence on the course of future develop­
ments in International relations". The conference therefore called
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upon a ll parti9$ concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force 
to solve the German question or the problem of Berlin,
A draft resolution submitted by the Arab States condemning the crea­
tion of the State of Israel was strongly opposed by U Nu, Mrs, Bandaranalke 
and others, and was omitted from the declaration.2
2, Keating*1 Contemporary Archives, o.18604 A-B, February 17-14,
•
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APPENDIX C
ECONOMIC CONFERENCE OF 1962 IN CAIRO 
PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES 
The Economic Conference of Developing CountHe; was held 1n July 8-19,
1962, In Cairo with the following countries attending:
1. Afghanistan 17, Lebanon
2, Algeria 18, Libya
3, Bolivia 19, Mali
4. Brazil 20. Malaya
5, Burma 21, Mexico
6. Cambodia 22, Morocco
7. Ceylon 23, Pakistan
8, Congo 24. Saudi Arabia
9. Cuba 25. Somalia
10. Cyprus
Ethiopia
26. Sudan
11, 27. Tanganyika
12. Ghana 28, Tunisia
13. Guinea 29. United Arab Republic
14. India 30. Yemen
15. Indonesia 31. Yugoslavia
16. Kuwait
OBSERVERS
Observers from the following organizations were also present at the 
Conferencei
1, United Nations
2. Food and Agricultural Organization
5, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
4. International Monetary Fund
6. Afro-Aslan Organization for Economic Cooperation 
6, Ar*> League
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APPENDIX D
THE CAIRO CONFERENCE 1964 
PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES 
The Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned 
Countries* held In Cairo, front October 5-10th, 1964, was attended by 
forty-seven fu ll member countries as follows?
1, Afghanistan
2, Algeria
3, Angola
4, Burnt
I ,  Burundi
6, Cambodia
7, Cameroon
8, Central African Republic 
t ,  Ceylon
10. Chad
11, Congo (Brazzaville)
I t ,  Cuba
18, Cyprus 
14, Dahomey
I I ,  Ethiopia
16, Ghana
17, Guinea
18, India 
li»  Indonesia 
10* Iraq
2 1 .  Jordan
22. Kenya
23. Kuwait
24. Laos
25. Lebanon
26, Liberia
27. Libya
28. Malawi
29. Mall
30. Mauritania
31. Morocco
32. Nepal
33. Nigeria
34. Saudi Arabia
35. Senegal
36. Sierra Leone
37. Somalia
38 Sudan
39. Syria
40, Tanganyika
41. Togo
42, Tunisia
43. Uganda
44. United Arab Republic
45, Yemen
46. Yugoslavia
47. Zambia
OBSERVER COUNTRIES 
The Cairo Conference was attended by the following countries as
observersi
1, Argentina
2, Bolivia
S, Brazil
4, Chile
5. Finland
6, Jamaica
7, Mexico
8, Trinidad and Tobago
9, Uruguay 
10, Venezuela
OBSERVERS
The Conference was alto attended by the Secretaries General of two 
regional organizations; the Organization of African Unity, and the 
Arab league.
Moreover, Conference proceedings were followed by observers free 
many national liberation movements and political parties from a ll parts
of the world, but mostly from the African countries which are s till
fighting for liberation and Independence.
THE PROGRAMME FOR PEACE AMD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The Conference undertook an analysis of the International situation 
with a view to making an effective contribution to the solution of the 
major problems which are of concern to mankind In view of their effects 
m peace and security In the world.
To this end, and on the basis of the principles embodied In the
Belgrade Declaration of September 1961, the Heads of State or Government 
of the above-mentioned countries proceeded. In an amicable, frank and 
fraternal atmosphere, to hold detailed discussion and an exchange of 
views on the present state of International relations and the predomi­
nant trends In the modern world. The Heads of State or Government of 
the participating countries note with satisfaction that nearly half of 
the Independent countries of the world have participated in this Second 
non-aligned conference.
The Conference also notes with satisfaction the growlno Interest 
and confidence displayed by peoples s t i l l  under foreign domination, and 
by those whose rights and sovereignty are being violated by Imperialism 
mi neo-colonialism. In tho highly positive role which the nonaligned 
countries are called upon co piay In the settlement of international 
problems or disputes.
l..w Conference expresses satisfaction at the favourable reaction 
throughout the world to this second meeting of nonaligned countries.
This emphasises the rightness, efficacy and vieour of the policy of 
nonalignment, and its  constructive role In the maintenance and consoli­
dation of International peace and security.
The principles o f non-alignment, thanks to the confidence they 
inspire In the world, are becoming an Increasingly dynamic and powerful 
force for the promotion of peace and the welfare of mankind.
The participating Heads of State or Government note with satisfac­
tion that, thanks to the combined efforts of the forces of freedom, 
peace and progress, this second Non-aligned Conference Is being held at 
a time when the International situation has Improved as compared with 
that which existed between the two power blocs at the time of the 
historic Belgrade Conference. The Heads of State or Government of the 
Non-aligned Countries are well aware, however, that, despite the present 
Improvement In International relations, and notwlthstandlng the conclu­
sion and signature of the Treaty of Moscow, sources of tension s t i l l  
exist In many parts of the world.
This situation shows that the forces of Imperialism are s till  
powerful and that they do not hesitate to resort to the use of force to 
defend their Interests and maintain their privileges.
This policy, I f  not firmly resisted by the forces of freedom and 
peace, Is like ly  to Jeopardise the Improvement in the international 
situation and the lessening of tension which has occurred, and to con-
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stttute « th n a t to world peace*
The policy of active peaceful co-existence, Is an Indivisible 
whole. I t  cannot be applied partia lly , in accordance with special 
Interests and c rite ria .
Important changes have also taken place within the Eastern and 
Western blocs, and this new phenomenon should be taken Into account in 
the objective assessment of the current international situation.
The Conference notes with satisfaction that the movements of nation­
al liberation are engaged, 1n different regions of the world, 1n a 
heroic struggle gainst neo-colonialism, and the practices of apartheid 
and racial discrimination. This struggle forms part of the common 
striving towards freedom, justice end peace.
The Conference reaffirms that Interference by economically develop­
ed foreign States In the Internal affairs of newly Independent, deve­
loping countries and the existence of territories which are s t i l l  de­
pendent constitute a standing threat to peace and security.
The Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries, 
while appreciative of the efforts which resulted In the holding of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and mindful of the 
results of that Conference, nevertheless note that much ground s t i l l  
remains to be covered to eliminate existing Inequalities in the relation­
ship between Industrialized and developing countries.
The Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries, while 
declaring their determination to contribute towards the establishment of 
just and lasting peace In the world, affirm that the preservation of 
peace and the promotion of the well-being of peoples are a collective 
responsibility deriving from the natural aspirations of mankind to live  
In a better world.
The Heads of State or Government have arrived In their deliberations 
at a eamaon understanding of the various problems with which the world 
Is now faced, and a common approach to them. Reaffirming the basic 
principles of the Declaration of Belgrade, they express their agreement 
upon the following pointst
I
CONCERTED ACTION FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE COUNTRIES STILL
DEPENDENT; ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM, NEO-COLONIALISM
AND IMPERIALISM
The Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Countries de­
clare that lasting world peace cannot be realised so long as unjust 
conditions prevail and peoples under foreign domination continue to be 
deprived of their fundamental right to freedom, Independence and se lf- 
determination.
Imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialIsm constitute a basic 
source of International tension and conflict because thiy endanger world
Sacs and security. The participants in the Conference deplore that the deration of the United Nations on the granting of Independence to 
colonial countries and peoples has not been Implemented everywhere and 
call for the unconditional, complete and final abolition of colonialism
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now.
At present a particular cause of concern Is the m ilitary or other 
assistance extended to certain countries to enable them to perpetuate 
by force colonialist and neo-colonialist situations which are contra* 
ry to the s p ir it of the Charter of the United Nations#
The exploitation by colonialist forces of the d ifficu lties and 
problems of recently liberated or developing countries. Interference 
In the Internal affairs of these states, and colonialist attempts to 
maintain unequal relationships, particularly In the economic fie ld ,
constitute serious dangers to these young countries. ColonialIsm
and see-colonialism Haw many forms and manifestations.
leper! 1Ism uses many devices to Impose Its  w ill on Independent 
nations. Economic pressure and domination. Interference, racial dis­
crimination, subversion, Intervention and the threat of force are meo- 
colomlallat devices against which the newly Independent nations have 
to defend themselves. The Conference condemns a ll colonialist, neo- 
cel eel el le t aid Imperialist policies applied In various parts of the 
world . . . .
The newly independent countries have, like  a ll other countries, the 
right i f  sovereign disposal In regard to their natural resources, and 
the right to u tilis e  these resources as they deem appropriate in the 
Interest of their peoples, without outside interference,
l ie  process of liberation Is Irres is tib le  and Irreversible. Colo­
nised peoples may legitimately resort to arms to secure the fu ll exer­
cise of their right to self-determination and Independence i f  the 
colonial powers persist in opposing their natural aspirations.
The participants In the Conference undertake to work unremittingly 
to eradicate a ll vestiges of colonialism, and to combine a ll their 
efforts to render a ll necessary aid and support, whether moral, poli­
tica l or material, to the peoples struggling against colonialism and 
neo-eelsnlalIsm, The participating countries recognize the nationalist 
movements of the peoples which are struggling to free themselves from 
colonial domination as being authentic representatives of the colonial 
peoples, and urgently call upon the colonial powers to n»%ot1ate with 
their leaders.
Portugal continues to held in bondage by repression, persecution and 
force. In Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and the other 
Portuguese colonies In Africa and Asia, millions of people who have been 
suffering far too long under the foreign yoke. The Conference declares 
Its  determination to ensure that the peoples of these territories ac­
cede Immediately to Independence without any conditions or reservations.
The Conference condemns the government of Portugal for its  obstinate 
refusal to recognize the Inalienable right of the peoples of those te rrl 
torias to self-determination and independence In accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the granting of 
Independence to colonial countries and peoples . . .
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I I
respect for the right of peoples to self- determination
AND CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE EXERCISE
OF THIS RIGHT
The Conference solemnly reaffirms the right of peoples to self- 
determination and to make their own destiny.
I t  stresses that this right constitutes one of the essential prin­
ciples of the United Nations Charter, that I t  was laid down also In the 
Charter of the Organization of African Unity, and that the Conference 
of Bandung and Belgrade demanded that I t  should be respected, and In 
particular Insisted that I t  should be effectively exercised.
The Conference notes that this right Is s t i l l  violated or Its  
exercise denied In many regions of the world and results In a continued 
Increase of tension and the extension of the areas of war.
The Conference denounces the attitude of those Powers which oppose 
the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination*
I t  condemns the use of force, and a ll forms of Intimidation, Inter­
ference and Intervention which are aimed at preventing the exercise of 
this right,
III
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE POLICY OF APARTHEID
The Heads of State or Government declare that racial discrimination -  
and particularly its  most odious manifestation, apartheid -  constitutes 
a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the 
principle of the equality of peoples. Accordingly, a ll governments s t i l l  
persisting In the practice of racial discrimination should be complete­
ly  ostracized until they have abandoned their unjust and Inhuman poli­
cies. In particular tne governments and peoples represented at this 
conference have decided that they w ill not tolerate much longer the 
presence of the Republic of South Africa In the comunity of Nations,
The inhuman racial policies of South Africa constitute a threat to 
International peace and security. All countries Interested in peace 
must therefore do everything In their power to ensure that liberty and 
fundamental freedoms are secured to the people of South Africa,
The Heads of State or Government solemnly affirm their absolute 
respect for the right of ethnic or religious minorities to protect In 
particular against the crimes of genocide or any other violation of a 
fundamen-el human right . . . .
IV
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND THE CODIFICATION OF ITS PRINCIPLES 
BY THE UNITED NATIONS
Considering ;he principles proclaimed at Bandung In 1955, Resolution 
1514 (XV) adopted by the United Nations In 1960, the Declaration of 
the Belgrade Conference, the Charter of the Organization of African 
Unity, and numerous Joint declarations by Heads of State or Government
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on pssceful co-exlstance;
Reaffirming their deep conviction that, In present circumstances, 
mankind must regard peaceful co-existence as the only way to strength­
en world peace, which must be based on freedom, equality and justice 
between peoples within a new framework of peaceful and harmonious 
relations between the States and nations of the world;
Considering the fact that the principle of peaceful co-existence 
Is based on the right of a ll peoples to be free and to choose their 
own p o litic a l, economic and social systems according to their own na­
tional Identity and their Ideals, and Is opposed to any form of 
foreign domination;
Convinced also that peaceful co-existence cannot be fu lly  achieved 
throughout the world without the abolition of Imperialism, colonialism 
and neo-colonialism;
Deeply convinced that the absolute prohibition of the threat or use 
of force, direct or disguised, the renunciation of a ll forms of coercion 
In international relations, the abolition of relations of Inequality and 
the promotion of International cooperation with a view to accelerating 
economic, social and cultural development, are necessary conditions for 
safeguarding peace and achieving the general advancement of mankind,
fhe Heads of State or Government solemnly proclaim the following 
fundamental principles of peaceful co-existences
1. The right to complete Independence, which is an Inalienable 
right, must be recognized Immediately and unconditionally as 
pertaining to a ll peoples, in conformity with the Charter and 
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly; I t  Is Incum­
bent upon a ll states to respect this right and fa c ilita te  its  
exercise.
2. The right to self-determination, which is an inalienable right, 
must be recognized as pertaining to a ll peoples; accordingly, 
a ll nations and peoples have the right to determine their poli­
tica l status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development without IntlmldaVon or hindrance,
3. Peaceful co-existence between States with differing social and 
political systems Is both possible and necessary; I t  favours 
the creation of good-neighbourly relations between States with 
a view to the establishment of lasting peace and general well­
being, free from domination and exploitation,
4. The sovereign equality of States must be recognized and respected. 
I t  Includes the right of a ll peoples to the free exploitation of 
their natural resources,
5. States must abstain from a ll use of threat or force directed 
against the te rr ito ria l Integrity and political Independence of 
other States; a situation brought about by the threat or use of 
force shall not be recognized, and In particular the established 
frontiers of States shall be Inviolable. Accordingly, every 
State must abstain from interfering in the affairs of other 
States, whether openly, or Insidiously, or by means of subversion
155
tod the various forms of p o litic a l, economic and m ilitary
pressure,
6. Frontier disputes shall be settled by peaceful means. All 
States shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the human person and the equality of a ll nations and r a w .
7, All International conflicts must be settled by peaceful means,
In a s p ir it  of mutual understanding and on the basis of equa­
l i t y  and sovereignty, in such a manner that Justice and legi­
timate rights are not impaired; all States must apply them­
selves to promoting and strengthening measures designed to 
diminish international tension and achieve general and complete 
disarmament,
8. All States must co-operate with a view to accelerating economic 
development In the world, and particularly In the developing 
countries. This co-operation which must be aimed at narrowing 
the gap, at present widening, between the levels of living In 
the developing and developed countries respectively. Is essential 
to the maintenance of a lasting peace,
9, States shall meet their International obligations in good faith  
In conformity with the principles and purposes of the United 
Nations.
The Conference recommends to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations to adopt, on the occasion of Its  twentieth anniversary, a decla­
ration on the principles of peaceful co-existence. This declaration 
w ill constitute an Important step towards the codification of these 
principles,
V
RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF 
STATES AND THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
PROBLEMS OF DIVIDED NATIONS
(11 The Conference of Heads of State or Government proclaims Its  
fu ll adherence to the fundamental principles of International relations. 
In accordance with which the sovereignty and te rrito ria l Integrity of 
a ll States, great and small, are Inviolable and must be respected,
[?.) The countries participating In tfw Conference, having for the 
most part achieved their national Independence after years of struggle, 
reaffirm their determination to oppose by every means In their power 
any attempt to compromise their sovereignty or violate their te rrito ria l 
Integrity. They pledge themselves to respect frontiers as they existed 
when the States gained Independence; nevertheless, parts of territories  
taken away by occupying powers or converted Into autonomous bases for 
their own benefit at the time of Independence must be given back to the 
country concerned,
(S) The Conference solemnly reaffirms the right of a ll peoples to 
adopt the form of government they consider best suited to their develop­
ment,
(4) The Conference considers that one of the causes of International
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tension 11is In the problem of divided nations. I t  expresses Its  
entire sympathy with the peop.es of such countries and upholds their 
desire to achieve unity. I t  exhorts the countries concerned to seek 
a j # t  and lasting solution In order to achieve fcho unification of 
their territories by peaceful methods without outside Interference or 
pressure. I t  considers that the resort to threat or force cam lead 
to mo satisfactory settlement, cannot do otherwise than jeopardize 
International security . . .
Taking Into account the principles set forth above and with a view 
to restoring peace and s tab ility  In the Indo-Chlra Peninsula, the 
Conference appeals to the Powers which participated In the Geneva Con­
ference of 1954 and 1962$
(1) to abstain from any action like ly  to aggravate the situation 
which Is already tense In the Peninsula;
(2) to terminate a ll foreign inlz >rence In the internal affairs  
of the countries of that regi. ,
(3) to convene urgently a new Geneva Conference on Indo-Chlna with 
a view to seeking a satisfactory political situation solution 
for the peaceful settlement of the problems arising In that 
part of the world namely$
(a) ensuring the s tr ic t application of the 1962 agreements 
on Laos;
(b) recognising and guaranteeing the neutrality and te rr ito r­
ial Integrity of Cambodia;
(cl ensuring the s tric t application of the 1954 Geneva
Agreement on Vietnam, end finding a political solution to 
the problem In accordance with the legitimate aspirations 
of the Vietnamese people to freedom, peace and independ­
ence.
VI
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES »L WOUT 
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
(1) As the use of force may take a number of forms, m ilitary , political 
and economic, the participating countries deem I t  essential to re­
affirm the principles that a ll States shall refrain In their Inter­
national relations from the threat or use of force against the 
te rrito ria l Integrity or political Indupendence of any State, or 
In any other manner Inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter 
of the United Nations.
(2) They consider that disputes between States should be settled by 
peaceful means In accordance wUh the Charter on the basis of 
sovereign equality and justice.
(31 The participating countries are convinced of the necessity of exert­
ing a ll International efforts to find solutions to a ll situations
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which threaten International peace or impair friendly relations 
among nations.
(4) The participating countries gave special attention to the problems 
of frontiers which may threaten International peace or disturb 
friendly relations among States, and are convinced that In order 
to settle such problems, a ll States should resort to negotiation, 
mediation or arbitration or other peaceful means set forth In the 
United Nations Charter in conformity with the legitimate rights 
of a ll peoples,
(5) The Conference considers that disputes between neighbouring States 
must be settled peacefully in a sp irit of mutual understanding, 
without foreign Intervention or intervention or Interference.
VII
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT;
PEACEFUL USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY,
PROHIBITION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPf,
TESTS, ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-tREL 
ZONES, PREVENTION OF DISSEMINATION OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ABOLITION 
OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAFTNS
The Conference emphasises the paramount Importance of disarmaoent as one 
of the basic problems of the contemporary world, and stresses the nece­
ssity of reaching Immediate and practical solutions which would free 
mankind from the danger of war and from a sense of Insecurity.
The Conference motes with concern that the continuing arms race and 
the tremendous advances that have been made in the production of weapons 
of mess destruction and their stockpiling threaten the world with armed 
conflict and annihilation. The Conference urges the great Powers to 
take new and urgent steps toward achieving general and complete dir.ama- 
ment under stric t and effective International control.
The Conference regrets that despite the efforts of the members of 
the 18-Nation Coamlttse on Disarmament, and In particular t:>ose of the 
non-aligned countries, the results have not beer, satisfactory. I t  
urges the great Powers. In collaboration with other members of that Com­
mittee, to renew their efforts with determination with a view to the 
rapid conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.
The Conference calh, upon a ll States to accede to the Moscow treaty 
partia lly  bannlno the testing of nuclear wrerons, and to aMde hy Its  
provisions In the Interests of peace and tho welfare of humanity.
The Conference urges the extension of the iloscow Treaty so as to 
include underground tests, and the discontinuance of such tests pending 
the extension of the agreement.
The Conference urges the soeedy conclusion of agreements on various 
other partial and collateral measures of disarmament proposed by the 
members of the 18 -h it1 on Committee on Disarmament.
The Conference appeals to the Great Powers to take the lead In giv­
ing effect to decisive mnd immediate measures which would make possible 
substantial reductions in their m ilitary budgets.
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The Conference rcqm 5t» the Great ^cwer* to abstain froa all poli­
cies conducive to ttie dissemination nuclear t-eanon* and their by­
products aronq t.nosv States t.iilcl. do not at present rossc-ss thoft. I t  
underlines the rrrat darner In t v  dlssenlnatlon of nuclear weapons and 
urres all States, particularly the in oss’sslrr: nuclear weapons, to 
conclude non-dlssonlnation acrnoMnts and tn a-irec on ..rjaajres orovldlnq 
for thecnrariual liquidation of the etlf.tlne stoe'.- lies i f  nuclear 
weapons,
As part of these e ffo rt-. the Heads of State or nuvenwnt declare 
their own readiness not to i’rcou- \  aaiulre or test any nuclear weapons, 
and call on all countries IhUudlv those have not subscribed to the 
Moscow Treaty to enter Into »■ s l r l ' r undertaking and to take tha nece­
ssary steps to prevent their t i r r lv  e1cs* ports and airfields fro* btlnn 
used by nuclear powers for t  ie dc^U; cent or disposition of nuclear 
weapons. This undertaking should b the subject of a treaty to be con­
cluded In an International Ccnferenc convened under tha ausilues of 
the United Nations and open to accev.'on by a ll States. Tbo Ccwiference 
further calls uoon all nuclear rows'*. to observe the spirit of this 
declaration.
The Conference welcomes th~ r r*ixm\ 'u Sraat Powers not to
orbit In outer space nuclear or uther we. of mass destruction and
expresses its  conviction that i t  Is nccoss*.to conclude an International
treaty prohibiting the utilisation of outer space for military purposes. 
The Conference urges fu ll International cooperation 1r the peaceful uses 
of outer s ac#
The Conference requests those States which have succeeded In explor- 
ino outer space, to exchange and disseminate 1rformation related to the 
research tliey hevw carried out In this fie ld , so that scientific progress 
for the peaceful utilization of outer space to of comon benefit to a ll .  
The Conference is cf the vie* that for this purpose an International con­
ference should oe convened at an appropriate tine.
The Conference considers that the declaration by African States re­
garding the denuclearization of Africa, V *  m irations of tie  UUn  
American countries to dunucle rlze their continent and tlie various oropo- 
s a H , pertaining to the denuclearization of arras In furoso and Asia are 
steps In the right direction because they assist In consolidating Inter­
national peace and security and lessening International tensions.
Tue Conference recommends the establishment of denuclearized zones 
covering these and other areas and the oceans of tin* world, particularly 
those which have t-enn hitherto free fron nuclear ,/?a;ons, In accordance 
with the desires expressed by the States and peoples concerned.
The Conference also requests the nuclear rowers to respect these- de­
nuclearized zones.
The Conference Is convinced that the conventn* of a world disarmament 
conference under the auspices of tne Vntted Nations to which a ll coun­
tries would t>e invited, would provide nowtrfu! support to the efforts 
which are being mads to set In motion the process of disarmament and for 
securing the further and steady develorr.fnt of this process.
The Conference therefore urges tn.» participating countries to take, 
at the fortncominv General Assembly of t ic "iltdd 'letlons, all t  »e nece-
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gstry steps for the holding of such a conference and of any other special 
conference for the conclusion of special agreements on certain measures 
of disarmament.
The Conference urges a ll nations to join In the co-operative deve­
lopment of the peaceful use of atomic energy for the benefit of a ll 
mankind; and In particular, to study the development of atomic power 
and other technical aspects In which International cooperation might be 
most effectively accomplished through the free flow of such scientific  
Information.
V III
MILITARY PACTS, FOREIGN TROOPS 
AND BASES
The Conference reiterates Its  conviction that the existence of m ili­
tary blocs. Great Power alliances and pacts arising therefrom has accen­
tuated the cold war and heightened International tensions. The Non-Align­
ed Countries are therefore opposed to taking part In such pacts and 
alliances.
The Conference considers the maintenance or future establishment rf 
foreign m ilitary bases and the stationing of foreign troops on the 
territories of other countries, against the expressed w ill of those 
countries, as a gross violation of the sovereignty of States, and as a 
threat to freedom and International peace, I t  furthermore considers as 
particularly Indefensible tltc existence or future establishment of bases In 
dependent territories which could be used for the maintenance of colo­
nialism or for other purposes.
Noting with concern that foreign m ilitary bases are In practice a 
naans of bringing pressure on nations and retarding their emancipation 
and development, based on their own Ideological, p o litic a l, economic 
and cultural Ideas, the Conference declares Its  fu ll support to the 
countries which are seeking to secure the evacuation of foreign bases on 
their territory and calls upon all States maintaining troons and bases 
In other countries to remove them forthwith.
The Conference considers that the maintenance at Guantanamo (Cuba) 
of a m ilitary base of the United States of America, 1n defiance of the 
w ill of the Government and people of Cuba and In defiance of the pro­
visions embodied In the Declaration of the Belgrade Conference, consti­
tutes a violation of Cuba's sovereignty and te rrito ria l Integrity.
Noting that the Cuban Government expresses Its  readiness to settle  
Its  dispute over the base of Guantanamo with the United States on an 
equal footing, the Conference urges the United States Government to nego­
tia te  the evacuation of this base with the Cuban Government.
The Conference condemns the expressed Intention of Imperialist 
powers to establish bases in the Indian Ocean, as a calculated attempt 
to Intimidate the emerging countries of Africa and Asia and an unwarran­
ted extension of the policy of neo-colonialism and Imperialism,
The Conference also recommands the elimination of the foreign bases 
In Cyprus and the withdrawal of foreign troops from this country, except 
for those stationed thorn ty virtue of United Nations resolutions.
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IX
THE UNITED NATIONSi ITS ROLE 
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ITS RESOLUTIONS AND AMENDMENT OF 
ITS CHARTER
The participating countries declares
The United Nations Organization was established to promote Inter­
national peace and security, to develop International understanding 
and co-operation, to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedom 
and to achieve a ll the purposes of the Charter, In order to be an 
effective Instrument, the United Nations Organization must be open to 
a ll the States of the world. I t  Is particularly necessary to a ll 
that countries s t i l l  under colonial domination should attain Indepen­
dence without delay and take their rightful place In the community 
of nations.
I t  Is essential for the effective functioning of the United Nations 
that a ll nations should observe Its fundamental principles of peaceful 
co-existence, co-operation, renunrlatlon of the threat or the use of 
force, freedom and equality without discrimination on grounds of race, 
sex, language or religion.
The Influence and effectiveness of the United Nations also depends 
upon equitable ^presentation of different geographical regions In the 
various organs of the United Nations and In the service of the United 
Nations.
The Conference notes with satisfaction that with Resolution 1991 
(X V III) , the General Assembly has taken the In it ia l positive step to­
wards transformation of the structure of the United Nations In keeping 
with Its  Increased membership and the necessity to ensure a broader 
participation of States In the work of Its  Organs. I t  appeals to a ll 
Members of the United Nations to ra tify  as speedily as possible the 
amendments to tho Charter adopted at the XVIIIth session of the General 
Assembly,
The Conference recognises the paramount Importance of tho United 
Nations and the necessity of enabling I t  to carry out the functions 
entrusted to I t  to preserve International cooperation among States,
To this end, the Non-Aligned Countries should mn$ult one another 
at the Foreign minister or Head of Deleoatlon level at each session of 
the United Nations,
The Conference stresses the need to adapt tha Charter to the dyna­
mic changes and evolution of international conditions.
The Conference expresses the hope that the Heads of State or Govern­
ment of the States Members of the United Nations w ill attend the regu­
la r Session of the General Assembly on the occasion of the 20th anniver­
sary of the Organization.
Recalling the reconmendatlon of the Belgrade Conference, the Confer­
ence asks the General Assembly of the United Nations to restore the 
rights of the People’ s Repuullc of China and to recognize the represents-
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tlves of China In the United nations.
TM Confenmce recomend* to the States Members of the United Nation* 
to ffispect the resolution* of the United Nations and to render a ll 
assistance necessary for the Organization to fu l f i l  Its  role In maintain­
ing Internet* Mtal peace and security.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AND COOPERATION
The Head* of State or Government participating In this Conference*
Convinced that peace must rest on a sound and solid economic founda­
tion,
that the persistence of poverty poses a threat to world peace and 
prosperity,
that economic emancipation Is an essential element in the struggle 
for the elimination of po litical domination,
that respect for tho right of peoples and nations to control and 
dispose freely of their national wealth and resources Is v ita l for 
their economic develops.it.
Conscious that participating States have a special respcnstbllty to 
do their utmost to break through the barrier of underdevelopmenti
Believing that economic development Is an obligation of the whole 
International community,
that I t  Is the duty of a ll countries to contribute to the rapid evo­
lution of a new and Just economic order under which a ll nations can live  
without fear or want or despair and rise to their fu ll stature In the 
family of Nations,
that the structure of world economy and the existing International 
Institutions of International trade anti development have failed either 
to reduce the disparity in the per caolta Incore of the peoples 1n deve­
loping and developed countries or to promote International action to 
rectify serious and growing Imbalances between developed and developing 
countries,
Emphasizing ths imperative neod to amplify and Intensify Internation­
al co-operation based an equality, and consistent wltn the needs of 
accelerated economic development,
noting that as a result of the proposals adn .ted at Belgrade In 19F1 
and elaborated In Cairo In 1%2, the United uat -n . Conference on Trade
and Dtivelopmimt mot in Coneva in 1>'4,
Considering that while the uoneva Conference marxi the f irs t  step In 
the evolution of annew International economic no!ley for development and 
offers a sound basis for progress In trie future, tin  results achieved 
were neither adequate for, nor connversurctc wH , the essential require­
ments of developing countries.
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Support th* Joint Declaration of th* "Seventy-Sovon" developing
countries isde a t th# conclusion of that Conference, and PLEDGE the 
co-opsra.tion o f the pa rtic ipa ting  States to the strengthening of 
th e ir so lid a rity ;
i l l iE lp S
Sent my be more effectively and speedily resolved;
Consider that democratic procedures,which afford no position of 
privilege, are as essential In the economic as In the political sphere,
that a new International division of labour 1s needed to hasten the 
Industrialization of developing countries and the modernization of 
their agriculture, so as to enable them to strengthen their domestic 
economies and diversify their export trade,
to the free flow of trade and to peace and should be eliminated,
every possible means, Including economic sanctions.
Reeomaend that the target of economic growth set for the development 
Decade by the United Nations should be revised upwards,
that the amount of capital transferred to developing countries and 
tews and conditions governing the transfer should be extended and Im­
proved without political commitments, so as to reinforce the efforts of 
these countries to build self-re lian t economics,
that a programme of action should be developed to Increase the In­
come In foreion exchange of developing countries and, In particular, 
to provide access for primary products from 1 ^''loMnn countries to the 
n *rk e ts  of Industrialized countries, on an equitable basis and for manu­
factured goods from developing countries on a preferential basis,
that the establishment of a Specialized "goncy for Industrial deve­
lopment should he expedited,
that member* of regional economic groupings should do their utmost 
to ensure that economic Integration help: to -ronote the Increase of 
Imports from the developing countries either individually or collective­
ly ,
that th.- recommendation of the United nations Conference on Trade
fflf.WHK «.(•«$• AtiiirirsiiMi MSUWy
by the united Nations Conference on Trade and Development In relation to 
the transit trade of landlocked countries he given consideration;
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Call upon participating countries to concert measures to bring 
about closer economic relations among the developing countries on a 
basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual assistance, bearing in 
mind the obligations of a ll developing countries t *  accord favourable 
consideration to the expansion of their reciprocal trade, to unite 
against a ll forms of economic exploitation and to strengthen mutual 
consultation;
Call upon the members of the HSeventy-Seven" developing countries, 
who worked closely together at the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development of 1964 in Geneva to consult together during the next 
session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in order io 
consolidate their efforts and harmonise their policies In time for the 
next Conference on Trade and Development In 1968.
Convinced that progress towards disarmament Increases the resources 
available for economic development;
Support proposals for the diversion of resources now employed on 
armaments to the development of underdeveloped parts of the world and 
to the promotion of the prosperity of mankind.3
3. Review of International A ffairs, Belgrade Documentation No. 488-9,
1 August V-Vi, pp.2&-M
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APPENDIX E
DECLARATIONS OF THE THIRD CONFERENCE 
OF NCH-ALISNSP" O T O T T O r - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DECLARATION ON PEACE,
TiraramEErnmcopHENT, cooperation 
W lP T O T O T T O ^ ^ g r o T O A T R E lA T IO N S
Th# Third Conferenc* of Hesds of Stats or Sovsmment of the following 
Non-aligned countries was held In Lusaka, Zambia, from the 8th to the 
10th September, 1970.
The following countries were present;
Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central 
African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic o f), Congo 
(Fmople*# Republic of),  Cuba, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
shana, Guinea* Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mall, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Somalia, South Yemen, the Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, 
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, 
the Yemen Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia,
The following countries attended as observers;
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, South 
Vietnam, Uruguay* Venezuela, Finland (non-accredlted observer), Austria 
(nan-accredited observer),
The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity also 
attended as an observer.
National liberation movements addressed the Conference as guests;
They exchanged views on the significance and the role of non-aligned 
countries in the present world, with particular reference to safeguard­
ing and strengthening world peace and security, ensuring national Inde­
pendence and fu ll sovereignty of a ll nations on a basis of equality, 
on the need to realize the fundamental right of a ll peoples to self- 
determination, as well as democratization of international relations, 
promoting the rapid economic growth of the developing countries and 
considering possibilities for greater consultation and cooperation among 
the non-aligned countries and strengthening the United Nations.
Two and a half decades ago, the peoples of the United Nations Inscribed 
In the Charter their desire to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war; to reaffirm faith  In fundamental human rights. In the 
dignity cf the human person, 1n the equal rights of nations, large and 
small; to establish conditions under which Justice and respect for 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of International law 
can be maintained and to i omcte social progress and better standards of
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of l i f e  In lerger freedom for a l l .  The Intervening period has confirm­
ed the historic merit of these Ideals and aspirations but, I t  has like ­
wise demonstrated that many expectations have not been fu lf ille d  and 
many problems have not been solved, notwithstanding the efforts of the 
non-ellgned covntrles.
The policy of non-alignment has emerged as the result of the deter­
mination of Independent countries to safeguard their national Independ­
ence and the legitimate rights of their poeples. The growth of non- 
alignment Into a bread International movement cutting across racial, 
regional and other barriers, Is an Integral part of significant changes 
In the structure of the entire Intematlnal community, This Is the 
product of the world antl-eolonlal revolution and of the emergence of a 
large number of newly-11 berated countries which, opting for an l.t «epend- 
ent political orientation and development, have refused to accept the 
replacement of centuries-old forms of subordination by new ones. At 
the root of these changes lies the ever more clearly expressed aspiration 
of nations for freedom. Independence and equality, and their determina­
tion to resist a ll forms of oppression and exploitation. This has been 
the substance and meaning of our strivings and actions; this Is a con­
firmation of the valid ity of the Belgrade and Cairo Declarations, At 
a time when the polarization of the International community on a bloc basis 
was believed to be a permanent feature of International relations, and 
the threat of a nueler- conflict between the big powers an ever-present 
spectre hovering ever mankind, the nonal1gned countries opened up new 
prospects for the contemporary world and paved the way for relaxation 
of international tension.
Our era Is a t the crossroads of history; with each passing day we 
are presented with fresh evidence of the exceptional power of the human 
mind and also of the dangerous paths down which Its  Imperfections may 
lead. The epoch-making scientific  and technological revolution has 
opened up unlimited vistas of progress; at the same time, prosperity 
has failed to become accessible to a ll and a major section of mankind 
s t i l l  lives under conditions unworthy of man. Scientific discoveries 
and their application to technology have the posslbllty of welding the 
world Into an Integral whole, reducing the distance between countries 
and continents to a measure making international co-operation increas­
ingly Indispensable and ever more possible; yet the states and nations 
comprising the present International community are s t i l l  separated by 
p o litic a l, economic and racial barriers. These barriers divide coun­
tries Into developed and the developing, oppressors and the oppressed, 
the aggressors and the victims of aggression, Into those who act from 
positions of strength, either m ilitary or economic, and those who are 
forced to live In the shadow of permanent dancer of convert and overt 
assaults on their Independence and security. In spite of the great 
progressive achievements and aspirations of our generation, neither 
peace, nor prosperity, nor the right to Independence and equality, 
have yet become the Integral, Indivisible attribute of a ll mankind.
Our age, however, raises the greatest hopes and also presents the 
greatest challenges.
I I
The Immediate danger of a conflict between the superpowers has lessened 
because their tendency to negotiate In their mutual relations Is streng­
thening; however, i t  has not yet contributed to the security of the 
small, medium-sized and developing countries, or prevented tne danger 
of local wars.
TfS
The practice of Interfering 1n the Interne! affairs of other states, 
and the recourse of political and economic pressure, threats of force 
and subversion are acquiring alarming proportions and dangerous fre ­
quency. Mars of aggression are raging In the Middle East and In 
Indo-China and being prolonged 1n South Vietnam and extended to 
Cambodia and the presence of foreign forces in Korea Is posing a threat 
to national Independence and International peace and security. The 
continued oppression and subjugation of the African Peoples In southern 
Africa by the racist and colonial minority regimes, apart from being a 
blot on the conscience of mankind, poses a serious threat to Interna­
tional peace and security. This situation 1s becoming dangerously 
explosive as a result of the collision between certain developed coun­
tries of the West and the racist minority regimes in this part of the 
world. The continuing arms race is causing alarm and concern and 
rendering nuclear dltents extremely precarious and serves as a spur to 
limited wars. The balance of terror between the superpowers has not 
brought peace and security to the rest of the world. There are wel­
come signs of a growing dltente between the power blocs but the abate­
ment of the cold war has not yet resulted In the disintegration of 
m ilitary blocs formed in the context of great power conflicts.
International relations are entering a phase characterized by Increa­
sing Interdependence and also by the desire of States to pursue indepen­
dent policies. The democratization of international relations Is there­
fore an Imperative necessity of our times. But there is an unfortunate 
tendency on the part of some of the big powers to monopolize decision­
making on world Issues which are of vita l concern to a ll countries.
The forces of racism, apartheid, colonialism and Imperialism continue 
to bodcvdl world peace. At the same time classical colonialIsm Is 
trying to perpetuate Its e lf In the garb of neo-colonialism - a less 
obvious but in no way a less dangerous means of economic and political 
domination over the developing countries. These phenomena of the 
present day world tend not only to perpetuate the evils of the past but 
also to undermine the future; they retard the liberation of many coun­
tries s t i l l  under colonial domination end jeopardize the Independence 
and te rrito ria l integrity of many countries, above a ll of the non-aligned 
and developing countries, hampering their advancement. Intensifying 
tension and giving rise to conflicts.
The economic oap between the developed and the developing countries 
Is Increasingly wideninn -  the rich growing richer and the poor remain­
ing poor. The developing countries are being denied their right to 
equality and to effective participation in International progress. The 
technological revolution, which is now the monopoly of the rich, should 
constitute one of the main opportunities for progress of developing 
countries. World solidarity Is not only a just appeal but an overrid­
ing necessity; I t  Is Intolerable today for some to enjoy an untroubled 
and comfortable existence at the expense of the poverty and misfortune 
of others.
I l l
Concerned by this state of affairs in the world, the participants In this 
Conference have agreed to take jo in t action, and to unite their efforts 
towards that end.
The participants in the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries reaffirm  
and attach special importance to the following principles: the right of
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the peoples who sre not yet free to freedom, self-determination and 
Independence; respect for the sovereignty and te rrito ria l Integrity  
of a ll states; the right of a ll sovereign nations to determine In 
fu ll freedom, the oaths of their Internal p o litic a l, economic, social 
and cultural development; the right of a ll peoples to the benefits 
of economic development and the fru its  of the scientific  and technolo­
gical revolution; refraining from the threat or use of force, and 
the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes.
The Conference declares that the following continue to be the basic 
alms of non-alignmentt the pursuit of world peace and peaceful co-
existence by strengthening the role of non-aligned countries within the
United Nations so that I t  w ill be a more effective obstacle against the
freedom, Independence, sovereignty and te rr ito ria l Integrity of any
country; the fight against colonialism and racialism which are a nega­
tion of human equality and dignity; the settlement of disputes by 
peaceful means; the ending of the arms race followed by universal dis­
armament; opposition to great power m ilitary alliances and pact; 
opposition to the establishment of foreign m ilitary bases and foreign 
troops on the soil of other nations In the context of and the stating 
of great powers conflicts and colonial and racist suppression; the 
universality of and the stating of strengthening of the efficacy of the 
United Nations; and the struggle for economic Independence and mutual 
co-operation on a basis of equality and mutual benefit. What Is needed 
Is not redefinition of non-alignment but a rededication by a ll non- 
aligned nations to Its  central alms and objectives.
The participants In the Conference solemnly declare that they shall 
consistently adhere to these principles in their mutual relations and 
In their relations with other states. They have accordingly agreed to 
take the following measuresi
(n) To achieve fu ll solidarity and to In itia te  effective and con­
crete measures against a ll forces that jeopardize and violate the Inde­
pendence and te rrito ria l Integrity of the non-aligned countries and for 
this purpose to cooperate with and consult each other as and when nece­
ssary,
(b) to continue their efforts to bring about the dissolution of 
great power m ilitary alliances In the interest of promoting peace and 
m l axing International tensions, under circumstances ensuring the secur­
ity  of a ll States and peoples; to safeguard International peace and 
security through the development of social, economic, political and 
m ilitary strength of each country,
(c) to assert the right of a ll countries to participate In In ter­
national relations on an equal footing which Is imperative for the 
democratization of International relations,
(d) to offer determined support to the Intensification of the 
work of a ll International bodies concerned with problems of disarmament, 
particularly In the preparations for and Implementation of the programme 
of the Disarmament Decade as an Integral part of general and complete 
disarmament,
(• )  to Intensify end unite efforts among the developing countries 
and between them and the developed countries for the carrying out of 
urgent structural changes In the world economy and for the establishment
of such International co-operation as w ill rrduce the pap between 
developed and developing countries,
( f)  to Intensify jo in t efforts for the liquidation of colonial­
ism a .d racial discrimination; to this end to pledge their utmost 
possible moral, political and material support to national liberation 
movements and to ensure Implementation of International decisions. In­
cluding measures by the Security Council In accordance with the rele­
vant provisions of the United Nations Charter,
(a) to continue their efforts toward strengthening the role and 
efficacy of the United Nations, to promote the achievement of the 
universality of the United Nations and the urgent need for giving the 
People's Republic of China her rightful place In the organization and 
the admission of other countries s t i l l  outside the United Nations, In­
cluding those which are s t i l l  divided, to participate in the activ i­
ties of the Organization and Its  Agencies,
fh) t j  strengthen steadily, and expand the domain of mutual co­
operation within the International, regional and bilateral frameworks,
11} to ensure the continuity of action by holding periodic consul­
tations of representatives of non-aligned countries at dlf: (rent levels 
and by convening summit conferences more frequently depending on the 
prevailing International situation.
The Heads of State or Government and leaders of participating coun­
tries resolve that this Declaration as well as the statements and
resolutions Issued by this Conference shall be forwarded to the UN and
brought to the attention of a ll the member States of the world organi­
zation, The present Declaration shall also be forwarded to a ll other 
states.
The participants In the Conference appeal to a ll nations and 
governments, a ll peace and freedom-loving forces and to a ll people the 
world over for cooperation and jo in t efforts for the implementation of 
these objectives. At the same time, they declare that they shall 
support a ll International actions that are In itiated In the Interests 
of the progress of mankind.
DECLARATION
TmrRQNPBITGNMENT AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS
The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, united by 
common political and economic aspirations,
Expressing the determine*;n of the non-aligned countries to achieve 
economic emendpatton, to strevqthen their Independence and to make 
their contribution to world peace and to economic and social progress 
for a ll mankind,
Reviewing the lack of progress In the Implementation by the Inter- 
natlone1 community of the policies and objectives declared by them at 
Belgrade and Ca1rr% and those enshrined In the Charter of Algiers;
Disturbed by the rapidly widening gap between the economies of the 
rich and the poor nations, which constitutes a threat to the Independ­
ence of developing countries and to international peace and security;
Noting with concern the negative trends which exclude develoolng 
counirfis from tne mainstream of world economic l i fe  despite their 
endeavour to participate In contemporary progress;
Noting In particular tha decline In the share of developing eoun- 
t r le l 'fh  world export trade from one third 1n 1160 to l/6 th  In 1969;
Noting further with regret the decline in financial flows In terms 
of percentage of GNP from developed to developing countries and the 
Increase In'financial flows from developing countries by way of pay­
ments of debts, dividends, and royalties, and financial and commercial 
services;
Believing that the poverty of developing nations and their economic 
dependence on those In affluent circumstances constitute a structural 
weakness In the present world economic order;
Convinced that the persistence of an Inequitable world economic 
system TnherTted from the colonial past and continued through present 
neo-colonialism poses Insurmountable d ifficu lties  in breaking the bond­
age of poverty and shackles of economic dependence;
Realizing that the occupation of parts of territories of non-align­
ed developing countries and dependent nations by aggressors or minority 
governments deprives these groups of their rtsources and constitutes a 
hindrance to their development;
Considering that the gap in science and technology between the develop­
ing and developed countries Is widening and the need for preventing 
the emergence of technological colonialism Is pressing;
Recognizing that the massive Investments In the economic and social 
progress of mankind can be made I f  agreements are reached to reduce 
expenditure on armaments;
Conscious of the Increase since the meeting In Belgrade, In the 
capaol ifty  df non-aligned countries to plan, organise, and manage 
their own economic development, both Individually and within a multi­
national co-operative framework, and the progress made by them during 
the sixties;
Convinced that the second United Nations Development Decade provides 
an opportunity to bring about structural changes In the world economic 
system so as to meet the pressing needs of poor nations, to strengthen 
their Independence, and to provide for a more rapid and better balanced 
expansion of the world economy;
HEREBY!
A. PLEDGE THEMSELVES
(1) to cultivate the s p ir it  of self-reliance and to this end to 
adopt a firm policy of organising their own socio-economic progress 
and to raise i t  to the level of a priority action programme;
(11) to exercise fu lly  their right and fu l f i l  their duty so as to 
secure optimal utilisation of the natural resources on their territories  
and In adjacent seas for the development and welfare of their Peoples;
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(111) to develop their technology and scientific capability to maxi­
mise production and Improve productivity;
(1v) to promote social changes to provide Increasing opportunity to 
each Individual for developing Ms worth, maintaining his dignity, mak­
ing his contribution to the process of growth and for sharing fu lly  in 
Its  fru its;
(v) to promote social justice and efficiency of production, to 
raise the level of employment and to expand and Improve fa c ilitie s  for 
education, healt:., nutrition, housing and social welfare;
(vl)  to ensure that external components of the developmental process 
further national objectives and conform to national needs; and In 
particular to adopt so far as practicable a common approach to problems 
and possibilities of investment of private capital In developing coun­
tries;
(v11) to broaden and diversify economic relationships with other 
nations so as to promote true Inter-dependence;
6, DECIDE
to foster mutual co-operation among developing countries so as to Impart 
strength to their national endeavour to fo rtify  their Independence;
to contribute to each other's economic and social progress by an 
effective utilisation of the complementarities between their respective 
resources and requirements;
to Intensify and broaden to the maximum extent practicable, the 
movement for co-operation and Integration among developing countries 
at sub-regional, and Inter-regional levels for accelerating their eco­
nomic growth and social development and take Into account the necessary 
measures required to guarantee that the peoples of developing countries 
concerned receive the benefit of the Integration and not the foreign 
companies operating within the Integrated area;
and to this end, to adopt the following Programme of Action in the 
fie ld  ©ft
I
PLANNING AND PROJECTION
(a) to identify products and countries In which production can be 
stimulated and exp nd with a view to Increasing existing Income and 
trade exchange;
(b) to Identify projects and programmes for which Import require­
ments capable of being met from developing countries are like ly  to 
arise, and
(c) to define as closely as possible financing and technological 
requirements to secure increases 1n production and to support expansion 
of trade flows amongst developing countries.
mn
TRADE, CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(a) to organise exchange of Information In regard to products of 
export Interest to developing countries;
(b) to provide adequate access to products of export Interest to 
other developing countries, especially by preferential reduction of
Import duties i
(c) to negotiate long-term purchases and sale agreements In res­
pect of Industrial raw materials and to orient policies of o ffic ia l
procurement organizations In favour of developing countries;
(d) to evolve payment arrangement to support expansion of trade 
exchange amongst developing countries;
(e) to fa c ilita te  transit tra ffic  for the diversification and the 
expansion of the external trade of landlocked countries;
( f )  to fa c ilita te  International tra ffic  across overland transit
highways crossing International borders amongst developl g countries;
(g) to encourage travel and tourism amongst developing countries.
I l l
INDUSTRIAL, MINERAL, AGRICULTURAL AND MARINE PRODUCTION
( i )  to exchange Information on needs and resources of different
developing countries In respect of technical know-how, research, 
consultancy services, experts and training fa c ilit ie s ; and
(b) to Institute and Intensify programmes of co-operation at bi­
la te ra l, regional and Inter-regional levels to combine needs and resour­
ces of developing countries for furthering one another's production 
programmes and projects;
(c) to co-ordinate through policies and measures for the u tiliza ­
tion In their national Interest their mineral and marine resources and 
far the protection of the maritime environment,
IV
DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE
(a) to fac ilita te  mutual co-operation In preparing pre-investment 
surveys and In executing projects for the development of one another's 
infrastructure In the fie ld  of road and ra il communication, Irrigation  
and power; and
(b) to concert measures for transforming the prevailing systems
of cmmwjnlcations, transport and commercial sarvlces previously design­
ed to link metropolitan countries to their dependent territories so as 
to promote direct commerce, contact and co-operation amongst developing 
countries.
mv
APPLICATION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
{») to organize means and measures to share one another's expe­
rience In the application of science and technology to processes of 
econortc and social development;
(b) to Institute schemes of co-operation for the acquisition of 
skills relevant to their situation and 1n particular to promote ex­
change of trainees and experts and thus provide for optimum use and 
efficiency of their specialised technological and scientific Institu­
tions; and
(c) to devise programmes for adoption of technology to the special 
needs of countries in different stages of development, and to provide 
for Its  widest possible diffusion to developing countries and fort the 
conservation of their technical skills and personnel In consonance with 
their needs and conditions,
VI
MECHANISM
To facilitate contact, exchange of Information, co-ordination and 
consultations among Governments and concerned organizations and Institu­
tions to further mutual co-operation and Integration for Implementing 
the programmes of action,
C. URGE THE UNITED NATIONS
to fu lf il  the objectives enshrined In the Charter "to promote social 
progress and better standards of l i fe  In larger freedom”;
to employ International machinery to brine about a rapid transforma­
tion of the world economic system, particularly In the field of trade, 
finance and technology so that economic domination yields to concmlc 
cooperation and economic strength Is used for the benefit of the world
community;
to view the developmental process In a global context and to adopt 
a programme of International action for utilization of world resources 
In mem and materials, science and technology, benefiting developed and 
developing countries alike;
to adopt at their Commemorative Meeting a Declaration on the Interna­
tional strategy providing for the following:
I
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
(a) International co-operation for economic development Is not a 
one sided process of donor-donee relationship; the development of deve­
loping countries 1s a benefit to the whole world. Including the more 
advanced nations;
(b) The aim of International economic co-operation should be to 
provide a dynamic combination of the world's production, market and
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technological factors to promote a rational division of labour ami a 
humane sharing of Its fru its ; International co-operation should streng­
then the capability of developing countries to exercise fu lly their 
sovereignty over their natural resources;
(c) A rapid transformation of the world economic system should 
be achieved through the adoption of convergent and concomitant poli­
cies and measures so that the develoolng and developed countries be­
come partners, on a basis of eguallty and mutual benefit, In a common 
endeavour for peace, progress and prosperity,
(d) The essential purpose of development Is to provide equal oppor­
tunity foraa better l ife  to everyone; the aim should, therefore, be
to accelerate significantly the growth of gross product per head so 
that I t  Is possible to secure for everyone a minimum standard of l ife  
consistent with human dignity;
I I
POLICIES AND MEASURES
(a) Since primary commodities constitute a preponderant source of 
foreign Income for most developing countries, provision should be made 
for maximising their consumption, diversifying their utilisation, se­
curing for producers a fa ir and equitable return, organising their 
production on the basis of endowment factors, and securing for develop­
ing countries an increasing share of the growth In comsmption; un­
finished action to conclude commodity agreements should be completed
by 1972;
(b) International action should be taken to promote processing of 
primary products In areas of production and to provide access to consu­
ming markets of processed products♦ free from all ta r if f  and non-tariff 
barriers;
( t )  The scheme of non-dlscrlmlnatory non-reciprocal preferences 
In favour of products of developing countries Is 1:. demented without 
further delay;
fd) Other measures should be undertaken to 'ecure for developing 
countries an Increasing share of International trade in manufactured 
and semi-manufactured goods, especially t .rough adjustment of produc­
tion structures In developed countries;
(e) A distinction should be made botween transfer of resources 
Intended to promote development of developing countries and commercially 
motivated Investments;
(f )  The new flow of financial transfers from .eveloped to develop­
ing countries should correspond, by 1972, to a minimum of 1 per cent 
of the QNP of each developed country, 3/4 cf which should be from o ffi­
cial sources;
in) Financial transfer for development should be united and provi­
ded on terms and conditions compatible with the efficiency of the 
developmental progress;
(h) Appropriate measures should be adopted to alleviate the burdon
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of debts on developing countries;
(1) A link between Special Drawing Rights and development fin ­
ance should be established by 1972;
(J) Steps should be taken to enable developing co„.itr1es to 
extend their merchant marines, to develop their shipbuilding Indus­
tries , and to Improve end modernize their ports. Urgent action Is 
needed to restrain the alarming Increase In freight rates and to e l i ­
minate discriminatory and restrictive elements from I t .  Consultation 
machinery for the solution of d ifficulties of shippers from developing 
countries needs to be Improved to increase Its efficiency;
(k) Concerted measures should be undertaken to bridge the widen­
ing gap In the technological skills between developing and developed 
countries, to fac ilitate  diffusion of technology, patented and non- 
pi ten ted, on reasonable terms and conditions, and to ensure that trans­
fers of technology are free from Illegitimate restraints. An appro­
priate International mechanism should be devised to Implement these 
measures;
(1) Provision should be made to expand research and development 
on materials with which developing countries are endowed. Arrangements 
should also be made for their nationals and Institutions to build up 
scientific capabilities;
jm) Within the framework of international development strategy, 
special measures should be taken to Imorove the productive capacities 
and develop the Infra-structure of least developed. Including land-locked 
countries so as to enable them to drive fu ll benefit from convergent 
aid eoncommltant measures; end
(n) Mutual contact and co-operation amongst developing countries 
U  an Indispensable element In the global strategy. The developed 
countries should support the In itiative of developing countries In this 
regard and pay special attention to concrete proposals that may be put 
forward by them to this end,
D. DECLARE THEIR DETERMINATION
C«) to undertike sustained and continuous endeavours within the 
Wilted Nations sysvm to secure faithful Implementation of international 
development policies and programmes;
(b) to further the unity and solidarity of the Srouo of 77 at all 
lew is including the convening of a ministerial meeting to prepare for 
UNCTAD 3;
(e| to review and appraise oerlodlcally the progress of mutual co­
operation In the field of development In pursuance of the programme of 
action; and
(dl to seek ways and means for strengthening the capabilities of 
the United Nations system, to fu lf i l  Its commitments to social and 
economic progress,'
4. Yugoslav Survey, Y. XI (4), 1970; pp.113-124,
__ i
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APPENDIX F
THE ALGIERS CONFERENCE
CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
According to tho offic ial H i t ,  the following countries were represent­
ed at the conferencei
Full members (76)i Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, 
BanfTaiesF, IHir&n, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia (by Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk), Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, 
Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey* Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia* Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia* South Vietnam (PRO), Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Yemen Arab Republic 
(North Yemen), Yemen (Democratic People's Republic, 1 ,i. South Yemen), 
Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.
Observers (9}s Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico 
Panama* Wgu'ay, Venezuela.
Guests (5 )t Austria, Finland, Sweden.
tCountries with observer status were entitled to participate on a 
consultative basis, but not to vote, and were not bound by decisions 
reached. Guest countries were only entitled to follow the proceedings
of the conference,)
The following International organizations were also represented at 
the conferencei the United Nations (by Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Its Secretary 
General), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, and 
the African, Asian and Latin American Solidarity Organization,
Representatives of 14 "liberation movements" recognized by the OAU 
were also present at the conference, as well as Mr. Yasser Arafat, of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Mr, Juan Marla Bras, of the 
Socialist Party of Puerto Rico.
Heads of State present Included the Emperor Halle Selassie of 
Ethiopia, King Blrendra of Nepal, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, General 
Gowon of Nigeria and Colonel Kadhafl of Libya, as well as President 
Boumedlenne (Algeria), M1combero (Burundi), Ahldjo (Cameroon), Bokassa 
(Central African Republic), Ngouabl (Congo), (Archbishop) Makarlos 
(Cyprus), Karekou (Dahomey), Sadat (Egypt), Bongo (Gabon), Houpbouit- 
Bolgny (Ivory Coast), Tolbert (Liberia), Mousse Traore (Mall), Quid 
Daddah (Mauritania), Hamanl Dlorl (Niger), Habyallmana (Rwanda),
Senghor (Senegal), SIaka Stevens (Sierra Leone), Siyad Barreh (Somalia), 
Nemery (sudan), Assad (Syria), Nyero (Tanzania), Eyadema (Togo), 
Bmirgulba (Tunisia), Amin (Uganda), Sheikh Zald el Nahyame (United Arab
mEmlrites), imrfiarji (Upper Volta), el Irlanl (North Yemen), Rubai All 
(South Yemen), Tito (Yugrslavla), Mobutu (Zaire) and Kaunda (Zambia),
Prime Ministers attending the conference were: Sheikh Mujlbur 
Rahman (Bangladesh), Dr. Fidel Castro (Cuba), M. Lansana Beivogul 
(Guinea), Mr. Forbes Burnham (Guyana), Mrs, Gandhi (India), Mr, Manley 
(Jamaica), Mr. Rlfal (Jordan), Chief Leabua Jonathan (Lesotho), Tun 
Abdul Raxak (Malaysia), Mr. Mlntoff (Malta), Mr. Gaitan Duval (Mauritius) 
Mr. Ahmed Osman (Momcco), Dr, Eric Williams (Trinidad and Tobago), 
and General Mercado Jarrin (Peru).
Other member-countries were represented by their Vice-Presidents, 
Foreign or other Ministers, or Ambassadors.
Notable absentees Included King Hassan I I  of Morocco ("for health 
reasons"). King Hussein of Jordan, and Presidents Allande of Chile 
(who expressed regret at his Inability to attend the conference because 
of the internal situation In his country), Sekou Tour# of Guinea, and 
Suharto of Indonesia.
THE POLITICAL DECLARATION
The political declaration, which was largely based on an Algerian 
draft, dealt with the following principal points:
Dfttente between Big Powers. While welcoming the East: West dltente, 
the Third World was far from assured of general peace as long as there 
continued to be "colonial wars, Imperialist aggression and foreign 
occupation".
Middle East "Israel's persistence In Its defiance of the Interna- 
tlo n iT ^S E E iiy  and the U.N. w ill Induce the non-aligned countries to 
take measures (against Israel) collectively and Individually. In 
addition to demanding "the Immediate and unconditional withdrawal of 
Israel from all occupied territories", the declaration referred to the 
non-aligned countries' undertaking to "aid Egypt, Syria and Jordan In 
liberating their occupied terrltorles by a ll means and demanded that 
the U.S.A. should "refrain from supplying Israel with arms or any 
politica l, economic or financial support enabling I t  to pursue Its  
aggressive end expansionist policy".
Latin America. The conference demanded the recognition of„"theJn- 
allehaBTe r 1 #  fd Independence of the non-aligned countries of Latin 
America s t i l l  under colonial domination", and supported In particular 
■the struggle of the people of Puerto Rico for Independence". I t  also 
called for the surrender to their legitimate owner: cf the U.S. military 
bases In Cuba, Panama and Puerto Rico; supported the "struggle of the 
Latin American countries for affirmation of their sovereignty and the re­
covery of their natural resources"; and In particular endorsed Panama s 
claim to sovereignty over the Canal Zone.
Liberation Movements. Reaffirming their solidarity with the llbera- 
tlon movements in Africa, the non-aligned countries denounced the aid 
received by Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia from certain NATO member- 
countries", and expressed the view that I t  was "urgent to end the col©nit 
presence In the so-called Spanish Sahara, Djibouti, the Comoro Islands, 
and the Seychelles*.
17?
Indo-Chlne The conference Invited the non-aligned countries to 
support to PftS of South Vietnam and to "proceed* immediately to recog­
nize the Government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as “the sole legitimate 
and legal Government of Cambodia", while condemning “the miliary inter­
vention of the United States and its allies In Cambodia",
Other Matters. The conference called for the holding of an inter- 
national conference on disarmament with the participation of all States, 
and also "the suspension of the French nuclear tests".
The conference further endorsed the 200-mile territoria l waters 
lim it and stressed the urgency of holding the proposed Conference on 
the Law of the Sea,
The declaration also referred to "the continuing deterioration of 
economic conditions in developing countries" and the “threat* to their 
sovereignty by "neo-colonialist exploitation, especially by multinational 
companies",
THE ECONOMIC DECLARATION
The economic declaration emphasized that “the determination of the 
large majority of the developed countries to perpetuate the economic 
order for their own exclusive benefit* had "practically nullified a ll the 
non-aligned countries1 attempts to achieve progress”. In this context 
the declaration noted that “the enlargement of the EEC has taken place 
without providing for policies and actions that benefit the less develop­
ed countries as a whole".
The declaration contained a number of proposals for a common posture 
of non-aligned and other developing countries to be adopted In future 
multilateral trade negotiations.
These proposals Included: acceptance of the principles of non­
discrimination and preferential treatment for developing countries; 
an expansion of the generalized system of preferences; and inclusion 
of preferential treatment for developing countries In any reform of 
International trade or of the rules of GATT,
The non-aligned countries, I t  was announced, had agreed on the 
following measures:
(a) The creation of an economic and social development fund open 
to participation by a ll non-aligned countries for the purpose of 
promoting investment and financing development projects and technical 
assistance.
(b) Prior authorization and government control of foreign invest­
ments, the securing of assurances that authorized foreign Investments 
would net be prejudicial to national development plans and would 
generate new employment, and the limitation of foreign investments to 
n@n-strateg1e sectors of national economies,
(c) Reinvested profits from foreign Investments to be ccisldered 
as new investments subject to prior control,
fd) A “code of conduct* for the activities of “transnational and 
multinational companies".
(e) Reaffirmation of the right of any State to nationalize the 
assets of foreign companies In order to recover Its  natural resources.
(f)  Co-ordination of the action of member-States In order to 
achieve a reform of the world's economic and financial system.
(g) A demand fo r  the urgent convening of a joint conference of 
FAO and UNCTAD to examine the world's food shortages.
OTHER DECISIONS
Among the resolutions adopted by the conference was one calling for 
a boycott of Israel.
The resolution specifically welcomed "the decision of certain 
member-eountrles to break off diplomatic relations with Israel", and 
requested all countries “to take steps to boycott Israel diplomatically, 
economically, m ilitarily  and culturally, as well as In the field  of a ir 
and sea transport. In accordance with Chapter VII of the II,N. Charter ,
In a resolution on Cambodia, the conference recognized the "legi­
timacy and legality” of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Government and called 
upon a ll "peace-loving* Governments to do the sane.
I t  was announced during the conference that Jamaica had offered 
U.S. $160,000, and the United Arab Emirates $500,000, to the "national 
liberation movements”.
The conference also decided that the next summit conference of the 
non-aligned movement should be held In Colombo (Sri Lanka) In 1976, and 
that meanwhile the conference bureau In Algiers should serve as a co­
ordinating organ. The conference thus did not agree to set un perma­
nent organs, as suggested by Yugoslavia and other member-countries.
Among proposals submitted to the conference and not pursued was one 
by Libya, f irs t made at. the Foreign Ministers' meeting, and later 
presented to the conference by Mr. Abdel Latlf Labldl, the Libyan Foreign 
Minister.
This proposal called for (1) a "new definition" and stricter Interpre­
tation of non-alignment; (2) the exclusion of the U.S. and Soviet navies 
from the Mediterranean and the removal of mines laid during colonialist 
and Imperialist wars”; and (3) reparations to be paid by the big Powers 
to their former colonial territories. The proposal had been endorsed 
by a small group of member-States, among them Burundi, Cambodia,
Equatorial Guinea and Somalia, I t  was pointed out that a "stricter 
Interpretation" of non-alignment would embarrass Morocco, Ethiopia and 
Cyprus, which permitted Western military bases, and Syria and Iraq, 
which had military aid agreements with the Soviet Union.
President Boumedlenne declared In his closing speech: "Following 
the meetings In Peking, Moscow and Washington, and the European conference 
In Helsinki, the Algiers conference became more than ever necessary to 
show that decisions effect*ng all of us to the highest degree cannot be 
taken without the Third World?" The common denominator of the non- 
aligned countries, he said, was that they were undeveloped and relatively 
weak, having suffered from colonial or economic domination. Now that 
the great Powers had reached a dltento, the non-aligned countries would
be the battlefields of future conflicts - political, economic, and 
v illta ry . The Third World, he affirmed, must "count on its  own 
strength* and In the coming period i t  would be "the motor of history",S
6, K-t1nj^<ytemporary Archives, October 1-7, 1971, pp. 26117-
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